The Analysis of Knowing: A Decade of Research (Princeton Legacy Library, 4914)

This book is the first complete survey and critical appraisal of the large body of research that has appeared during approximately the last decade concerning the analysis of knowing. Robert K. Shope pays special attention to the social aspects of knowing and proposes a new formulation of the fundamental structure of the Gettier problem. Originally published in 1983. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. 1. The Significance of the Gettier Problem for an Analysis of Knowing (pp. 3-44) A certain account of knowing has often seemed to represent simple common sense, and was, indeed, regarded as obviously correct by one of the greatest epistemologists, Immanuel Kant (see Section 2). Edmund Gettier has characterized any such ‘standard analysis’ of personS’s knowing thatpas having a form similar to the following analysis: (A1)Sknows thatpif and only if (i)pis true, (ii)Sbelieves thatp, and (iii)Sis justified in believing thatp. (Gettier 1963, p. 121)1 Such an analysis treats conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) as individually necessary and jointly sufficient... 2. Additions to Standard Analyses I: Subjunctive Conditionals (pp. 45-80) Certain modifications, of a standard analysis of knowing involve what are commonly called “defeasibility conditions,” but there is no agreement about the definition of that technical label. For example, Steven Levy speaks of a defeasibility condition in an analysis of knowledge as “a requirement to the effect that forSto know thatpthere must be no other evidence againstpstrong enough to undermineS’s belief thatp, should this evidence come toS’s attention” (Levy 1977, p. 115). However, speaking of undermining belief seems to concern the psychological change consisting in weakening or ending belief, whereas the... 3. Additions to Standard Analyses II: Limitations on the Presence of Falsehoods in Justification (pp. 81-95) There is no way of proving that every possible exploration along the paths considered in the previous chapter is doomed to reach a dead end. But the stumbling blocks that have been encountered call for serious investigation of another path. It is an alternative that rules out certain roles for false propositions in a full account of a justification of propositionpwhich is relevant toS’s believing that proposition. John Dreher has attempted to develop this approach to the Gettier problem by presuming that a standard analysis of knowing employs the phrase, “justified belief,” to mean believing on good... 4. Additions to Standard Analyses III: Limitations on the Justifying Power of Evidence or Grounds (pp. 96-118) Roderick Chisholm has developed an analysis ofS’s knowingpwhich avoids relying on any subjunctive conditionals. He includes a fourth condition of knowledge which requires thatpbe “non-defectively evident forS” in the following sense: Eitherpis certain forS, orpis evident forSand entailed by a conjunction of propositions each having forSa basis which is not a basis of any false proposition forS(Chisholm 1957, p. 109).S’s having a basis of some proposition,h, is understood in the sense ofS’s having at least one basis, which might be... 5. Causal Analyses, Conclusive Reasons Analyses, and Reliability Analyses (pp. 119-170) Some philosophers add a clause concerning causation as a fourth condition of knowledge, while others substitute such a clause for the justification condition in a standard analysis. It is generally agreed that the following simple condition yields an analysis that is too strong: (c1) the state of affairs (fact) thatpis a cause ofS’s believingp. For example, Alvin Goldman has remarked that whenSknows that something is a dog by seeing that it is,S’s percept (and thusS’s belief) is not caused by the animal’s being a dog. Instead, the molecular properties of the animal’s... 6. Deletions from Standard Analyses (pp. 171-200) Critics of a standard analysis of knowing have sometimes faulted it for including the belief condition. Some of their objections depend upon the differing linguistic roles played by “know” and “believe.” Additional objections concern the possibility that knowledge may sometimes be ascribed on the basis of powers or capacities other than ones directly connected with belief. Merrill Ring has argued that the belief condition is not only unnecessary in a suitable account of knowing, but that it is never satisfied in any case of knowing (Ring 1977). Before alluding to various linguistic facts as a basis for his contention, Ring... 7. Falsity and Rational Inquiry—a Solution to the Gettier Problem and a Perspective on Social Aspects of Knowing (pp. 201-238) In this concluding chapter, I shall mainly be concerned to explain the manner in which I proposed to deal with the Gettier problem and the social aspects of knowing near the end of the period with which the present survey is concerned (Shope 1979c; 1979d). What I believe to be the proper approach is partly suggested by the results of our discussion thus far, which may be summarized as follows. The defeasibility analyses considered in Chapter 2 were to some extent successful in classifying instances of knowing because they often exposed the fact that awareness of a falsehood would reveal...