So Much to Lose: John F. Kennedy and American Policy in Laos (Studies in Conflict, Diplomacy, and Peace)

Before U.S. combat units were deployed to Vietnam, presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy strove to defeat a communist-led insurgency in Laos. This impoverished, landlocked Southeast Asian kingdom was geopolitically significant because it bordered more powerful communist and anticommunist nations. The Ho Chi Minh Trail, which traversed the country, was also a critical route for North Vietnamese infiltration into South Vietnam. In So Much to Lose: John F. Kennedy and American Policy in Laos , William J. Rust continues his definitive examination of U.S.-Lao relations during the Cold War, providing an extensive analysis of their impact on US policy decisions in Vietnam. He discusses the diplomacy, intelligence operations, and military actions that led to the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, signed in Geneva in 1962, which met President John F. Kennedy's immediate goal of preventing a communist victory in the country without committing American combat troops. Rust also examines the rapid breakdown of these accords, the U.S. administration's response to their collapse, and the consequences of that response. At the time of Kennedy's assassination in 1963, U.S. policy in Laos was confused and contradictory, and Lyndon B. Johnson inherited not only an incoherent strategy, but also military plans for taking the war to North Vietnam. By assessing the complex political landscape of Laos within the larger context of the Cold War, this book offers fresh insights into American foreign policy decisions that still resonate today. Before U.s. Combat Units Were Deployed In Vietnam, Presidents Eisenhower And Kennedy Strove To Defeat A Communist-led Insurgency In Laos. This Impoverished, Landlocked Southeast Asian Kingdom Was Geopolitically Significant Because It Bordered More Powerful Communist And Anticommunist Nations. The Ho Chi Minh Trail, Which Traversed The Country, Provided A Critical Route For North Vietnamese Infiltration Into South Vietnam. The Declaration On The Neutrality Of Laos, Signed In Geneva In 1962, Ostensibly Accomplished President John F. Kennedy's Goal Of Preventing A Communist Victory Without Committing American Combat Troops. However, Like Eisenhower's Policies In The 1950s, Kennedy's Attempts To Contain Communist Expansion In Laos Foundered, And The Embattled Nation Became One Of His Administration's Most Persistent Foreign Policy Problems. In So Much To Lose, William J. Rust Continues His Definitive Examination Of U.s. - Lao Relations During The Cold War, Providing An Extensive Analysis Of Their Impact On U.s. Policy Decisions In Vietnam. -- Dust Jacket. Introduction: We've Got So Much To Lose If That Thing Goes Sour -- We Cannot Enforce What We Would Like -- A Wide Measure Of Discretion -- Less Precise Language Than We Desire -- A Disagreeable, Hard, And Dangerous Fact -- A Severe Loss Of Face -- A Very Hazardous Course -- A Colossal Booby Trap -- We Do Not Have The Power Of Decision -- Tenuous At Best -- A Piece Of War -- We're Going To Have To Take Some Action -- Epilogue: An Awful Mess. William J. Rust. Includes Bibliographical References And Index. Rust discusses the formulation and execution of US foreign policy in Laos during the presidency of John F. Kennedy. Using documents from the US National Archives, the Kennedy Library, the Library of Congress, and other public and private collections of primary sources, he examines the diplomacy, intelligence operations, and military actions that led to the 1962 Geneva accords. He also considers the rapid breakdown of that agreement, the response of the Kennedy administration to the collapse of the Geneva solution, and the consequences of that response not only for Laos but also for Vietnam