Skeletons in the Closet: Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Europe (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics)

This book tackles three puzzles of pacted transitions to democracy. First, why do autocrats ever step down from power peacefully if they know that they may be held accountable for their involvement in the ancien régime? Second, when does the opposition indeed refrain from meting out punishment to the former autocrats once the transition is complete? Third, why, in some countries, does transitional justice get adopted when successors of former communists hold parliamentary majorities? Monika Nalepa argues that infiltration of the opposition with collaborators of the authoritarian regime can serve as insurance against transitional justice, making their commitments to amnesty credible. This explanation also accounts for the timing of transitional justice across East Central Europe. Nalepa supports her theory using a combination of elite interviews, archival evidence, and statistical analysis of survey experiments in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Half-title Series-title Title Copyright Contents Figures Tables Acknowledgments East Central European Political Organizations Poland Czechoslovakia, Czech Republic, and Slovakia Hungary Chapter 1 Introduction 1.1. Why Lustration? 1.2. First Puzzle: Skeletons in the Closet 1.3. Second Puzzle: Why Were the Promises of Amnesty Eventually Broken? 1.4. Third Puzzle: Why Did Post-Communists Lustrate? 1.5. Existing Explanations of Transitional Justice and Timing of Lustration 1.6. A Roadmap of the Argument 1.7. Terminology Part 1 Skeletons in the Closet Chapter 2 Committing to Amnesty 2.1. A Simple Transition Game 2.2. Limitations of STG Chapter 3 The Kidnapper's Dilemma 3.1. The Kidnapper's Dilemma in Pacted Transitions 3.2. The Transition with Secret Information Game Chapter 4 Hostages and Skeletons in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic 4.1. Case Selection 4.2. The Interview Data 4.3. Empirical Implications 4.4. Hostages and Skeletons: Analytical Narratives 4.4.1. Czechoslovakia: No Skeleton, No Hostage 4.4.2. Refraining from Transitional Justice: Poland and Hungary 4.4.2.1. Poland 4.4.2.2 Hungary 4.5. Evidence from Aggregate Data 4.5.1. Operationalizing i: The Level of Infiltration 4.5.2. Operationizing to: the Opposition's Tolerance for a Transition with Amnesty 4.5.3. Operationalizing NA: Could the Communists Hold Out Longer? 4.5.4. Evidence of Exchange of Amnesty for Free Elections at Roundtable Negotiations 4.6. Summary of the Skeletons Argument 4.7 Alternative Explanations Part 2 Out of the Closet Chapter 5 Voters: Transitional Justice Demand 5.1. The East Europeans "Don't Need That"? 5.2. Surveys with Questions on Transitional Justice 5.3. Summary and Descriptive Statistics 5.4. Factors Associated with Demand for Lustration 5.4.1. Past Involvement in the Resistance Increases Demand for Transitional Justice 5.4.2. The More Citizens Feel Threatened by Communists, the Greater Their Demand for Transitional Justice Will Be 5.4.3. Sensitivity to Procedural Fairness Cuts Both Ways 5.5. The Statistical Model 5.6. Conclusions Chapter 6 Strategic Elites: Transitional Justice Supply 6.1. The Origins of Pro-lustration Parties 6.1.1. PiS 6.1.2. FiDeSz 6.2. Lustration Policies and Parties' Origins in Dissident Movements 6.2.1. Open Opposition 6.2.2. Clandestine Conspiracy 6.3. Do Parties Exhibit More Support for Lustration over Time? 6.4. Do Younger Legislators Select Pro-lustration Parties? 