The 25-Year War : America's Military Role in Vietnam

"" On April 30, 1975, Saigon and the government of South Vietnam fell to the communist regime of North Vietnam, ending -- for American military forces -- exactly twenty-five year of courageous but unavailing struggle. This is not the story of how America became embroiled in a conflict in a small country half-way around the globe, nor of why our armed forces remained there so long after the futility of our efforts became obvious to many. It is the story of what went wrong there militarily, and why. The author is a professional soldier who experienced the Vietnam war in the field and in the h.;Cover; Title; Copyright; Contents; Preface; Prologue: 1950-1963; Part I AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM; 1. 1963-1967: The JCS and Vietnam; 2. 1967: Corps Command, Vietnam; 3. 1967-1968: Army HQ, Vietnam; 4. 1968-1969: The Transition Years; 5. 1969-1971: Vietnamization; 6. 1972-1973: Cease-Fire Achieved; Illustrations; 7. 1973-1975: The Final War Years; Part II ASSESSMENT; 8. American Operational Performance; 9. American Strategy; 10. The Larger Lessons; Notes; Glossary of Acronyms; Selected Bibliography; Index.

On April 30, 1975, Saigon and the government of South Vietnam fell to the communist regime of North Vietnam, ending -- for American military forces -- exactly twenty-five year of courageous but unavailing struggle. This is not the story of how America became embroiled in a conflict in a small country half-way around the globe, nor of why our armed forces remained there so long after the futility of our efforts became obvious to many. It is the story of what went wrong there militarily, and why. The author is a professional soldier who experienced the Vietnam war in the field and in the highest command echelons. General Palmer's insights into the key events and decisions that shaped American's military role in Vietnam are uncommonly perceptive. America's most serious error, he believes, was committing its armed forces to a war in which neither political nor military goals were ever fully articulated by our civilian leaders. Our armed forces, lacking clear objectives, failed to develop an appropriate strategy, instead relinquishing the offensive to Hanoi. Yet an achievable strategy could have been devised, Palmer believes. Moreover, our South Vietnamese allies could have been bolstered by appropriate aid but were instead overwhelmed by the massive American military presence. Compounding these errors were the flawed civilian and military chains of command. The result was defeat for America and disaster for South Vietnam. General Palmer presents here an insider's history of the war and an astute critique of America's military strengths and successes as well as its weaknesses and failures.

" On April 30, 1975, Saigon and the government of South Vietnam fell to the communist regime of North Vietnam, ending -- for American military forces -- exactly twenty-five year of courageous but unavailing struggle. This is not the story of how America became embroiled in a conflict in a small country half-way around the globe, nor of why our armed forces remained there so long after the futility of our efforts became obvious to many. It is the story of what went wrong there militarily, and why. The author is a professional soldier who experienced the Vietnam war in the field and in the highest command echelons. General Palmer's insights into the key events and decisions that shaped American's military role in Vietnam are uncommonly perceptive. America's most serious error, he believes, was committing its armed forces to a war in which neither political nor military goals were ever fully articulated by our civilian leaders. Our armed forces, lacking clear objectives, failed to develop an appropriate strategy, instead relinquishing the offensive to Hanoi. Yet an achievable strategy could have been devised, Palmer believes. Moreover, our South Vietnamese allies could have been bolstered by appropriate aid but were instead overwhelmed by the massive American military presence. Compounding these errors were the flawed civilian and military chains of command. The result was defeat for America and disaster for South Vietnam. General Palmer presents here an insider's history of the war and an astute critique of America's military strengths and successes as well as its weaknesses and failures An American army general presents an insider's history of the Vietnam War with “a tough, dispassionate, common-sense analysis” of what went wrong (Baltimore Sun). On April 30, 1975, Saigon and the government of South Vietnam fell to the communist regime of North Vietnam, ending twenty-five years of struggle for American military forces. This is the story of what went wrong there militarily, and why. General Bruce Palmer experienced the Vietnam War in the field and in the highest command echelons. America's most serious error, he believes, was committing its armed forces to a war in which neither political nor military goals were ever fully articulated by our civilian leaders. Our armed forces, lacking clear objectives, failed to develop an appropriate strategy, instead relinquishing the offensive to Hanoi. Yet an achievable strategy could have been devised, Palmer believes. Moreover, our South Vietnamese allies could have been bolstered by appropriate aid but were instead overwhelmed by the massive American military presence. Compounding these errors were the flawed civilian and military chains of command. The result was defeat for America and disaster for South Vietnam. “Perhaps the best single account of the Vietnam War by a military man.” —Baltimore Sun From May 1st, 1950, the day President Truman authorized the first U.S. military assistance to Indochina, to April 30th, 1975, the day Saigon fell to the North Vietnamese regime, America was engaged in the longest conflict in its history. This is the story of what went wrong. Bruce Palmer was the Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army from 1968 to 1973. His insights into the key events and decisions that shaped America's military role in Vietnam are uncommonly perceptive. In this penetrating work, he not only presents an insider's history of the war, but also gives an astute critique of America's military strengths and weaknesses. This book is certain to become a standard reference for anyone seriously interested in how America lost the Vietnam war. The period 1963-65 was one of the most tumultuous times for the United States in all its history, for these years saw American military power committed to a war in Indochina which was to divide Americans to a degree unprecedented since the Civil War a hundred years before.