Strategic decisionmaking in cabinet government: institutional underpinnings and obstacles, Part 294

"Collective cabinet decisionmaking provides the institutional mechanism by which many governments prioritize their policies and guard against unpredictable policy reversals." - Mansood Ahmed, Vice President, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network, The World Bank The style and membership of cabinets vary in every country. The heads of democratic governments form a cabinet for three principal reasons: 1. The threat that the legislature will significantly amend the government's program as expressed in the budget proposals made by the executive. 2. The threat of dismissal between elections. 3. The risk that the executive will be seen by the public as having departed from a previous tradition of cabinet government and judged poorly as a result. 'Strategic Decisionmaking in Cabinet Government' shows that cabinet government is a rational response to these risks and sets out the institutional arrangements that make the cabinet a binding device. This report recognizes the significance of the budget process for collective decisionmaking, but moves beyond the simplistic assumption that tradeoffs in cabinet government can only be made by reallocating the budget. It supports practical approaches for assessing the strength of cabinet decisionmaking arrangements and for identifying practical steps to improve the prospect that decisions will be collectively binding. This report describes an approach to assessing how the institution of cabinet responds to the threats that government faces and provides some practical strategies for examining the institutional government for supporting cabinet decisionmaking. The threats are: 1) The threat that the legislature will significantly amend the government's program as expressed in the budget proposals made by the executive. 2) The threat of dismissal between elections. 3) The risk that the executive will be seen by the public as having departed form a previous tradition of cabinet government and judged poorly as a result. The report shows that cabinet government is a rational response to these risks and sets out the institutional arrangements that make cabinet a binding device. It takes a purely empirical view to determine what constitutes cabinets. Using some new data and illustrative quantitative measures, the report shows how to make comparisons across countries. It recognizes the significance of the budget process for collective decisionmaking, but moves beyond the simplistic assumption that tradeoffs in cabinet government can only be made by reallocating the budget. Politicians trade in many commodities, including prestige and public acclaim. In sum, the report supports practical approaches for assessing the strength of cabinet decisionmaking arrangements and for identifying practical steps to improve the prospect that decisions will be collectively binding. 1. What Are Cabinets? Cabinets And Councils Of Ministers. Contours Of Cabinet In Organisation For Economic Co-operation And Development Countries. What Gets Discussed? Variations On A Theme -- 2. How Do Cabinets Work? When Is Government Cabinet-like? What Does Cabinet-like Government Need To Make It Work? The Cabinet Office -- 3. Where Does It Matter? If Cabinet Is The Solution, What Is The Problem? Cabinet Is A Popular Form Of Government, And Pressures For Collective Decisionmaking Are Growing -- 4. Implications For Action. Credible Policy Drives Public Management. Improving Institutional Support For The Cabinet: A New Frontier Of Institutional Reform. The Gambia -- Cabinet And The Budget Cycle. Malawi -- Cabinet And The Cabinet Office. Nick Manning With Naazneen Barma ... [et Al.]. Includes Bibliographical References.