The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy (Oxford Studies in Democratization)

in This Fascinating Exploration Of Democracy, Reynolds Assembles Prominent Scholars To Discuss The Successes And Failures Of Constitutional Design. Chapters Analyze The Effects Of Presidential And Parliamentary Systems, Issues Of Federalism And Autonomy, And The Varying Impact Of Electoral Systems, Concluding With Notable Case Studies Of Fiji, Ireland, Eritrea, Indonesia, Nigeria, And India. The Culmination Of The Study Of Constitutional Engineering In The Third Wave Of Democracy, This Important Work Sets Parameters For Crucial Research As Democracy Diffuses Across The World. Democratic design is increasingly seen as the key to crafting stability in the fragile states of the developing world. Getting the democratic institutions right may not guarantee success but getting them wrong has led to violent collapse in many socially divided states. The Architecture of Democracy brings together both theory and case study evidence to provide the reader with an excellent overview of the cutting edge of academic debate and its practical implications for democratic design in the 21st century. The discipline of constitutional engineering reached maturity in the 1990s with theories of ethnic polarization and democratic conflict management being applied in trouble spots across the globe. Andrew Reynolds brings together the leading lights of the discipline to discuss the successes and failures of constitutional design. The two icons of modern constitutional design, Arend Lijphart and Donald Horowitz, lead off by debating their own contributions to the field. Then Olga Shvetsova, Timothy Frye, and José Antônio Cheibub, present important new evidence from Europe, the Central and Eastern Europe/Asia, and Latin America. Steven Solnick, Yash Ghai, Pippa Norris, and Rein Taagepera analyze the effects of presdential and parliamentary systems, issues of federalism and autonomy, and the varying impact of electoral systems. The book concludes with Brij Lal's case study of Fiji, Brendan O'Leary on Northern Ireland, Bereket Habte Selassie on Eritrea, William Liddle on Indonesia, Rotimi Suburu and Larry Diamond on Nigeria, and David Stuligross and Ashutosh Varshney on India. The Architecture of Democracy is the culmination of the study of constitutional engineering in the third wave of democracy and sets parameters for this crucial research as democracy diffuses across the world. Introduction : Institutional Design, Conflict Management, And Democracy / Katharine Belmont, Scott Mainwaring, And Andrew Reynolds -- Constitutional Design : Proposals Versus Processes / Donald L. Horowitz -- The Wave Of Power-sharing Democracy / Arend Lijphart -- Institutions And Coalition-building In Post-communist Transitions / Olga Shvetsova -- Presidents, Parliaments, And Democracy : Insights From The Post-communist World / Timothy Frye -- Presidentialism And Democratic Performance / José Antonio Cheibub -- Constitutional Asymmetries : Communal Representation, Federalism, And Cultural Autonomy / Yash Pal Ghai -- Federalism And State-building : Post-communist And Post-colonial Perspectives / Steven L. Solnick -- Ballots Not Bullets : Testing Consociational Theories Of Ethnic Conflict, Electoral Systems, And Democratization / Pippa Norris -- Designing Electoral Rules And Waiting For An Electoral System To Evolve / Rein Taagepera -- Constitutional Engineering In Post-coup Fiji / Brij V. Lal -- The Belfast Agreement And The British-irish Agreement : Consociation, Confederal Institutions, A Federacy, And A Peace Process / Brendan O'leary -- The Eritrean Experience In Constitution Making : The Dialectic Of Process And Substance / Bereket Habte Selassie -- Indonesia's Democratic Transition : Playing By The Rules / R. William Liddle -- Institutional Design, Ethnic Conflict Management, And Democracy In Nigeria / Rotimi T. Suberu And Larry Diamond -- Ethnic Diversities, Constitutional Designs, And Public Policies In India / David Stuligross And Ashutosh Varshney. Edited By Andrew Reynolds. Includes Bibliographical References (p. [459]-487) And Index. Contents List of Figures List of Tables Contributors Introduction: Institutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy I: Institutional Design in Divided Societies: An Overview 1. Constitutional Design: Proposals versus Processes 2. The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy 3. Institutions and Coalition-Building in Post-Communist Transitions II: Presidentialism, Federalism and Decentralization, and Electoral Systems 4. Presidents, Parliaments, and Democracy: Insights from the Post-Communist World 5. Presidentialism and Democratic Performance 6. Constitutional Asymmetries: Communal Representation, Federalism, and Cultural Autonomy 7. Federalism and State-Building: Post-Communist and Post-Colonial Perspectives 8. Ballots Not Bullets: Testing Consociational Theories of Ethnic Conflict, Electoral Systems, and Democratization 9. Designing Electoral Rules and Waiting for an Electoral System III: Country Studies 10. Constitutional Engineering in Post-Coup Fiji 11. The Belfast Agreement and the British-Irish Agreement: Consociation, Confederal Institutions, a Federacy, and a Peace Process 12. The Eritrean Experience in Constitution Making: The Dialectic of Process and Substance 13. Indonesia's Democratic Transition: Playing by the Rules 14. Institutional Design, Ethnic Conflict Management, and Democracy in Nigeria 15. Ethnic Diversities, Constitutional Designs, and Public Policies in India References Index A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z This text discusses the successes and failures of constitutional design. Chapters analyse the effect of presidential and parliamentary systems, federalism and autonomy, and electoral systems Constitution-making has become an international and comparative exercise in a way that it rarely was in the century before 1989.