The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information, Second Edition (Cambridge Surveys of Economic Literature)

There has been explosive progress in the economic theory of uncertainty and information in the past few decades. This subject is now taught not only in departments of economics but also in professional schools and programs oriented toward business, government and administration, and public policy. This book attempts to unify the subject matter in a simple, accessible manner. Part I of the book focuses on the economics of uncertainty; Part II examines the economics of information. This revised and updated second edition places a greater focus on game theory. New topics include posted-price markets, mechanism design, common-value auctions, and the one-shot deviation principle for repeated games This Second Edition, With A Greater Focus On Game Theory, Attempts To Unify Recent Developments In Economic Theories Of Uncertainty And Information For Students. Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- Elements Of Decision Under Uncertainty -- Risk-bearing: The Optimum Of The Individual -- Comparative Statics Of The Risk-bearing Optimum -- Market Equilibrium Under Uncertainty -- Information And Informational Decisions -- Information And Markets -- Strategic Uncertainty And Equilibrium Concepts -- Informational Asymmetry And Contract Design -- Competition And Hidden Knowledge -- Market Institutions -- Long-run Relationships And The Credibility Of Threats And Promises -- Information Aggregation, Transmission, And Acquisition. Sushil Bikhchandani, University Of California, Los Angeles, Jack Hirshleifer, John G. Riley, University Of California, Los Angeles. Includes Bibliographical References And Index. Every individual must choose among acts - or synonymously, he or she must make decisions, or select among actions, options, or moves.