State Control over Private Military and Security Companies in Armed Conflict (Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law, Series Number 80)

"The past two decades have witnessed the rapid proliferation of private military and security companies (PMSCs) in armed conflicts around the world, with PMSCs participating in, for example, offensive combat, prisoner interrogation and the provision of advice and training. The extensive outsourcing of military and security activities has challenged conventional conceptions of the state as the primary holder of coercive power and raised concerns about the reduction in state control over the use of violence. Hannah Tonkin critically analyses the international obligations on three key states - the hiring state, the home state and the host state of a PMSC - and identifies the circumstances in which PMSC misconduct may give rise to state responsibility. This analysis will facilitate the assessment of state responsibility in cases of PMSC misconduct and set standards to guide states in developing their domestic laws and policies on private security"--Provided by publisher. "The past two decades have witnessed the rapid growth and consolidation of the global private security industry. Tens of thousands of contractors working for private military and security companies (PMSCs) now provide a wide range of services to states, international organisations, corporations and non-governmental organisations around the world. Many PMSCs operate in zones of armed conflict, where they carry out functions that were formerly the exclusive domain of the armed forces. In this context, PMSCs have performed coercive activities such as offensive combat, armed security and the detention and interrogation of prisoners, as well as non-coercive activities such as military advice and training, transport, housing and intelligence collection and analysis"--Provided by publisher. Contents......Page 6 Acknowledgements......Page 9 Abbreviations......Page 11 International Court of Justice/Permanent Court of International Justice......Page 13 European Court of Human Rights/European Commission on Human Rights......Page 14 Inter-American system......Page 15 UN Human Rights Committee......Page 16 International arbitral decisions......Page 17 United States......Page 18 Other jurisdictions......Page 19 United States......Page 20 Other jurisdictions......Page 21 Table of international treaties and conventions......Page 22 Introduction......Page 26 1 The private security industry uncovered......Page 31 1.1 History of private military actors in international relations......Page 32 Private force in twelfth- to seventeenth-century Europe......Page 33 The first shift away from mercenary use: state troop exchange......Page 34 The second shift away from mercenary use: citizen armies......Page 35 Private force in the twentieth century......Page 36 Lessons from history......Page 40 1.2 Objections to private force, mercenaries and modern PMSCs......Page 42 Lack of attachment to a cause......Page 43 Fighting outside the citizen–state military relationship......Page 46 The hiring state's lack of control over PMSC activities......Page 48 The home state's lack of control over PMSC activities......Page 50 General lack of transparency in the private security industry......Page 52 1.3 The spectrum of private military and security activity today......Page 53 Mercenaries......Page 54 Private military and security companies......Page 55 Volunteers......Page 56 National soldiers fighting for their home state......Page 57 Terminology......Page 58 General nature of PMSCs......Page 60 PMSC services......Page 64 Offensive combat......Page 65 Military and security expertise......Page 70 Armed security......Page 74 Military support......Page 76 1.5 Conclusion......Page 77 2 State obligations and state responsibility......Page 79 2.1 The nature of international obligations and conditions for breach......Page 80 2.2 The attribution of private misconduct to the state......Page 82 2.3 States’ obligations to take positive steps to control PMSCs......Page 84 Obligations of result......Page 85 Obligations of diligent conduct......Page 88 Identifying a due diligence obligation of prevention and punishment......Page 89 Mental element......Page 92 Positive action to discharge the obligation......Page 94 Resources available to the state......Page 96 Risk of violation......Page 97 Causation......Page 98 2.5 Circumstances precluding wrongfulness......Page 100 2.6 Consequences of state responsibility......Page 101 2.7 Conclusion......Page 103 3 The attribution of PMSC conduct to the hiring state......Page 105 International armed conflicts......Page 106 Non-international armed conflicts......Page 117 International armed conflicts......Page 120 Non-international armed conflicts......Page 122 3.2 PMSCs empowered by law to exercise governmental authority......Page 124 What constitutes 'governmental authority’?......Page 125 Private person test......Page 126 ILC guidelines......Page 127 US law and policy regarding 'inherently governmental’ functions......Page 133 What constitutes 'the law of the state’?......Page 136 When is a PMSC employee 'acting in that capacity’?......Page 137 3.3 PMSCs acting under state instructions, direction or control......Page 138 State instructions......Page 139 State direction or control......Page 142 3.4 Conclusion......Page 146 4 Obligations of the host state......Page 148 The obligation in Common Article 1 to 'ensure respect’ for IHL......Page 149 Nature and scope of Common Article 1......Page 150 Ensuring respect for IHL by private actors......Page 154 Positive action to discharge the obligation......Page 157 State responsibility for breach of Common Article 1......Page 161 Obligation to protect civilians in international armed conflict......Page 162 Obligation to repress or suppress violations of IHL......Page 164 Do the rules of IHL displace the rules of HRL in armed conflict?......Page 166 Derogating from human rights in times of emergency......Page 170 The principle of lex specialis......Page 172 Lex specialis as an exception or limitation to the general rule......Page 174 Obligation to prevent human rights violations by PMSCs......Page 177 Special