Tamed Village ?democracy?: Elections, Governance And Clientelism In A Contemporary Chinese Village (understanding China)

Wang's book offers an empirically rich and conceptually nuanced analysis of how local state agents maintain control over village self-governance in China. His careful analysis of primary documents enables him to explicate the formal mechanisms used by members of the local state to influence village affairs. Meanwhile, his rigorous and fascinating ethnographic data enable him to elucidate the manifold ways in which informal clientelist ties between local state officials and village elites permit the former to exert control. Overall, this excellent book powerfully demonstrates the need for scholars to go beyond attention to election processes when evaluating what village democracy means in a Chinese context. It is a must-read for all serious scholars of Chinese politics and society. **—Rachel Murphy, University of Oxford** Guohui Wang's highly original, in-depth case research vividly reveals the dynamics of contemporary Chinese village politics. By combining abundant empirical data with close observation as an "insider," his book illustrates the processes and consequences of transplanting 'democracy' into rural Chinese society. Particularly for those in the West who are keen on understanding the ongoing transformation of rural China, this book is a rich and revealing source. **—Shukai Zhao, Development Research Center of the State Council, P.R. China** Acknowledgement 8 Abstract 10 Contents 12 Abbreviations 16 Chapter 1: Introduction 17 1.1 Understanding Village Elections and Governance in Contemporary Rural China 17 1.2 Approaches to Analysing Chinese Village Elections and Self-Governance 19 1.2.1 The Liberal-Democratic Approach: Bottom-Up Democratization? 19 1.2.2 The Authoritarian Approach: Bringing the State Back In 22 1.2.3 The Developmentalist Approach  24 1.3 Towards a Clientelist Analysis: The Interaction Between Peasants and State 26 1.4 Methodology: A Case Study of One Village Community 29 1.4.1 Why a Case Study? 29 1.4.2 Why B Village? 31 1.4.3 Sources of the Study 35 1.4.3.1 Field Visits and In-Depth Interviews 35 1.4.3.2 Non-participant Observations 35 1.4.3.3 Official Documents and Published Materials 36 1.5 Structure of This Book 36 References 37 Chapter 2: The Social and System Background of Villagers’ Self-Governance 41 2.1 The Origin of Villagers’ Self-Governance 41 2.1.1 The Dismantling of the People’s Commune System 41 2.1.2 The Emergence of Villagers’ Committees (VCs) 42 2.1.3 Peng Zhen’s Pushing and the Constitutional Confirmation of VCs 43 2.2 The Legislation for Village Self-Governance: The Provisional Organic Law and Relevant Local Regulations Before 1998 44 2.2.1 A Controversial Legislative Start: 1984–1987 44 2.2.2 Irresolution and Implementation of the Provisional Organic Law at the Central Level: 1988–1998 46 2.2.3 Local Regulations for Implementing the Provisional Organic Law and Villagers’ Self-Governance: 1988–1998 47 2.2.3.1 On VC Elections 48 2.2.3.2 On Village Self-Governance 49 2.3 The Revised Organic Law and Relevant Local Regulations After 1998 51 2.3.1 The Revised Organic Law 51 2.3.2 Institutional Background in Shandong After 1998 54 2.3.2.1 On VC Elections 54 2.3.2.2 On Village Self-Governance 56 2.4 Conclusion 57 References 58 Chapter 3: Villagers as Clients and “Locked-In” Voters 61 3.1 Villagers in the Reform Era: The Socioeconomic Structure of Rural Society 62 3.1.1 Improved Economic Well-Being 62 3.1.2 Absence of a Social Security System and Safety Nets 63 3.1.3 Market Reform and the Wealth Gap 64 3.1.4 Absence of Free Peasant Associations 65 3.1.5 Peasant Burdens and Official Corruption 66 3.2 Guanxi and Clientelism 67 3.2.1 Guanxi in Chinese Rural Society 67 3.2.2 Guanxi and Patron-Client Relationship 68 3.3 Why Do Villagers Participate in Village Elections? 