Shrewd Sanctions : Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism

Over the last two decades, American policymakers have increasingly used sanctions to punish countries that transgress U.S. and international norms, or attack U.S. interests. Sometimes these sanctions are coordinated with multilateral sanctions; sometimes the U.S. applies them alone. Sometimes the U.S. puts forward comprehensive sanctions against a country; sometimes it only sanctions particular companies or organizations in a country rather than the country itself. In some cases, the U.S. continually adjusts its sanctions against a particular country; in other cases, those sanctions remain fairly static. The variety of sanction packages begs a question: which ones actually work in changing the behavior of the state being sanctioned? Part of the surprising multifaceted answer to this question, according to Meghan O' Sullivan, is that many policymakers don't even seem to care. Instead, they look upon sanctions as a generic expression of disapproval against the country being sanctioned -- with U.S. domestic interests often affecting the actual shape that disapproval takes -- rather than as a practical tool of statecraft. O'Sullivan's book is an attempt to rescue sanctions from this current state by showing their potential as effective policy to change the sanctioned state's behavior. She does this by closely examining four case studies where the U.S. employed sanctions against countries it deemed to be state sponsors of terrorism - Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Sudan. This book's twin cardinal virtues are its thoroughness and its cautious conclusions. Despite footnoting every twist and turn in how the U.S. employed sanctions in the four cases, and what subsequently happened in those sanctioned countries, O'Sullivan never overreaches in her claims. Many places in the book, she is careful to note that proving what sanctions accomplished (or did not accomplish) in any particular case is extremely difficult to separate from other factors affecting the outcome. Nevertheless, she superbly teases out some interesting and valuable conclusions from the data. At the end of her book, O'Sullivan focuses on what policymakers need to do to make sanctions effective policy rather than just dramatic policy. She believes they should employ sanctions that are flexible, as well as maintain open channels of communication with the sanctioned country. Too often, U.S. policymakers have used rigid and redundant guidelines for sanctions that don't allow the target to be rewarded for good behavior. Without this flexibility, there is almost no incentive for the country to change. This causes the U.S. sanctions regime against it to harden into permanent U.S. policy, even when there is little interest in either country for this to happen.

Ninety-nine percent of studies on sanctions are obsessed with the question of whether sanctions "work." Most of the literature concludes that they do not.

Meghan O' Sullivan argues that this focus is misplaced and that blanket claims about the weaknesses of sanctions are irrelevant. Policy-makers do not care whether sanctions, per se, can be characterized as useful, any more than they are inclined to generalize about military force. What matters is whether sanctions (or any other foreign policy tool) can be counted on to deliver results in specific instances.

Shrewd Sanctions breaks new ground in moving beyond this sanctions debate to address more pertinent concerns about how sanctions fit into a post-cold war, post-9/11 American foreign policy. O'Sullivan is not preoccupied with making a case for or against unilateral sanctions. Instead, she is interested in shedding light on how, if at all, unilateral sanctions can make a positive contribution to U.S. foreign policy, particularly in a rapidly globalizing world.

O'Sullivan offers some of the most comprehensive analyses ever published of the sanctions-dominated strategies adopted by the United States toward Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Sudan. She commends policies that have succeeded in tackling one of the greatest foreign policy challenges facing the United States-state sponsorship of terrorism and the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction-and forcefully advocates policy changes where they are warranted. Shrewd Sanctions also offers broader insights into the utility of sanctions in a world marked by globalization and American power.

O'Sullivan finds that sanctions do have a role in U.S. foreign policy. But it is not the role that so many policy-makers often call on sanctions to play. Rather than using sanctions indiscriminately to isolate or punish countries, Shrewd Sanctions argues for a more nuanced strategy in the interest of getting better results. It advocates that policymakers select different sanctions strategies depending on the goals and circumstances at hand. A sanctions strategy for regime change should differ from one used for containment, which in turn should be distinct from a sanctions strategy intended to change the behavior of a government. In laying out this new approach, O'Sullivan offers broad guidelines to policy-makers wishing to choose more wisely between sanctions and other tools-and between different sorts of sanctions regime-to ensure a more effective U.S. foreign policy.

Policymakers will need all the tools at their disposal to craft an effective response to international terrorism and to protect and promote other U.S. interests in the coming decades. In this quest to shape the right strategies for the challenges ahead, economic instruments will play a central role.

O'Sullivan, an expert on the use of positive and negative tools of economic statecraft, argues that in the post-September 11th international climate, the United States will be even more willing to use its economic power to advance its foreign policy goals than it has in the past. This impulse, she argues, can lead to a more effective foreign policy given the many ways in which sanctions and incentives can forcefully advance U.S. interests. But a recalibration of these tools —sanctions in particular —is necessary in order for them to live up to their potential. Critical to such a reassessment is a thorough understanding of how the post-cold war international environment —globalization and American primacy in particular —has influenced how sanctions work. O'Sullivan addresses this issue in a thorough examination of sanctions-dominated policies in place against Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Sudan. Her findings not only highlight the many ways in which sanctions have often been poorly suited to achieve their goals in the past, but also suggest how policymakers might use these tools to better effect in the future.

This book will provide a valuable resource for policymakers groping to find the right set of instruments to address both the old and the new challenges facing the United States. It will also serve as an important resource to those interested in U.S. policy toward 'rogue' states and in the status of the sanctions debate between policymakers and scholars.

" Policymakers will need all the tools at their disposal to craft an effective response to international terrorism and to protect and promote other U.S. interests in the coming decades. In this quest to shape the right strategies for the challenges ahead, economic instruments will play a central role. O'Sullivan, an expert on the use of positive and negative tools of economic statecraft, argues that in the post-September 11th international climate, the United States will be even more willing to use its economic power to advance its foreign policy goals than it has in the past. This impulse, she argues, can lead to a more effective foreign policy given the many ways in which sanctions and incentives can forcefully advance U.S. interests. But a recalibration of these toolssanctions in particularis necessary in order for them to live up to their potential. Critical to such a reassessment is a thorough understanding of how the post-cold war international environmentglobalization and American primacy in particularhas influenced how sanctions work. O'Sullivan addresses this issue in a thorough examination of sanctions-dominated policies in place against Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Sudan. Her findings not only highlight the many ways in which sanctions have often been poorly suited to achieve their goals in the past, but also suggest how policymakers might use these tools to better effect in the future. This book will provide a valuable resource for policymakers groping to find the right set of instruments to address both the old and the new challenges facing the United States. It will also serve as an important resource to those interested in U.S. policy toward 'rogue' states and in the status of the sanctions debate between policymakers and scholars. " O'Sullivan (policy planning, U.S. State Department) analyzes and integrates four case studies of U.S. imposition of economic sanctions as a tool of foreign policy: Iran, Iraq, Sudan, and Libya. Largely dismissing any questions about the morality of sanctions (aside from briefly brushing aside claims of millions of dead Iraqi children as Iraqi propaganda), she judges the effectiveness of the sanctions regimes in accomplishing foreign policy goals to be strong. She suggests that they shouldn't always be seen in terms of producing immediate political change and that they can be useful in "containment," especially if crafted carefully to fit each particular case. Annotation (c)2003 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)