Social Choice Re-examined: Volume 1: Proceedings of the IEA Conference held at Schloss Hernstein, Berndorf, near Vienna, Austria (International Economic Association Series)

Since World War II the subject of social choice has grown in many and surprising ways. The impossibility theorems have suggested many directions: mathematical characterisations of voting structures satisfying various sets of conditions, the consequences of restricting choice to certain domaines, the relation to competitive equilibrium and the core, and trade-offs among the partial satisfactions of some conditions. The links with classical and modern theories of justice and, in particular, the competing ideas of rights and utilitarianism have shown the power of formal social choice analysis in illuminating the most basic philosophical arguments about the good social life. Finally, the ideals of the just society meet with the play of self interest; social choice mechanisms can lend themselves to manipulation, and the analysis of conditions under which given ideals can be realised under self interest is a political parallel to the welfare economics of the market. The contributors to these volumes focus on these issues at the forefront of current research.

Since the Second World War the subject of social choice has grown in many and surprising ways. The impossibility theorems have suggested many directions: mathematical characterisations of voting structures satisfying various sets of conditions, the consequences of restricting choice to certain domains, the relation to competitive equilibrium and the core, and trade-offs among the partial satisfactions of some conditions. The links with classical and modern theories of justice and, in particular, the competing ideas of rights and utilitarianism have shown the power of formal social choice analysis in illuminating the most basic philosophical arguments about the good social life.

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Presents papers from the May 1994 conference, organized in sections on the nature and role of social choice theory, and the structure of social choice and impossibility theorems. Topics include the functions of social choice theory, individual preference as the basis of social choice, voting models in the Arrovian framework, axiomatic analyses of resource allocation problems, Arrovian social choice on economic domains, and the possibility-impossibility boundary in social choice. Annotation c. by Book News, Inc., Portland, Or.

Front Matter....Pages i-xvii Front Matter....Pages 1-1 The Functions of Social Choice Theory....Pages 3-9 Discussion of Arrow’s Paper....Pages 10-14 Individual Preference as the Basis of Social Choice....Pages 15-37 Discussion of Sen’s Paper....Pages 38-43 Front Matter....Pages 45-45 Voting Models in the Arrovian Framework....Pages 47-67 Discussion of Aleskerov’s Paper....Pages 68-71 Arrovian Social Choice on Economic Domains....Pages 72-96 Discussion of Le Breton’s Paper....Pages 97-100 Axiomatic Analysis of Resource Allocation Problems....Pages 101-120 A Unified Perspective on Resource Allocation: Limited Arbitrage is Necessary and Sufficient for the Existence of a Competitive Equilibrium, the Core and Social Choice....Pages 121-174 Discussion of Chichilnisky’s Paper....Pages 175-178 The Possibility-Impossibility Boundary in Social Choice....Pages 179-204 Back Matter....Pages 205-212 Since the Second World War the subject of social choice has grown in many and surprising ways. The impossibility theorems have suggested many directions: mathematical characterisations of voting structures satisfying various sets of conditions, the consequences of restricting choice to certain domains, the relation to competitive equilibrium and the core, and trade-offs among the partial satisfactions of some conditions. The links with classical and modern theories of justice and, in particular the competing ideas of rights and utilitarianism have shown the power of formal social choice analysis is illuminating the most basic philosophical argument s about the good social life. Edited By Kenneth J. Arrow, Amartya Sen And Kotaro Suzumura. Includes Bibliographical References And Indexes.