Subjectivity After Wittgenstein: The Post-Cartesian Subject and the "Death of Man" (Continuum Studies in British Philosophy)

Although Wittgenstein is often held co-responsible for the so-called death of man as it was pronounced in the course of the previous century, no detailed description of his alternative to the traditional or Cartesian account of human being has so far been available. By consulting several parts of Wittgenstein's later oeuvre, Subjectivity after Wittgenstein aims to fill this gap. However, it also contributes to the debate about the Cartesian subject and its demise by discussing the criticism that the rethinking of subjectivity received, for it has been argued that the anti-Cartesian turn in continental philosophy has lead to a loss of a centre for both ethics and politics. By further exploring the implications of the Wittgensteinian account of human being, this book makes it clear that a non-Cartesian view on the subject is not necessarily ethically and politically inert. Moreover, it argues that ethical and political arguments should not automatically take precedence in a debate about the nature of man. > Title 4 Copyright 5 Contents 6 Abbreviated References 8 Acknowledgements 10 Chapter 1 Subjectivity, Wittgenstein and the Debate about the ‘Death of Man’ 12 Chapter 2 Wittgenstein and/as Philosophy: A Constructive Reading of Wittgenstein’s Method 26 Chapter 3 Inner and Outer, Self and Other: Wittgenstein’s Post-Cartesian Subject 44 Intermezzo 1 The Inner as the Centre of Morality: The Ethical (In) Adequacy of Post-Cartesian Subjectivity 84 Chapter 4 Wittgenstein on Interiority and Religiosity 90 Intermezzo 2 The Self as the Site of Autonomy. The Political (In) Adequacy of Post-Cartesian Subjectivity 126 Chapter 5 Wittgenstein on Community in On Certainty 132 Chapter 6 Wittgensteinian Subjectivity and the Nature of the Debate about the ‘Death of Man’ 153 Notes 163 References 192 Index 200 Explores Wittgenstein's contribution to continental philosophical debates about the 'death of man' and constructs and defends a positive Wittgensteinian account of human being. This title constructs a positive Wittgensteinian account of subjectivity and human nature. It includes later writings on philosophy of psychology and religion.