Social Choice and Strategic Decisions: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey S. Banks (Studies in Choice and Welfare)

Social choices, about expenditures on government programs, or about public policy more broadly, or indeed from any conceivable set of alternatives, are determined by politics. This book is a collection of essays that tie together the fields spanned by Jeffrey S. Banks' research on this subject. It examines the strategic aspects of political decision-making, including the choices of voters in committees, the positioning of candidates in electoral campaigns, and the behavior of parties in legislatures. The chapters of this book contribute to the theory of voting with incomplete information, to the literature on Downsian and probabilistic voting models of elections, to the theory of social choice in distributive environments, and to the theory of optimal dynamic decision-making. The essays employ a spectrum of research methods, from game-theoretic analysis, to empirical investigation, to experimental testing. Social choices, about expenditures on government programs, or about public policy more broadly, or indeed from any conceivable set of alternatives, are determined by politics. This book is a collection of essays that tie together the fields spanned by Jeffrey S. Banks̀ research on this subject. It examines the strategic aspects of political decision-making, including the choices of voters in committees, the positioning of candidates in electoral campaigns, and the behavior of parties in legislatures. The chapters of this book contribute to the theory of voting with incomplete information, to the literature on Downsian and probabilistic voting models of elections, to the theory of social choice in distributive environments, and to the theory of optimal dynamic decision-making. The essays employ a spectrum of research methods, from game-theoretic analysis, to empirical investigation, to experimental testing. In the manner of Jeffrey S. Banks̀ research, these pieces focus on fundamental social scientific issues, such as the welfare properties of voting systems, the existence and characterization of electroral equilibria, and the impact of parties on political processes Kuklys examines how Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen's approach to welfare measurement can be put in practice for poverty and inequality measurement in affluent societies such as the UK. Sen argues that an individual's welfare should not be measured in terms of her income, but in terms what she can actually do or be, her capabilities. In Chapters 1 and 2, Kuklys describes the capability approach from a standard welfare economic point of view and provides a comprehensive literature review of the empirical applications in this area of research. In the remaining chapters, novel econometric techniques are employed to operationalise the concepts of functionings and capability to investigate inequality and poverty in terms of capability in the UK. Kuklys finds that capability measurement is always a useful complement to traditional monetary analysis, and particularly so in the case of capability-deprived disabled individuals. Kuklys Examines How Nobel Prize-winning Economist Amartya Sen's Approach To Welfare Measurement Can Be Put In Practice For Poverty And Inequality Measurement In Affluent Societies Such As The Uk. Sen Argues That An Individual's Welfare Should Not Be Measured In Terms Of Her Income, But In Terms What She Can Actually Do Or Be, Her Capabilities.--book Jacket. 1. Introduction -- 2. Sen's Capability Approach To Welfare Economics / Wiebke Kuklys And Ingrid Robeyns -- 3. Measurement Of Functionings Achievement : Structural Equation Models As An Alternative -- 4. Functionings-based Vs. Income-based Inequality Measures : Informational Content And Robustness -- 5. Monetary Approach To Capability Measurement Of The Disabled In The Uk. Wiebke Kuklys. Based On The Author's Ph. D. Thesis, Cambridge University. Includes Bibliographical References (p. [105]-112) And Index. Contents......Page 15 Introduction and Overview......Page 17 Probabilistic Voting in the Spatial Model of Elections: The Theory of Office-motivated Candidates......Page 31 Local Political Equilibria......Page 73 Electoral Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information......Page 108 Party Objectives in the "Divide a Dollar" Electoral Competition......Page 128 Generalized Bandit Problems......Page 146 The Banks Set and the Uncovered Set in Budget Allocation Problems......Page 178 Experiments in Majoritarian Bargaining......Page 215 Legislative Coalitions in a Bargaining Model with Externalities......Page 241 Testing Theories of Lawmaking......Page 262 Deliberation and Voting Rules......Page 282 E......Page 330 P......Page 331 W......Page 332 "This book is a collection of essays that tie together the fields spanned by Jeffrey S. Banks' research on this subject. It examines the strategic aspects of political decision-making, including the choices of voters in committees, the positioning of candidates in electoral campaigns, and the behavior of parties in legislatures. The chapters of this book contribute to the theory of voting with incomplete information, to the literature on Downsian and probabilisitc voting models of elections, to the theory of social choice in distributive environments, and to the theory of optimal dynamic decision-making. The essays employ a spectrum of research methods, from game-theoretic analysis, to empirical investigation, to experimental testing."--Jacket The spatial model of elections, originating in the work of Hotelling [19], Downs [12], and Black [8], is perhaps the simplest formalization of democratic politics: each of two candidates adopt policy platforms before an election, voters cast their votes, and the winner implements his or her platform.