The Battle for Britain : Interservice Rivalry between the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy, 1909#x96 ; 1940

"The Battle for Britain is a provocative reinterpretation of both British air and naval power from 1909 to 1940. Anthony Cumming challenges the view that the Battle of Britain was a decisive victory won solely by the Royal Air Force through independent airpower operations. By re-evaluating the early stage of the Mediterranean conflict and giving special emphasis to naval battles such as Calabria and Taranto, Cumming argues that the Royal Navy played an equally important role in defeating Hitler's early advances, buying critical time until the Americans could make a decisive contribution. His argument holds that the RAF's role as an independent arm has been exaggerated and that contemporary strategists can learn from investing too much confidence in independent airpower."-- Provided by publisher The book is a short review of British air and naval power from 1909 -1940 and represents an attack upon “independent” airpower. When Bleriot became the first man to fly the English Channel in a heavier-than-air flying machine in 1909, it seemed to mark the beginning of a fundamental decline in British attitudes towards maritime defense. Exploiting prevalent invasion paranoia, press baron, Lord Northcliffe invited distinguished writers such as William Le Queue and H G Wells to write articles on the theme “We are no longer an Island”. Bleriot’s exploit encouraged the politicians to reassess how Britain would be defended in the future. An important government committee heard evidence that led directly to the forming of the Royal Flying Corps – an organization that initially included army and naval wings. Superficially, the Royal Navy was moving from strength to strength as it expanded in the naval arms race with Germany. The service remained in high public esteem but a section of the ruling Liberal party wanted money diverted for welfare – a new and powerful competitor for funds. The Two-Power Standard was quietly dropped in 1909 and the astronomical costs of battleship building forced the Navy to look for cheaper substitutes such as submarines and aircraft. A forceful critic of naval expenditure, Winston S. Churchill fostered the early development of airpower when he became First Lord in 1911 and continued to do so when out of office. The German air raids of 1917 panicked the wartime government into making an ill-considered merger of naval and army air arms that supported imaginative but untried theories of airpower. In 1938, a later government submitted to the national psychosis of bombing by allowing the Royal Air Force to be the only service to rearm without regard to the nation’s ability to afford it. In 1940, the contribution of the Royal Navy was minimized as Churchill praised the RAF for saving the nation from invasion in the Battle of Britain. As a result the RAF’s story has achieved an iconic status that is part of British national identity. Consequently, more important operations including the Dunkirk evacuation; Battle of the Atlantic; Battle of Mers El Kebir and the naval operations against the Italian fleet have been underrated and misunderstood. This ultimate justification of independent airpower continues to undermine understandings of maritime defense and may have skewed US and UK defense policies in the wrong direction for decades. The book is a short review of British air and naval power from 1909 -1940 and represents an attack upon #x93;independent" airpower. When Bleriot became the first man to fly the English Channel in a heavier-than-air flying machine in 1909, it seemed to mark the beginning of a fundamental decline in British attitudes towards maritime defense. Exploiting prevalent invasion paranoia, press baron, Lord Northcliffe invited distinguished writers such as William Le Queue and H G Wells to write articles on the theme #x93;We are no longer an Island". Bleriot's exploit encouraged the politicians to reassess how Britain would be defended in the future. An important government committee heard evidence that led directly to the forming of the Royal Flying Corps #x96; an organization that initially included army and naval wings. Superficially, the Royal Navy was moving from strength to strength as it expanded in the naval arms race with Germany. The service remained in high public esteem but a section of the ruling Liberal party wanted money diverted for welfare #x96; a new and powerful competitor for funds. The Two-Power Standard was quietly dropped in 1909 and the astronomical costs of battleship building forced the Navy to look for cheaper substitutes such as submarines and aircraft. A forceful critic of naval expenditure, Winston S. Churchill fostered the early development of airpower when he became First Lord in 1911 and continued to do so when out of office. The German air raids of 1917 panicked the wartime government into making an ill-considered merger of naval and army air arms that supported imaginative but untried theories of airpower. In 1938, a later government submitted to the national psychosis of bombing by allowing the Royal Air Force to be the only service to rearm without regard to the nation's ability to afford it. In 1940, the contribution of the Royal Navy This Persuasive Study Attacks The Key Myths Surrounding The Battle Of Britain To Revise The Relative Status Of Maritime And Aviation Factors In The Defense Of Britain. Without Denigrating The Heroism Of The Fighter Pilots, Anthony Cumming Challenges The Effectiveness Of The Royal Air Force In 1940 And Gives The Royal Navy Much Greater Prominence Than Others Have. He Vigorously Asserts The Ability Of British Warships To Frustrate German Plans For Operation Sea Lion And To Repel Luftwaffe Attacks. The Author Argues That The Raf Took The Lion S Share Of The Glory Only Because Its Colorful Image Could Easily Be Used To Manipulate American Opinion. Cumming Contends That The 70th Anniversary Of The Battle Of Britain Should Celebrate The Contributions Of The Many Rather Than Focusing On The Pilot Elite, An Assertion Certain To Provoke Discussion.