6.5. Alternative Explanations 6.5.1. Substitute Topic 6.5.2. NATO Expansion and EU Accession 6.5.3. Roundtable Negotiations 6.6. Conclusions Chapter 7 The Transitional Justice Bill Game 7.1. The Wave of Post-Communist Lustrations 7.2. The Model 7.2.1. Example 7.2.2. The Model with Uncertainty 7.2.2.1. Solving for the Median and Proposer's Best Responses in the Four Subgames 7.2.2.2. The Post-Communists' Optimal Strategy 7.3. Case Studies Explained by the Model 7.3.1. Hungary 7.3.1.1. Before the 1994 Election 7.3.1.2. Before the 1998 Election 7.3.2. Poland 7.3.2.1. Before the 1997 Election 7.3.2.2. After the 1997 Election 7.4. Slovakia: Agenda Setting with an Atypical Status Quo 7.5. Strategic Transitional Justice in the Baltics 7.6. Conclusions Chapter 8 Strategic Transitional Justice: Beyond East Central Europe 8.1. Summary of the Argument in Part I 8.2. Summary of the Argument in Part II 8.3. Broader Implications 8.3.1. An Application to Colombia 8.3.2. Other Broader Applications 8.4. Conclusions Chapter 9 Epilogue: Between Agents and Heroes Appendix A Mathematical Proofs to Chapter 3 Appendix B Answers of MPs and Their Constituents to 'More Should Be Done to Punish People Who Were Responsible for the Injustices of the Communist Regime' Appendix C Sampling Technique and Transitional Justice Survey Questionnaire The Sampling Technique The Questionnaire (based on the Hungarian survey) Appendix D Birth and Death of Parliamentary Parties by Their Position Regarding Lustration Appendix E Mathematical Proofs to Chapter 7 Sensitivity Analysis Appendix F Lustration Laws by Target, Targeted Activity, and Sanction Type in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic Bibliography Surveys News sources Cited works Archival Materials from Secret Police Files and Samizdat Collections (Accessed in Archiwum Osrodka Fundacji KARTA in Warsaw) Index This Book Tackles Three Puzzles Of Pacted Transitions To Democracy. First, Why Do Autocrats Ever Step Down From Power Peacefully If They Know That They May Be Held Accountable For Their Involvement In The Ancien Regime? Second, When Does The Opposition Indeed Refrain From Meting Out Punishment To The Former Autocrats Once The Transition Is Complete? Third, Why, In Some Countries, Does Transitional Justice Get Adopted When Successors Of Former Communists Hold Parliamentary Majorities? Monika Nalepa Argues That Infiltration Of The Opposition With Collaborators Of The Authoritarian Regime Can Serve As Insurance Against Transitional Justice, Making Their Commitments To Amnesty Credible. This Explanation Also Accounts For The Timing Of Transitional Justice Across East Central Europe. Nalepa Supports Her Theory Using A Combination Of Elite Interviews, Archival Evidence, And Statistical Analysis Of Survey Experiments In Poland, Hungary, And The Czech Republic.--jacket. Committing To Amnesty -- Kidnapper's Dilemma -- Hostages And Skeletons In Poland, Hungary, And The Czech Republic -- Voters : Transitional Justice Demand -- Strategic Elites : Transitional Justice Supply -- Transitional Justice Bill Game -- Strategic Transitional Justice : Beyond East Central Europe -- Between Agents And Heroes. Monika Nalepa. Includes Bibliographical References And Index. "This book tackles three puzzles of pacted transitions to democracy. First, why do autocrats ever step down from power peacefully if they know that they may be held accountable for their involvement in the ancien regime? Second, when does the opposition indeed refrain from meting out punishment to the former autocrats once the transition is complete? Third, why, in some countries, does transitional justice get adopted when successors of former communists hold parliamentary majorities?" "Monika Nalepa argues that infiltration of the opposition with collaborators of the authoritarian regime can serve as insurance against transitional justice, making their commitments to amnesty credible. This explanation also accounts for the timing of transitional justice across East Central Europe. Nalepa supports her theory using a combination of elite interviews, archival evidence, and statistical analysis of survey experiments in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic."-- Jaquette Using cases from Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, this book explores pacted transitions to democracy, in which outgoing autocrats strike deals with dissidents, offering them the opportunity to participate in free elections in exchange for amnesty for crimes perpetrated under the ancien régime.