Scientific Progress: A Study Concerning the Nature of the Relation Between Successive Scientific Theories (Synthese Library Book 153)

Kuhn and Feyerabend formulated the problem. Dilworth provides the solution. In this highly original and insightful book, Craig Dilworth answers all the questions raised by the incommensurability thesis. Logical empiricism cannot account for theory conflict. Popperianism cannot account for how one theory is a progression beyond another. Dilworth’s __Perspectivist conception of science__ does both. While remaining within the bounds of classical philosophy of science, Dilworth does away with the logicism of his competitors. On the Perspectivist view theory conflict is not contradiction, and theory superiority does not consist in deductive subsumption or set-theoretic inclusion. Here the relation between theories is analogous to the application of individual concepts, and the question of theory superiority becomes one of relative applicability. In this way Dilworth succeeds in providing a conception of science in which scientific progress is based on both rational and empirical considerations. "[Dilworth] convincingly works out how from his point of view it is possible to explain the conflict between two theories as an incompatibility of perspectives, and at the same time avoid sliding into relativism by giving criteria for scientific progress." __Dialectica__ The aim of Synthese Library is to provide a forum for the best current work in the methodology and philosophy of science and in epistemology. A wide variety of different approaches have traditionally been represented in the Library, and every effort will be made to maintain this variety, not for its own sake, but because we believe that there are many fruitful and illuminating approaches to the philosophy of science and related disciplines. Special attention is paid to methodological studies which illustrate the interplay of empirical and philosophical viewpoints and to contributions to the formal (logical, set-theoretical, mathematical, information-theoretical, decision-theoretical, etc.) methodology of empirical sciences. Likewise, the applications of logical methods to epistemology as well as philosophically and methodologically relevant studies in logic are strongly encouraged. The emphasis on logic will be tempered by interest in the psychological, historical, and sociological aspects of science. "Kuhn and Feyerabend formulated the problem. Dilworth provides the solution." "In this highly original and insightful book, Craig Dilworth answers all the questions raised by the incommensurability thesis. Logical empiricism cannot account for theory conflict. Popperianism cannot account for how one theory is a progression beyond another. Dilworth's Perspectivist conception of science does both." "While remaining within the bounds of classical philosophy of science, Dilworth does away with the logicism of his competitors. On the Perspectivist view theory conflict is not contradiction, and theory superiority does not consist in deductive subsumption or set-theoretic inclusion. Here the relation between theories is analogous to the application of individual concepts, and the question of theory superiority becomes one of relative applicability. In this way Dilworth succeeds in providing a conception of science in which scientific progress is based on both rational and empirical considerations."--Jacket Front Matter....Pages i-xxi The Deductive Model....Pages 4-7 The Basis Of The Logical Empiricist Conception Of Science....Pages 8-10 The Basis Of The Popperian Conception Of Science....Pages 11-18 The Logical Empiricist Conception Of Scientific Progress....Pages 19-25 The Popperian Conception Of Scientific Progress....Pages 26-40 Popper, Lakatos, And The Transcendence Of The Deductive Model....Pages 41-48 Kuhn, Feyerabend, And In Commensurability....Pages 49-54 The Gestalt Model....Pages 55-65 The Perspectivist Conception Of Science....Pages 66-88 Development Of The Perspectivist Conception In The Context Of The Kinetic Theory Of Gases....Pages 89-107 The Set-Theoretic Conception Of Science....Pages 108-122 Application Of The Perspectivist Conception To The Views Of Newton, Kepler And Galileo....Pages 123-130 Back Matter....Pages 131-289