69 3.3.1 Voting Subsidy 70 3.3.2 Local Issues 71 3.3.3 Political Efficacy 72 3.3.4 Social Connections 72 3.4 How Do Villagers Vote: The Development of Clientelism Under Direct Elections 74 3.5 Conclusion 76 References 77 Chapter 4: Candidates, Patrons and Factions 80 4.1 The Changing Composition of Village Patrons and Patrons as VC Candidates 81 4.1.1 The Composition of Village Patrons: Before and After the Reform 81 4.1.2 Candidates Arising from the Village Patrons 84 4.1.3 Candidates’ Motivations for Running for VC Positions 85 4.1.3.1 Salary 85 4.1.3.2 Hidden Benefits 86 4.1.3.3 Prestige and Private Resentment 87 4.2 Strategies for Winning Votes 88 4.2.1 La Piao: Guanxi Mobilization for Village Electoral Campaign 88 4.2.2 Patrons and the Formation of Factions 91 4.2.3 Taking Advantage of Proxy Voting 94 4.3 Patronage and Factional Politics in Three Rounds of Electoral Contest 95 4.3.1 The 1999 Election 95 4.3.2 The 2002 Election 96 4.3.3 The 2004 Election 97 4.3.4 Analysis of the Three Elections 98 4.4 Conclusion 99 References 99 Chapter 5: The Role of Local State Officials in Village Elections 102 5.1 Local State Officials as State Policy Implementers 103 5.2 Local State Officials’ Attitudes Towards Direct Village Elections 104 5.2.1 Peasant Quality 105 5.2.2 Elections and the Party’s Leadership 105 5.3 Free and Fair? Local State Officials’ Strategies for Controlling Village Elections 107 5.3.1 Organizing Village Elections Strictly According to the Procedures 107 5.3.2 Defining the Qualifications of the Candidates 109 5.3.3 Pre-election Mobilization and Opinion Investigation 112 5.3.4 Influencing the Village Elites 113 5.3.5 Patron-Client Relationships Between Village Elites and Local State Officials 116 5.4 Conclusion 118 References 119 Chapter 6: Village Self-Governance: A “Democratic” Style? 122 6.1 The Role of the VPB and VPB-VC Conflict in Postelection Village Governance 123 6.1.1 VPB Before the Introduction of Direct Elections 123 6.1.2 VC-VPB Conflict Following the Introduction of Direct Elections 124 6.2 “Democratic” Supervision? 130 6.2.1 Villagers’ Financing Small Team 130 6.2.2 Transparency in Village Affairs 132 6.2.3 The Recall and Impeachment of VC Cadres 135 6.3 The Villagers’ Representative Assembly (VRA) 136 6.3.1 The Institutional Status of the VRA 136 6.3.2 The Malfunctioning of the VRA in Practice 138 6.3.3 Institutional Deficiencies 139 6.3.4 The Influence of Clientelism 140 6.4 Conclusion 142 References 143 Chapter 7: The Local State’s Sustained Control of Village Governance 146 7.1 The Village Guarantee Cadre System 147 7.1.1 The Introduction of Village Guarantee Cadre System 147 7.1.2 B Village’s Guarantee Cadre 150 7.1.3 Village Guarantee Cadre System: Fixing the Disconnection Between the Local State and the Village Community 151 7.2 Direct Control over Village Finance 153 7.2.1 The Dual Proxy Management System 153 7.2.2 Controlling Village Cadres’ Pay 155 7.3 Ensuring Obedience Through Clientelist Control 156 7.3.1 The Cultivation of Good Relations 156 7.3.2 Benefit/Patronage Exchange 158 7.3.3 The Use of Sanctions 159 7.3.4 Mediation of Factional Conflicts 160 7.4 Conclusion 161 References 163 Chapter 8: Conclusion 166 8.1 Village Elections: “Free and Fair” or Subject to Clientelist Control? 167 8.2 Village Governance: Self-Governance or Overwhelmed by the Administrative-Clientelist Dominance 168 8.3 “Grassroots Democracy”? 169 8.4 An Authoritarian System Supplemented with Informal Clientelist Structure 175 8.5 Clientelism, Developmentalism and Chinese Rural Society Under Transition 176 References 177 Appendices 179 Appendix A: Interviewee List 179 Appendix B: Organic Law of the Villagers’ Committee of the People’s Republic of China (Provisional) 180 Appendix C: Organic Law of the Villagers Committee of the People’s Republic of China 183 Appendix D: VC Election Results of B Village in 1999, 2002 and 2004 189 Front Matter....Pages i-xv Introduction....Pages 1-24 The Social and System Background of Villagers’ Self-Governance....Pages 25-44 Villagers as Clients and “Locked-In” Voters....Pages 45-63 Candidates, Patrons and Factions....Pages 65-86 The Role of Local State Officials in Village Elections....Pages 87-106 Village Self-Governance: A “Democratic” Style?....Pages 107-130 The Local State’s Sustained Control of Village Governance....Pages 131-150 Conclusion....Pages 151-163 Back Matter....Pages 165-177