The Arrow and the Point: Russell and Wittgenstein's Tractatus (Logos) (Logos, 11)

The book aims at a comprehensive account of the relationship between Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Russell’s philosophy as it developed between 1903 and 1918. The focus is on the central nucleus of the Tractatus, i.e., on its ontology and the picture theory of language. On Russell’s side, the multiple-relation theory of judgment has been chosen as the leading theme around which the presentation of several other issues is organized. Whereas the similarity between Russell’s and Wittgenstein’s problems is pointed out, the deep difference between their solutions is acknowledged, in particular with reference to the opposition between objects and names on the one hand, and facts and propositions on the other. Contents Introduction Part I. Falsehood, negation, and logical constants 1. Russell: from the binary to the multiple-relation theory of judgment 2. The reasons leading to the multiple-relation theory of judgment 3. Meinong and Russell on being and existence 4. Wittgenstein on bivalence and bipolarity 5. Russell on negation 6. Wittgenstein (and Russell) on negation and bipolarity 7. Sense, meaning, and Sachverhalte 8. Symmetry and asymmetry between true and false 9. The Grundgedanke: Wittgenstein on logical constants 10. Molecularity and Sachlage Part II. Facts 1. Russell and Bradley: the unity of the proposition and the doubleaspectproblems 2. Difficulties and further developments of the multiple-relation theoryof judgment 3. Judgment and logical form 4. Wittgenstein and the failure of the Theory of Knowledge 5. Facts, things, and bipolarity 6. Troubles with Sachverhalte 7. The nature of the proposition 8. Pictures, propositions, thoughts, and projection Part III. Objects and form 1. Atomism and objects 2. Relations, objects, and form 3. Sense and nonsense 4. Russell and Wittgenstein on the nature of philosophy References Main description: The book aims at a comprehensive account of the relationship between Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Russell's philosophy as it developed between 1903 and 1918. The focus is on the central nucleus of the Tractatus, i.e., on its ontology and the picture theory of language. On Russell's side, the multiple-relation theory of judgment has been chosen as the leading theme around which the presentation of several other issues is organized. Whereas the similarity between Russell's and Wittgenstein's problems is pointed out, the deep difference between their solutions is acknowledged, in particular with reference to the opposition between objects and names on the one hand, and facts and propositions on the other "The book aims at a comprehensive account of the relationship between Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Russell's philosophy as it developed between 1903 and 1918. The focus is on the central nucleus of the Tractatus, i.e., on its ontology and the picture theory of language. On Russell's side, the multiple-relation theory of judgment has been chosen as the leading theme around which the presentation of several other issues is organized. Whereas the similarity between Russell's and Wittgenstein's problems is pointed out, the deep difference between their solutions is acknowledged, in particular with reference to the opposition between objects and names on the one hand, and facts and propositions on the other."--Jacket. This series provides a forum for cutting-edge studies in logic and the modern philosophy of language as well as for publications in the field of analytical metaphysics.