Stuffing the Ballot Box: Fraud, Electoral Reform, and Democratization in Costa Rica (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics)

Stuffing the Ballot Box is a pioneering study of electoral fraud and reform. It focuses on Costa Rica, a country where parties gradually transformed a fraud-ridden political system into one renowned for its stability and fair elections by the mid-twentieth century. Lehoucq and Molina draw upon a unique database of more than 1,300 accusations of ballot-rigging to show that parties denounced fraud where electoral laws made the struggle for power more competitive. They explain how institutional arrangements generated opportunities for executives to assemble legislative coalitions to enact far-reaching reforms. This book also argues that nonpartisan commissions should run elections and explains why splitting responsibility over election affairs between the executive and the legislature is a recipe for partisan rancour and political conflict. Stuffing the Ballot Box will interest a broad array of political and social scientists, constitutional scholars, historians, election specialists and policy-makers interested in electoral fraud and institutional reform. Half-title......Page 3 Series-title......Page 5 Title......Page 7 Copyright......Page 8 Dedication......Page 9 Contents......Page 11 Tables......Page 12 Figures......Page 13 Preface......Page 15 Central Questions......Page 19 Presidentialism, Collective Dilemmas, and Institutional Reform......Page 21 Theories, Approaches, and Hypotheses......Page 25 Existing Research......Page 30 Sources and Methods......Page 32 Definitions and Scales......Page 35 Explaining Electoral Fraud......Page 37 The Magnitude of Electoral Fraud......Page 40 Theoretical Guideposts......Page 42 Methodological Reflections......Page 46 An Overview of the Book......Page 47 Introduction......Page 52 The Political Economy of Presidentialism......Page 53 Public Finances and Electoral Competition......Page 54 Presidentialism and the Classical Theory of Electoral Governance......Page 57 The Size and Nature of the Electorate......Page 59 Electors and Second-Stage Elections......Page 61 The Nature and Spatial Basis of Electoral Fraud......Page 63 The Intensity and Magnitude of Electoral Fraud......Page 70 Congress, Reform, and Dispute Resolution......Page 71 Institutional Controls......Page 72 Political Conflict and Electoral Reform......Page 73 Politicizing the Judiciary......Page 75 Parties and Electors: Principal-Agent Problems......Page 77 Conclusions......Page 78 Introduction......Page 81 Watershed Elections and Political Mandates......Page 83 The Struggle to Reform the Constitution......Page 84 Factionalism and the Reforms......Page 85 Committee Reports......Page 87 Midterm Elections, Legislative Alignments, and Reform Possibilities......Page 89 Partisanship, Roll-Call Votes, and the Constitutional Amendments......Page 90 The Proposed Electoral Law......Page 97 Electoral Incentives, Committee Power, and the Reforms......Page 98 Conclusions......Page 101 Introduction......Page 104 Political Instability......Page 106 Parties and Their Voters......Page 108 Parties and Voter Turnout Rates......Page 110 The Nature and Spatial Basis of Electoral Fraud......Page 112 The Intensity and Magnitude of Fraud......Page 122 Institutional Controls and the Separation of Powers......Page 124 A Crisis of Political Succession......Page 126 The President’s Dilemma......Page 128 Congress, Partisanship, and the Classical Theory of Electoral Governance......Page 130 Conclusion......Page 132 Introduction......Page 136 The Struggle to Reform Institutions......Page 137 Legislative Alignments and Reform......Page 138 Institutional Configurations and Reform Possibilities......Page 139 The President’s Response......Page 140 Political Threats and Committee Reports......Page 142 The Dilemmas Posed by Female Suffrage Rights......Page 143 Institutional Design and Strategic Interplay: Electoral Tribunals......Page 148 Parties and Voters: Maintaining the Links That Bind?......Page 150 Final Debates......Page 153 Veto Games and Political Coalitions......Page 154 Constitutional Reform and Double-Ballot Elections......Page 157 The Reform of Electoral Laws (II)......Page 160 The President’s Bill......Page 161 Partisan