Russia's Chechen Wars 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat: Lessons from the Urban Combat

Russian And Rebel Military Forces Fought To Control The Chechen City Of Grozny In The Winters Of 1994-1995 And 1999-2000, As Well As Clashing In Smaller Towns And Villages. The Author Examines Both Russian And Rebel Tactics And Operations In Those Battles, Focusing On How And Why The Combatants' Approaches Changed Over Time. The Study Concludes That While The Russian Military Was Able To Significantly Improve Its Ability To Carry Out A Number Of Key Tasks In The Five-year Interval Between The Wars, Other Important Missions--particularly In The Urban Realm--were Ignored, Largely In The Belief That The Urban Mission Could Be Avoided. This Conscious Decision Not To Prepare For A Most Stressful Battlefield Met With Devastating Results, A Lesson The United States Would Be Well Served To Study. Wider Implications Of The Chechen Wars -- Approach And Organization -- Grozny I: 1994-1995 -- A Step Back: The Historical Context -- Into Grozny -- In Grozny: Chechen Strategy And Tactics -- Learning Under Fire: The Evolution Of Russian Tactics -- After Grozny: The War Continues -- Return To Grozny: 1999-2000 -- Strategic And Tactical Thinking Between The Wars -- Preparation And Planning For Round Two -- Chechnya Between The Two Battles For Grozny: Foreign Involvement And Tactics -- The Russians Back In Grozny -- Evolving Russian Approaches To Urban Combat: Changes Since 1994-1995 -- Casualties And Morale -- Force Coordination -- Communications -- Aviation -- Artillery -- The Troops -- The Press -- The Chechens Still In Grozny -- The End Game -- Urban Operations After Grozny: Komsomolskoye -- Russia's Capabilities 1994-2000: Lessons Learned And Lessons Forgotten -- Learning From The Russian Experience. Olga Oliker. Prepared For The United States Army. Includes Bibliographical References. An examination of the difficulties faced by the Russian military in planning and carrying out urban operations in Chechnya. Russian and rebel military forces fought to control the Chechen city of Grozny in the winters of 1994-1995 and 1999-2000, as well as clashing in smaller towns and villages. The author examines both Russian and rebel tactics and operations in those battles, focusing on how and why the combatants' approaches changed over time. The study concludes that while the Russian military was able to significantly improve its ability to carry out a number of key tasks in the five-year interval between the wars, other important missions--particularly in the urban realm--were ignored, largely in the belief that the urban mission could be avoided. This conscious decision not to prepare for a most stressful battlefield met with devastating results, a lesson the United States would be well served to study Preface......Page 1 Figures......Page 3 Summary......Page 4 Acknowledgments......Page 11 Glossary......Page 12 1. Chapter 1: Introduction......Page 19 2. Chapter Two: Grozny I: 1994-1995......Page 23 3. Chapter Three: Return to Grozny: 1999-2000......Page 51 4. Chapter Four: Conclusions......Page 99 Bibliography......Page 105 Russian and rebel military forces fought to control the Chechen city of Grozny in 1994-1995 and 1999-2000, as well as clashing in smaller towns and villages. This work examines both Russian and rebel tactics and operations in those battles