SMALL ISLANDS IN MARITIME DISPUTES : greek -turkish energy geo-politics

This book explores the delicate interconnections between law and economics, especially as regards island entitlements under international maritime law. This is an area in the literature generally overlooked because maritime law has been the domain of legal experts. Maritime boundary disputes are over resources, a vitally important economic subject. Yet, the economics of maritime law has been ignored. Lawyers and legal experts have dominated the field, to the alarming degree of causing needless international conflicts. Our monograph addresses this serious neglect. The methodology would be rational behavior model, one specifically formulated to make the case that dialog and negotiation between these countries is the rational choice leading to win-win outcome in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean territorial waters. Public and private sector actors identified as key decision-makers in all phases of hydrocarbon development and monetization, within an overall win-win framework. Preface Terminology Our Major Theme Notes References Acknowledgements Contents Abbreviations List of Figures List of Tables 1 The Economics of Sovereignty in Small Islands 1.1 Introduction 1.2 Economics of Sovereignty: Some Basic Rules of Sustainability 1.3 The Regime of Islands: Law or Economics? 1.3.1 Size 1.3.2 Location 1.3.3 Economic Viability 1.3.4 Self-Sufficiency 1.4 Law Versus Economics 1.4.1 A Successful Model: Batam Island 1.5 Outline of the Book References 2 Small Greek Islands of the Aegean, Turkish Continental Shelf: Legal Precedent and Procedure in Maritime Conflict Resolution 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Six Clusters of the Aegean Islands 2.3 An Enclosed Sea: Lausanne or UNCLOS? 2.3.1 A Closed Sea Agreement, 2018: The Caspian Sea Case 2.3.2 Treaty or Convention? 2.4 The Regime of the Treaty of Lausanne, 1923 2.5 Economic Sustainability of the Greek Islands 2.6 Special Island Cases in Greek–Turkish Dispute: Kastellorizo/Meis and Cyprus 2.6.1 The Kastellorizo/Meis Case 2.6.2 St. Pierre and Miquelon Case 2.6.3 Cyprus: Unsustainability of a Bi-Ethnic Republic 2.7 Conclusion References 3 Cyprus: Hydrocarbons in a Divided Island 3.1 Introduction 3.2 A Republic Hijacked 3.3 How Cyprus Became Independent? 3.3.1 Cyprus Independence 3.3.2 Two-States and Political Equality 3.4 Sustainability of Micro States: The Case of TRNC 3.5 Micro States: The Case of Isle of Man (IOM) and Others 3.6 The IOM and Meis/Kastellorizo Cases 3.7 Cyprus in the Regional Energy Cooperation 3.8 Cyprus, Hydrocarbons, EU and Turkey 3.9 Conclusion: Looking Ahead References 4 International Evidence in Maritime Dispute Settlement in Small Islands: Problems with UNCLOS 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Continental Shelf Disputes Galore 4.2.1 The Libya-Malta-Tunisia Cases 4.2.2 Cases in the Red Sea and the Bay of Bengal 4.2.3 The Nicaragua-Colombia Case 4.2.4 The Nicaragua-Costa Rica Case 4.2.5 The North Sea Cases 4.3 The Channel Islands and Islands in the Irish and Celtic Seas 4.4 The Case of the Isle of Man and the Disputes in the Irish Sea 4.5 Archipelagic Nations and Greek Claims 4.6 Turkey Flexes Its Muscle 4.7 Conclusion References 5 Can the EU Be an Honest Broker in Greek–Turkish Relations? 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Balance in the Greek–Turkish–Europe Relations 5.3 Cyprus Joins the EU and Controls Turkey’s Accession 5.4 The EU Rewards the Greeks 5.5 Greeks in Charge of the EU–Greek–Turkish Agenda 5.6 The EU in the Aegean Dispute 5.7 The PKK and Other Issues in Greek–Turkish–EU Relations 5.8 The EU Not a Peacemaker in the Cyprus Conflict 5.9 The Role of the EU and UN Compared 5.10 The EU Funds for Mega Projects in Troubled Waters 5.11 Conclusion: Honest Broker or Promoter of Conflict? References 6 Greek–Turkish Energy Cooperation: Some Future Scenarios 6.1 Introduction 6.2 Greek Vulnerability and Indebtedness 6.3 The Ataturk-Venizelos Model 6.4 The Turkish Energy Market 6.5 The Greek Energy Market 6.6 Energy Cooperation in the Aegean 6.7 Joint Gas Hub? 6.8 Conclusion: Normalization by Stages References 7 Wider Energy Cooperation: Prospects in Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, and the Region 7.1 Introduction 7.2 The Greek–Turkish Trade 7.3 From Energy Import Dependence to Energy Cooperation 7.4 The Black Sea Bonanza First, Aegean Next? 7.5 Solving the Aegean Boundary Dispute 7.6 The Italian–Greek Maritime Agreement, 2020: A Possible Precedent? 7.7 South Cyprus: Another Indebted Economy 7.8 Cyprus Peace Dividend: A Long-Run Prospect 7.9 The Role of the UN and the EU 7.10 A Peaceful and Prosperous Cyprus: Confidence Building in Energy 7.11 Monetization Options, Regional Alliances 7.12 Ceyhan, the New Energy Hub 7.13 Conclusion References 8 TANAP and TAP: A Case of Turkish–Greek Energy Cooperation 8.1 Introduction 8.2 TANAP: A Successful Turkish–Azerbaijan Project 8.3 Financial Structure of TANAP and TAP 8.4 TANAP Expansion Projects (Phase II and Phase III) 8.5 Marketing of Natural Gas Through TANAP and TAP Pipelines 8.6 Gas Balance of Azerbaijan and Volume of Gas Traded to Regional Markets 8.6.1 TAP and the Broader Regional Market 8.6.2 Azerbaijan–Greece–Bulgaria–Romania Regional Market 8.6.3 Albania–Kosovo Regional Market 8.7 SGC, the Turkish Market and Role of Turkey in Caspian Gas Delivery 8.8 Pricing of Gas Through TANAP and TAP 8.9 Conclusion References 9 Energy Hubs: Models and Options 9.1 Introduction 9.2 Energy Hubs and Liberalization Process in Europe 9.3 Turkey as a Transit Hub 9.4 Price Formation in Liberalized Natural Gas Markets and Market Structure 9.5 Turkey as a Natural Gas Hub in the Eastern Mediterranean 9.6 Conclusion References 10 Conclusion 10.1 UNCLOS Versus Economics 10.2 Can the EU Be a Promoter of Peace? 10.3 A Rational Approach to Greek–Turkish Maritime Dispute Settlement Postscript References Internet References