Subjectivity And Selfhood: Investigating the First-person Perspective (A Bradford Book)

What is a self? Does it exist in reality or is it a mere social construct -- or is it perhaps a neurologically induced illusion? The legitimacy of the concept of the self has been questioned by both neuroscientists and philosophers in recent years. Countering this, in Subjectivity and Selfhood , Dan Zahavi argues that the notion of self is crucial for a proper understanding of consciousness. He investigates the interrelationships of experience, self-awareness, and selfhood, proposing that none of these three notions can be understood in isolation. Any investigation of the self, Zahavi argues, must take the first-person perspective seriously and focus on the experiential givenness of the self. Subjectivity and Selfhood explores a number of phenomenological analyses pertaining to the nature of consciousness, self, and self-experience in light of contemporary discussions in consciousness research. Philosophical phenomenology -- as developed by Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and others -- not only addresses crucial issues often absent from current debates over consciousness but also provides a conceptual framework for understanding subjectivity. Zahavi fills the need -- given the recent upsurge in theoretical and empirical interest in subjectivity -- for an account of the subjective or phenomenal dimension of consciousness that is accessible to researchers and students from a variety of disciplines. His aim is to use phenomenological analyses to clarify issues of central importance to philosophy of mind, cognitive science, developmental psychology, and psychiatry. By engaging in a dialogue with other philosophical and empirical positions, says Zahavi, phenomenology can demonstrate its vitality and contemporary relevance. This title focuses on the relationship of self, and self-awareness, and experience: exploring classical phenomenological analyses and their relevance to contemporary discussions in consciousness research. What is a self? Does it exist in reality or is it a mere social construct - or is it perhaps a neurologically induced illusion? The legitimacy of the concept of the self has been questioned by both neuroscientists and philosophers in recent years. Countering this, in "Subjectivity and Selfhood", Dan Zahavi argues that the notion of self is crucial for a proper understanding of consciousness. He investigates the interrelationships of experience, self-awareness, and selfhood, proposing that none of these three notions can be understood in isolation. Any investigation of the self, Zahavi argues, must take the first-person perspective seriously and focus on the experiential givenness of the self. "Subjectivity and Selfhood" explores a number of phenomenological analyses pertaining to the nature of consciousness, self, and self-experience in light of contemporary discussions in consciousness research. Philosophical phenomenology - as developed by Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and others - not only addresses crucial issues often absent from current debates over consciousness, but also provides a conceptual framework for understanding subjectivity. Zahavi fills the need - given the recent upsurge in theoretical and empirical interest in subjectivity - for an account of the subjective or phenomenal dimension of consciousness that is accessible to researchers and students from a variety of disciplines. His aim is to use phenomenological analyses to clarify issues of central importance to philosophy of mind, cognitive science, developmental psychology, and psychiatry. By engaging in a dialogue with other philosophical and empirical positions, says Zahavi, phenomenology can demonstrate its vitality and contemporary relevance What is a self? Does it exist in reality or is it a mere social construct -- or is it perhaps a neurologically induced illusion? The legitimacy of the concept of the self has been questioned by both neuroscientists and philosophers in recent years. Countering this, in __Subjectivity and Selfhood__, Dan Zahavi argues that the notion of self is crucial for a proper understanding of consciousness. He investigates the interrelationships of experience, self-awareness, and selfhood, proposing that none of these three notions can be understood in isolation. Any investigation of the self, Zahavi argues, must take the first-person perspective seriously and focus on the experiential givenness of the self. __Subjectivity and Selfhood__ explores a number of phenomenological analyses pertaining to the nature of consciousness, self, and self-experience in light of contemporary discussions in consciousness research. Acknowledgments 8 Introduction 10 1 Self-Awareness and Phenomenal Consciousness 20 2 The Concept(s) of Consciousness in Early Phenomenology 40 3 The Structure of Time-Consciousness 58 4 Reflection and Attention 82 5 Consciousness and Self 108 6 Self and Other 156 7 Theory of Mind, Autism, and Embodiment 188 Notes 232 References 250 Index 270 Content: Self-awareness and phenomenal consciousness -- The concept(s) of consciousness in early phenomenology -- The structure of time-consciousness -- Reflection and attention -- Consciousness and self -- Self and other -- Theory of mind, autism, and embodiment.

the Relationship Of Self, And Self-awareness, And Experience: Exploring Classical Phenomenological Analyses And Their Relevance To Contemporary Discussions In Consciousness Research.