Self-Knowing Agents

Lucy O'Brien argues that a satisfactory account of first-person reference and self-knowledge needs to concentrate on our nature as agents. She considers two main questions. First, what account of first-person reference can we give that respects the guaranteed nature of such reference? Second, what account can we give of our knowledge of our mental and physical actions? Clearly written, with rigorous discussion of rival views, this book will be of interest to anyone working in the philosophy of mind and action. Lucy O'brien Argues That A Satisfactory Account Of Self-reference And Self-knowledge Needs To Concentrate On Our Nature As Agents. She Considers Two Main Questions. First, What Account Should We Give Of First-person Reference That Will Respect The Guaranteed Nature Of Such Reference? Second, In Virtue Of What Should We Take Certain Judgements As Judgements About Oneself As A Self? Clearly Written, With Discussion Of Rival Views, This Book Will Be Of Interest To Anyone Working In The Philosophy Of Mind And Action.--book Jacket. Arguments For The No-reference View Of 'i' -- Perceptual Models Of First-person Reference -- The Self-reference Rule -- The Agency Account -- Agent's Awareness And Knowledge Of Our Mental Actions -- What Are Actions? -- On Knowing One's Own Actions -- Bodily Awareness -- Bodily Awareness And Self-knowledge. Lucy O'brien. Includes Bibliographical References (p. [219]-226) And Index. Contents......Page 12 Preface......Page 8 PART I. FIRST-PERSON REFERENCE......Page 14 1. Introduction to Part I......Page 16 2. Arguments for the No-Reference View of ‘I’......Page 28 3. Perceptual Models of First-Person Reference......Page 42 4. The Self-Reference Rule......Page 62 5. The Agency Account......Page 87 6. Agent’s Awareness and Knowledge of Our Mental Actions......Page 108 PART II. ACTION AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE......Page 138 7. Introduction to Part II......Page 140 8. What are Actions?......Page 142 9. On Knowing One’s Own Actions......Page 169 10. Bodily Awareness......Page 204 11. Bodily Awareness and Self-Knowledge......Page 214 Bibliography......Page 232 C......Page 240 I......Page 241 P......Page 242 S......Page 243 Y......Page 244 Covering a fascinating topic in the philosophy of mind and action, the author changes the focus of, and gives fresh momentum to, current discussions of self-identification and self-reference. Lucy O'Brien argues that a satisfactory account of first-person reference and self-knowledge needs to concentrate on our nature as agents. She considers two main questions. First, what account of first-person reference can we give that respects the guaranteed nature of such reference? Second, what account can we give of our knowledge of our mental and physical actions? Clearly written, with rigorous discussion of rival views, this book will be of interest to anyone working in thephilosophy of mind and action ## Abstract This book argues that a satisfactory account of first-person reference and self-knowledge needs to concentrate on our nature as agents. It considers two main questions. First, what account of first-person reference can we give that respects the guaranteed nature of such reference? Second, what account can we give of our knowledge of our mental and physical actions?