The AEF Way of War : The American Army and Combat in World War I

This 2007 book provides the most comprehensive examination of American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) combat doctrine and methods ever published. It shows how AEF combat units actually fought on the Western Front in World War I. It describes how four AEF divisions (the 1st, 2nd, 26th, and 77th) planned and conducted their battles and how they adapted their doctrine, tactics, and other operational methods during the war. General John Pershing and other AEF leaders promulgated an inadequate prewar doctrine, with only minor modification, as the official doctrine of the AEF. Many early American attacks suffered from these unrealistic ideas that retained too much faith in the infantry rifleman on the modern battlefield. However, many AEF divisions adjusted their doctrine and operational methods as they fought, preparing more comprehensive attack plans, employing flexible infantry formations, and maximizing firepower to seize limited objectives. Cover......Page 1 Half-title......Page 3 Title......Page 5 Copyright......Page 6 Dedication......Page 7 Contents......Page 9 Acknowledgments......Page 11 Introduction......Page 13 The U.S. Army, 1914–1917......Page 22 Pershing and the Creation of the AEF, 1917–1918......Page 37 Doctrinal Development in the AEF, 1918......Page 56 2 The 1st Division......Page 71 Training in France, June 1917–May 1918......Page 72 Cantigny, 28 May 1918......Page 84 The Aisne-Marne Offensive, 18–22 July 1918......Page 95 3 The 1st Division......Page 118 The St. Mihiel Attack, 12–14 September 1918......Page 120 The Meuse-Argonne Offensive, 1–12 October 1918......Page 137 Conclusions......Page 152 4 The 26th “Yankee” Division......Page 154 Organization in the United States, August–September 1917......Page 156 Training in France, November 1917–March 1918......Page 159 Holding the Front Lines, April–June 1918......Page 167 The Aisne-Marne Offensive, 18–25 July 1918......Page 171 The St. Mihiel Attack, 12–13 September 1918......Page 188 The Meuse-Argonne Offensive, 14 October–11 November 1918......Page 199 Conclusions......Page 209 6 The 2nd Division......Page 212 Training in the United States and France, August 1917–May 1918......Page 213 Belleau Wood and Vaux, June–July 1918......Page 218 The Aisne-Marne Offensive, 18–19 July 1918......Page 238 Retraining and Reorganizing, August 1918......Page 250 The St. Mihiel Attack, 12–16 September 1918......Page 253 Blanc Mont Ridge, 2–10 October 1918......Page 264 The Meuse-Argonne Offensive, 1–11 November 1918......Page 278 Conclusions......Page 291 8 The 77th “Liberty” Division......Page 292 Training in the United States, September 1917 to March 1918......Page 293 Training in France, May–August 1918......Page 297 The Vesle-Aisne Offensive, August–September 1918......Page 302 The Argonne, 26 September–16 October 1918......Page 322 To the Meuse, 1–11 November 1918......Page 344 Conclusions......Page 353 10 Conclusions......Page 355 Doctrinal and Operational Adaptation in AEF Divisions......Page 356 Innovation in the AEF: Combat Divisions and GHQ......Page 361 Epilogue: The AEF Legacy and U.S. Army Doctrine......Page 364 Archival Material......Page 377 Published Documents and Manuals......Page 379 Contemporary Journal Articles......Page 380 Memoirs and Other First-Hand Accounts......Page 382 Books......Page 383 Book Chapters and Journal Articles......Page 388 Unpublished Dissertations and Theses......Page 389 Index......Page 391 Cover 1 Half-title 3 Title 5 Copyright 6 Dedication 7 Contents 9 Acknowledgments 11 Introduction 13 1 Doctrine, Dogma, and Development in the AEF 22 The U.S. Army, 1914–1917 22 Pershing and the Creation of the AEF, 1917–1918 37 Doctrinal Development in the AEF, 1918 56 2 The 1st Division 71 Training in France, June 1917–May 1918 72 Cantigny, 28 May 1918 84 The Aisne-Marne Offensive, 18–22 July 1918 95 3 The 1st Division 118 The St. Mihiel Attack, 12–14 September 1918 120 The Meuse-Argonne Offensive, 1–12 October 1918 137 Conclusions 152 4 The 26th “Yankee” Division 154 Organization in the United States, August–September 1917 156 Training in France, November 1917–March 1918 159 Holding the Front Lines, April–June 1918 167 The Aisne-Marne Offensive, 18–25 July 1918 171 5 The 26th “Yankee” Division 188 The St. Mihiel Attack, 12–13 September 