measures targeting known sources of danger......Page 179 Protecting individuals whose lives are at risk......Page 181 Special obligations relating to women and children......Page 182 Obligations to investigate, punish and redress PMSC violations......Page 183 Sources of states’ obligations to investigate, punish and redress violations......Page 184 When will these obligations arise in relation to PMSC violations in armed conflict?......Page 186 Remedial action required of the host state......Page 188 4.3 How immunity agreements can undermine host state control over PMSCs......Page 191 4.4 Conclusion......Page 195 5 Obligations of the hiring state......Page 197 Constraints on the hiring state under international mercenary law......Page 198 The obligations of states party to the UN Convention......Page 200 The obligations of states party to the OAU Convention......Page 209 Constraints on the hiring state under international humanitarian law......Page 211 5.2 Obligations to control PMSCs under international humanitarian law......Page 212 Does Common Article 1 bind the hiring state in relation to PMSCs operating outside state territory?......Page 213 Does Common Article 1 bind the hiring state if it is not a party to the conflict?......Page 215 Positive action to discharge the Common Article 1 obligation......Page 217 State responsibility for a violation of Common Article 1......Page 221 Duty to train and disseminate......Page 222 Protection of civilians in international armed conflict......Page 224 Obligation to repress or suppress violations of IHL......Page 225 Special obligations of an occupying power......Page 226 5.3 Obligations to control PMSCs under human rights law......Page 227 Extraterritorial scope of human rights law......Page 228 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights......Page 229 Inter-American system......Page 232 European Convention on Human Rights......Page 235 Obligation to prevent human rights violations by PMSCs......Page 239 Special measures targeting known sources of danger......Page 240 Planning and controlling security operations to minimise the risk to life......Page 241 Protecting the physical integrity of detainees......Page 242 Positive action to discharge the preventive obligations......Page 243 Criminal investigation and prosecution......Page 246 Access to justice and compensation......Page 251 5.4 Conclusion......Page 252 6 Obligations of the home state......Page 254 6.1 General obligation to prevent private acts harmful to other states?......Page 255 6.2 Obligation to prevent PMSC intervention into other states......Page 258 Sources of the norm of non-intervention......Page 259 '[S]ubversive, terrorist or armed activities’......Page 261 '[D]irected towards the violent overthrow of’......Page 264 '[T]he regime of another state’......Page 265 Positive action to discharge the obligation......Page 266 6.3 Obligations to control PMSCs under the law of neutrality......Page 268 The law of neutrality post-1945......Page 269 Circumstances in which the law of neutrality applies today......Page 271 The two-dimensional nature of the law of neutrality......Page 274 The law of neutrality and modern PMSCs......Page 276 Positive action to discharge the obligations......Page 278 6.4 Obligations to control PMSCs under international humanitarian law......Page 279 General human rights law......Page 281 The UN Convention Against Torture......Page 282 6.6 Conclusion......Page 283 Conclusion......Page 285 Bibliography......Page 289 Index......Page 319 The past two decades have witnessed the rapid proliferation of private military and security companies (PMSCs) in armed conflicts around the world, with PMSCs participating in, for example, offensive combat, prisoner interrogation and the provision of advice and training. The extensive outsourcing of military and security activities has challenged conventional conceptions of the state as the primary holder of coercive power and raised concerns about the reduction in state control over the use of violence. Hannah Tonkin critically analyses the international obligations on three key states - the hiring state, the home state and the host state of a PMSC - and identifies the circumstances in which PMSC misconduct may give rise to state responsibility. This analysis will facilitate the assessment of state responsibility in cases of PMSC misconduct and set standards to guide states in developing their domestic laws and policies on private security.--Résumé de l'éditeur

The past two decades have witnessed the rapid proliferation of private military and security companies (PMSCs) in armed conflicts around the world, with PMSCs participating in, for example, offensive combat, prisoner interrogation and the provision of advice and training. The extensive outsourcing of military and security activities has challenged conventional conceptions of the state as the primary holder of coercive power and raised concerns about the reduction in state control over the use of violence. Hannah Tonkin critically analyses the international obligations on three key states – the hiring state, the home state and the host state of a PMSC – and identifies the circumstances in which PMSC misconduct may give rise to state responsibility. This analysis will facilitate the assessment of state responsibility in cases of PMSC misconduct and set standards to guide states in developing their domestic laws and policies on private security.

The past two decades have witnessed the rapid growth and consolidation of the global private security industry. Tens of thousands of contractors working for private military and security companies (PMSCs) now provide a wide range of services to states, international organisations, corporations and non-governmental organisations around the world. Many PMSCs operate in zones of armed conflict, where they carry out functions that were formerly the exclusive domain of the armed forces. In this context, PMSCs have performed coercive activities such as offensive combat, armed security and the detention and interrogation of prisoners, as well as non-coercive activities such as military advice and training, transport, housing and intelligence collection and analysis.--Résumé de l'éditeur