Secrets in Global Governance: Disclosure Dilemmas and the Challenge of International Cooperation (Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Series Number 154)

"Scholars have long argued that transparency makes international rule violations more visible and improves outcomes. Secrets in Global Governance revises this claim to show how equipping international organizations (IOs) with secrecy can be a critical tool for eliciting sensitive information and increasing cooperation. States are often deterred from disclosing information about violations of international rules by concerns of revealing commercially sensitive economic information or the sources and methods used to collect intelligence. IOs equipped with effective confidentiality systems can analyze and act on sensitive information while preventing its wide release. Carnegie and Carson use statistical analyses of new data, elite interviews, and archival research to test this argument in domains across international relations, including nuclear proliferation, international trade, justice for war crimes, and foreign direct investment. Secrets in Global Governance brings a groundbreaking new perspective to the literature of international relations." -- Provided by publisher Cover Half title Title Series Title Copyright Copyright Figures Tables Acknowledgments 1 | Introduction 2 | Theory 3 | Sensitive Information in Global Governance: The Past and the Present 4 | Nuclear Proliferation 5 | International Trade 6 | War Crimes 7 | Foreign Direct Investment 8 | Conclusion References Index Cambridge Studies in International Relations What makes international rules effective? Transparency provided by international organizations has been a common answer. This book offers multi-method evidence that equipping international organizations with secrecy, rather than transparency, can enhance cooperation in domains ranging from nuclear proliferation to trade to human rights.