[Studies in Brain and Mind] The Attentional Shaping of Perceptual Experience Volume 16 (An Investigation into Attention and Cognitive Penetrability) ||

This monograph presents a clear account of when and how attentional processes can shape perceptual experience. This argument is based on the prediction-error minimization model of the mind. The author believes that the topic of attention should take a more central role in the debate about the influence of cognition on perception. Inside, he shows how this can be possible. The hypothesis that cognition may shape perceptual experience has been traditionally labeled as the cognitive penetrability of perceptual experience. Cognitive penetrability is relevant for several debates in philosophy and cognitive science. It tackles the possibility of gathering genuine knowledge on the basis of perceptual information about the world delivered by sensory channels. The problem, the author notes, is that if our previously acquired belief can shape current perceptual experiences, such experiences cannot serve as an adequate source of justification in retaining those beliefs or even forming new ones. He argues that cognitive penetration may sometimes happen through attentional processes, but that its occurrence need not undermine perceptual justification. The book provides an overview of the cognitive penetrability debate. The author discusses evidence that supports the occurrence of this phenomenon. Overall, this investigation offers readers a philosophical discussion of attention based on the biased-competition theory. It argues that attention is a property of mental representations that emerges from a metacognitive competition process. Acknowledgments Introduction Setting the Stage The Core Question: Can Attention Shape Experience? Plan of the Book References Contents Chapter 1: A Play with Two Characters 1.1 The World and the Senses 1.2 Perception and Cognition: Definitional Issues 1.3 Is There a Real Distinction? 1.4 Summary and Conclusion References Chapter 2: The Cognitive Processing Hierarchy 2.1 A Gradualist Approach to Cognition 2.2 An Alternative to a Clear-Cut Distinction: The Resolution Criterion 2.3 Perception Has the Spatiotemporal Resolution of Action 2.4 Summary and Conclusion References Chapter 3: The Cognitive Penetrability of Perceptual Experience 3.1 The Influence of Cognition on Perceptual Experience 3.2 Cognitive Penetrability: Recent Developments 3.3 Evidence of Cognitive Penetration 3.4 Summary and Conclusion References Chapter 4: Attention and the Shaping of Experience 4.1 Why Attention Matters 4.2 What Is Attention? 4.3 Varieties of Attentional Phenomena 4.4 Summary and Conclusion References Chapter 5: Toward a New Theory of Attention 5.1 Theories of Attention: An Unsettled Game 5.2 Better Player in the Field: The Biased Competition Theory 5.3 Toward an Explanation of Attention 5.4 Summary and Conclusion References Chapter 6: How Attentional Cognitive Penetration Works 6.1 The Dismissive Attitude Concerning Attention 6.2 Competition Is Metacognitive Regulation 6.3 Attention and Cognitive Penetrability: A Second Look 6.4 The Epistemic Role of Attention 6.5 Summary and Conclusion References Chapter 7: Expectations and Predictions as a Model of the Mind 7.1 Predictive Processing: Fundamental Ideas 7.2 Perception and Cognition in PEM 7.3 Modularity and Cognitive Penetrability in PEM 7.4 Summary and Conclusion References Chapter 8: A Predictive-Processing Model of Attentional Cognitive Penetration 8.1 Attention in PEM: Precision, Competition, and Metacognitive Regulation 8.2 Attentional Cognitive Penetration in PEM 8.3 Precision and Uncertainty: The Case of Bi-Stable Images 8.4 Summary and Conclusion References Conclusion Retracing the Steps Attention Shapes Experience: Should We Be Worried?