Alignments and Election Year Politics......Page 162 Committee Responses......Page 163 Delay, Opposition, and Public Opinion......Page 164 Conclusions......Page 170 Introduction......Page 174 Parties Lose Control......Page 176 Parties and Voter Turnout Rates......Page 178 Electoral Fraud, 1925–38......Page 180 The Nature and Spatial Basis of Fraud......Page 181 The Intensity and Magnitude of Fraud......Page 189 Institutional Controls......Page 193 The Ruling Bloc Splits......Page 196 Social Reform and Coalitional Politics......Page 198 The Nature and Spatial Basis of Electoral Fraud......Page 200 Electoral Fraud and Institutional Controls......Page 206 Conclusion......Page 209 Introduction......Page 213 The Production and Scope of the Reform Bill......Page 215 Legislative Alignments and Strategic Possibilities......Page 217 Killer Amendments and Their Outcomes: The Pressure Mounts......Page 219 Debate, Delay, and Compromise......Page 224 The Political Center Stabilizes......Page 228 Rival Strategic Calculations: The Opposition Splits......Page 230 The Collapse of the Centrist Compromise......Page 232 Political Polarization and Electoral Reform......Page 235 Election Results and the Charges of Fraud......Page 236 Negotiation, Civil War, and a New Constitution......Page 241 Conclusion......Page 243 Introduction......Page 246 Electoral Fraud: Principal Findings......Page 249 Social Structural and Institutional Accounts: A Balance Sheet......Page 250 The Magnitude of Electoral Fraud......Page 257 Assessing the Classical Theory of Electoral Governance......Page 260 Electoral Reform: Theories and Evidence......Page 263 Office-Seeking Theories......Page 264 Sociological Approaches......Page 267 Institutionalist Approaches......Page 270 Rethinking Costa Rican Democratization......Page 274 Promoting the Study of Electoral Fraud: Beyond Costa Rica......Page 278 Reformulating Existing Accounts of Institutional Reform......Page 281 Index......Page 287 Stuffing The Ballot Box Is A Study Of Electoral Fraud And Reform. It Focuses On Costa Rica, A Country Where Parties Gradually Transformed A Fraud-ridden Political System Into One Renowned For Its Stability And Fair Elections By The Mid-twentieth Century. Lehoucq And Molina Draw Upon A Unique Database Of More Than Thirteen Hundred Accusations Of Ballot-rigging To Show That, Independently Of Social Structural Constraints, Parties Denounced Fraud Where Electoral Laws Made The Struggle For Power More Competitive. They Also Explain How Institutional Arrangements Generated Opportunities For Several Executives To Assemble Legislative Coalitions To Enact Far-reaching Reforms. This Book Argues That Nonpartisan Commissions Should Run Elections; It Explains Why Splitting Responsibility Over Election Affairs Between The Executive And The Legislature, As Classical Constitutional Theory Suggests, Is A Recipe For Partisan Rancor And Political Conflict. Stuffing The Ballot Box Will Interest A Broad Array Of Political And Social Scientists, Constitutional Scholars, Historians, Election Specialists, And Policy-makers Interested In Electoral Fraud And Institutional Reform.--book Jacket. 1. Political Competition And Electoral Fraud, 1901-1912 2. Institutional Change, Electoral Cycles, And Partisanship, 1910-1940 3. Political Competition And Electoral Fraud, 1913-1923 4. Institutional Change, Electoral Cycles, And Partisanship,1924-1980 5. Political Competition And Electoral Fraud, 1925-1946 6. Institutional Change, Electoral Cycles, And Partisanship, 1946-1949 Conclusion: Fraud And Electoral Reform In Comparative Perspective. Fabrice E. Lehoucq, Iván Molina. Includes Bibliographical References And Index.

This pioneering study of electoral fraud and reform focuses on Costa Rica, a country where parties gradually transformed a fraud-ridden political system into one renowned for stability and fair elections by the mid-twentieth century. Lehoucq and Molina draw upon a unique database of more than 1,300 accusations of ballot-rigging to show that, independently of social structural constraints, parties denounced fraud where electoral laws made the struggle for power more competitive. They explain how institutional arrangements generated opportunities for several executives to assemble legislative coalitions to enact far-reaching reforms.