1918 188 The Meuse-Argonne Offensive, 14 October–11 November 1918 199 Conclusions 209 6 The 2nd Division 212 Training in the United States and France, August 1917–May 1918 213 Belleau Wood and Vaux, June–July 1918 218 The Aisne-Marne Offensive, 18–19 July 1918 238 7 The 2nd Division 250 Retraining and Reorganizing, August 1918 250 The St. Mihiel Attack, 12–16 September 1918 253 Blanc Mont Ridge, 2–10 October 1918 264 The Meuse-Argonne Offensive, 1–11 November 1918 278 Conclusions 291 8 The 77th “Liberty” Division 292 Training in the United States, September 1917 to March 1918 293 Training in France, May–August 1918 297 The Vesle-Aisne Offensive, August–September 1918 302 9 The 77th “Liberty” Division 322 The Argonne, 26 September–16 October 1918 322 To the Meuse, 1–11 November 1918 344 Conclusions 353 10 Conclusions 355 The Role of Pershing and GHQ 356 Doctrinal and Operational Adaptation in AEF Divisions 356 Innovation in the AEF: Combat Divisions and GHQ 361 Epilogue: The AEF Legacy and U.S. Army Doctrine 364 References 377 Primary Sources 377 Archival Material 377 Published Documents and Manuals 379 Contemporary Journal Articles 380 Memoirs and Other First-Hand Accounts 382 Secondary Sources 383 Books 383 Book Chapters and Journal Articles 388 Unpublished Dissertations and Theses 389 Index 391 This Book Provides The Most Comprehensive Examination Of The American Expeditionary Force's (aef) Combat Doctrine And Methods Ever Published. It Shows How Aef Combat Units Actually Fought On The Western Front In World War I. It Describes How Four Aef Divisions (the 1st, 2nd, 26th, And 77th) Planned And Conducted Their Battles And How They Adapted Their Doctrine, Tactics, And Other Operational Methods During The War.--jacket. Introduction -- 1. Doctine, Dogma, And Development In The Aef -- 2. The 1st Division: Training For And Waging Trench Warfare -- 3. The 1st Division: Masters Of Firepower -- 4. The 26th Yankee Division: Doctrine, Discipline, And Discrimination -- 5. The 26th Yankee Division: Doctrine, Demoralization, And Disintegration -- 6. The 2nd Division: Bloody Lessons In Open Warfare -- 7. The 2nd Division: Masters Of Set-piece Battle -- 8. The 77th Liberty Division: Training For The Trenches And Fighting On The Vesle -- 9. The 77th Liberty Division: Dogma, Delegation, And Discretion -- 10. Conclusions -- References. Mark Ethan Grotelueschen. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 365-377) And Index. This book provides the most comprehensive examination of American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) combat doctrine and methods ever published. It shows how AEF combat units actually fought on the Western Front in World War I. It describes how four AEF divisions (the 1st, 2nd, 26th, and 77th) planned and conducted their battles and how they adapted their doctrine, tactics, and other operational methods during the war. General John Pershing and other AEF leaders promulgated an inadequate prewar doctrine, with only minor modification, as the official doctrine of the AEF. Many early American attacks suffered from these unrealistic ideas that retained too much faith in the infantry rifleman on the modern battlefield. However, many AEF divisions adjusted their doctrine and operational methods as they fought, preparing more comprehensive attack plans, employing flexible infantry formations, and maximizing firepower to seize limited objectives. - Back cover Provides the most comprehensive examination of AEF (American Expeditionary Forces) combat doctrine and methods ever published. It shows how AEF combat units actually fought on the Western Front in World War I. It describes how four AEF divisions (the 1st, 2nd, 26th, and 77th) planned and conducted their battles, and how they adapted their doctrine, tactics, and other operational methods during the war. General John Pershing and other AEF leaders promulgated an inadequate pre-war doctrine, with only minor modification, as the official doctrine of the AEF. Many early American attacks suffered from these unrealistic ideas that retained too much faith in the infantry rifleman on the modern battlefield. However, many AEF divisions adjusted their doctrine and operational methods as they fought, preparing more comprehensive attack plans, employing flexible infantry formations and maximizing firepower to seize limited objectives.