Seeking Supremacy: The Pursuit of Judicial Power in Pakistan (Cambridge Studies in Law and Society)

The emergence of the judiciary as an assertive and confrontationalcentre of power has been the most consequential new feature ofPakistan’s political system. This book maps out the evolution of therelationship between the judiciary and military in Pakistan, explainingwhy Pakistan’s high courts shifted from loyal deference to the military toopen competition, and confrontation, with military and civilian institutions. Yasser Kureshi demonstrates that a shift in the audiencesshaping judicial preferences explains the emergence of the judiciary asan assertive power centre. As the judiciary gradually embraced lessdeferential institutional preferences, a shift in judicial preferences tookplace and the judiciary sought to play a more expansive and authoritative political role. Using this audience-based approach, Kureshi rootsthe judiciary in its political, social and institutional context, anddevelops a generalizable framework that can explain variation andchange in judicial-military relations around the world.Yasser Kureshi is the John and Daria Barry Postdoctoral Fellow in constitutional theory and law at the University of Oxford. His research concerns the military and the judiciary and their impact on constitutionalconfigurations and democratic outcomes in authoritarian and postauthoritarian states. His other research interests include democratic backsliding in South Asia, coup legitimation strategies, federalism and themaking of legal cultures. His work has appeared in the Journal ofComparative Politics, the Journal of Conflict Resolution and Democratization "Like many other post-colonial states, Pakistan's political system has experienced domination by its military and other political power centres have needed to define their roles vis-à-vis the armed forces. An especially significant institution, and one whose role vis-à-vis the miltary has evolved and changed over time, has been the higher judiciary. On November 3rd, 2007, General Musharraf, Pakistan's fourth military ruler (since 1999), proclaimed a state of emergency in the country and suspended Pakistan's constitution. Musharraf's Proclamation was motivated by a growing confrontation with Pakistan's judiciary and its activist twentieth Chief Justice, Iftikhar Chaudhry. The regime ordered the judges of the High Courts and the Supreme Court to take an oath to uphold his new Provisional Constitutional Order, and dismiss any legal challenge to the powers and authority of Musharraf's military regime. Any judges who refused to take this oath were to be immediately removed from judicial service. Yet, in an impressive show of defiance, a majority of the judges refused to take the oath, and suffered removal from office. A picture of Justice Chaudhry being manhandled by security officials soon became an iconic image that galvanized public support for the judiciary in its growing confrontation with the military. As the confrontation between the two institutions escalated, Pakistan's lawyers mobilized across the country, celebrating the judiciary's newfound commitment to socio-economic activism, encouraging its growing assertiveness against the military regime, and resisting efforts by the military to subdue the judiciary"-- Provided by publisher The emergence of the judiciary as an assertive and confrontational center of power has been the most consequential new feature of Pakistan's political system. This book maps out the evolution of the relationship between the judiciary and military in Pakistan, explaining why Pakistan's high courts shifted from loyal deference to the military to open competition, and confrontation, with military and civilian institutions. Yasser Kureshi demonstrates that a shift in the audiences shaping judicial preferences explains the emergence of the judiciary as an assertive power center. As the judiciary gradually embraced less deferential institutional preferences, a shift in judicial preferences took place and the judiciary sought to play a more expansive and authoritative political role. Using this audience-based approach, Kureshi roots the judiciary in its political, social and institutional context, and develops a generalizable framework that can explain variation and change in judicial-military relations around the world. 00. 9781316516935 01.0_pp_i_i_Seeking_Supremacy 02.0_pp_ii_ii_Cambridge_Studies_in_Law_and_Society 03.0_pp_iii_iii_Seeking_Supremacy 04.0_pp_iv_iv_Copyright_page 05.0_pp_v_vi_Dedication 06.0_pp_vii_vii_Contents 07.0_pp_viii_viii_Figures 08.0_pp_ix_ix_Tables 09.0_pp_x_xii_Acknowledgements 10.0_pp_1_17_Introduction 11.0_pp_18_47_The_Judiciary_Rule_of_Law_and_the_Military 12.0_pp_48_82_The_Loyal_Court_19471977 13.0_pp_83_110_The_Controlled_Court_19771999_Part_1 14.0_pp_111_152_Between_the_Barracks_and_the_Bar_19771999_Part_2 15.0_pp_153_219_The_Confrontational_Court_19992017 16.0_pp_220_237_Epilogue 17.0_pp_238_264_Conclusion_and_Comparative_Perspectives 18.0_pp_265_266_Structure_of_the_Pakistani_Judiciary 19.0_pp_267_279_References 20.0_pp_280_286_Index 21.0_pp_287_296_Cambridge_Studies_in_Law_and_Society