Scientific Progress: A Study Concerning the Nature of the Relation Between Successive Scientific Theories (Synthese Library Book 153)

For the philosopher interested in the idea of objective knowledge of the real world, the nature of science is of special importance, for science, and more particularly physics, is today considered to be paradigmatic in its affording of such knowledge. And no understand­ ing of science is complete until it includes an appreciation of the nature of the relation between successive scientific theories-that is, until it includes a conception of scientific progress. Now it might be suggested by some that there are a variety of ways in which science progresses, or that there are a number of different notions of scientific progress, not all of which concern the relation between successive scientific theories. For example, it may be thought that science progresses through the application of scientific method to areas where it has not previously been applied, or, through the development of individual theories. However, it is here suggested that the application of the methods of science to new areas does not concern forward progress so much as lateral expansion, and that the provision of a conception of how individual theories develop would lack the generality expected of an account concerning the progress of science itself. The aim of Synthese Library is to provide a forum for the best current work in the methodology and philosophy of science and in epistemology. A wide variety of different approaches have traditionally been represented in the Library, and every effort will be made to maintain this variety, not for its own sake, but because we believe that there are many fruitful and illuminating approaches to the philosophy of science and related disciplines. Special attention is paid to methodological studies which illustrate the interplay of empirical and philosophical viewpoints and to contributions to the formal (logical, set-theoretical, mathematical, information-theoretical, decision-theoretical, etc.) methodology of empirical sciences. Likewise, the applications of logical methods to epistemology as well as philosophically and methodologically relevant studies in logic are strongly encouraged. The emphasis on logic will be tempered by interest in the psychological, historical, and sociological aspects of science. "Kuhn and Feyerabend formulated the problem. Dilworth provides the solution." "In this highly original and insightful book, Craig Dilworth answers all the questions raised by the incommensurability thesis. Logical empiricism cannot account for theory conflict. Popperianism cannot account for how one theory is a progression beyond another. Dilworth's Perspectivist conception of science does both." "While remaining within the bounds of classical philosophy of science, Dilworth does away with the logicism of his competitors. On the Perspectivist view theory conflict is not contradiction, and theory superiority does not consist in deductive subsumption or set-theoretic inclusion. Here the relation between theories is analogous to the application of individual concepts, and the question of theory superiority becomes one of relative applicability. In this way Dilworth succeeds in providing a conception of science in which scientific progress is based on both rational and empirical considerations."--Jacket Front Matter....Pages 1-9 Introduction....Pages 11-13 The Deductive Model....Pages 14-17 The Basis of the Logical Empiricist Conception of Science....Pages 18-21 The Basis of the Popperian Conception of Science....Pages 22-29 The Logical Empiricist Conception of Scientific Progress....Pages 30-36 The Popperian Conception of Scientific Progress....Pages 37-51 Popper, Lakatos, and the Transcendence of the Deductive Model....Pages 52-59 Kuhn, Feyerabend, and Incommensurability....Pages 60-65 The Gestalt Model....Pages 66-76 The Perspectivist Conception of Science....Pages 77-99 Development of the Perspectivist Conception in the Context of the Kinetic Theory of Gases....Pages 100-117 The Set-Theoretic Conception of Science....Pages 118-132 Application of the Perspectivist Conception of the Views of Newton Kepler and Galileo....Pages 133-141 Back Matter....Pages 142-164