Ruling by statute : how uncertainty and vote buying shape lawmaking Ruling by statute : how uncertainty and vote buying shape lawmaking

"What are the main factors that allow presidents and prime ministers to enact policy through acts of government that carry the force of law? Or, simply put, when does a government actually govern? The theory presented in this book provides a major advance in our understanding of statutory policy making. Using a combination of an original analytical framework and statistical techniques, as well as historical and contemporary case studies, the book demonstrates that, contrary to conventional wisdom, variations in legislative passage rates are the consequences of differences in uncertainty, not partisan support. In particular, it shows that a chief executive's legislative success depends on the predictability of legislators' voting behavior and whether buying votes is a feasible option. From a normative standpoint, the book reveals that governability is best served when the opposition has realistic chances of occasionally defeating the executive in the legislative arena"--Preliminary page Half-title......Page 3 Title......Page 5 Copyright......Page 6 Contents......Page 7 List of Figures......Page 10 List of Tables......Page 11 Acknowledgments......Page 13 Part I: Introduction......Page 17 1 Introduction......Page 19 1.1 Ruling by Statute......Page 20 1.2 Empirical Patterns......Page 24 1.3 Normative Implications......Page 26 1.4 Plan of the Book......Page 27 Part II: THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS......Page 31 2 On Statutory Policy Making......Page 33 2.1 Lawmaking as a Strategic Game......Page 34 2.2 Cross-Pressured Legislators and Lawmaking......Page 37 2.3 Decisiveness, Bribes, and Voting Coalitions......Page 41 2.4 Concluding Remarks......Page 50 3 A Model of Statutory Policy Making under Uncertainty......Page 52 3.1 Legislative Stage......Page 53 3.1.1 Equilibrium Outcomes without Bribes......Page 56 3.1.2 Equilibrium Outcomes with Bribes......Page 63 3.2 Proposal Stage......Page 66 3.3 Empirical Implications......Page 67 3.4 Concluding Remarks......Page 73 Part III: EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS......Page 75 4.1 Common Measures of Legislative Achievements......Page 77 4.2 Chief Executives' Box Scores......Page 82 4.3 The Appropriateness of Using Box Scores......Page 86 4.4 Concluding Remarks......Page 90 5 Patterns of Statutory Policy Making Around the World......Page 92 5.1 Political Regimes and Statutory Policy Making......Page 93 5.1.1 Statutory Policy Making under Dictatorship......Page 95 5.2 Constitutional Structures and Passage Rates......Page 100 5.3 Government Status and Passage Rates......Page 103 5.4 Multivariate Analysis......Page 105 5.5 Bill Initiation and Passage Rates......Page 108 5.6 Concluding Remarks......Page 110 6 Political Prowess or “Lady Luck”?......Page 111 6.1 Legislative Performance: A Sabermetric Approach......Page 112 6.2 Lawmaking under Uncertainty......Page 119 6.3 Actual and Expected Performance......Page 122 6.3.1 The “Three-Fourths” Rule......Page 126 6.4 Concluding Remarks......Page 127 7 Buying Legislators......Page 130 7.1 The Wallet of King George......Page 131 7.2 Say Cheese!......Page 141 7.3 Concluding Remarks......Page 147 8 Electoral Rules and Lawmaking......Page 149 8.1 Ballot Access and Legislative Behavior......Page 150 8.1.1 Cross-National Analysis......Page 151 8.2.1 Measuring Ideological Affinity......Page 158 8.2.2.1 Chile......Page 161 8.2.2.2 Colombia......Page 163 8.2.3 Ideological Cohesiveness and Passage Rates......Page 166 8.3 Concluding Remarks......Page 169 Part IV: NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS......Page 171 9 The Political Gap......Page 173 9.1 Government Performance and Political Instability......Page 175 9.2 Cross-National Analysis......Page 177 9.3 Governing without Surviving?......Page 182 9.3.1.1 Allende’s Fall......Page 183 9.3.1.2 The Fall of Sánchez de Lozada......Page 185 9.4 Concluding Remarks......Page 188 Part V: CONCLUSIONS......Page 191 10 Conclusions......Page 193 10.1 Ruling by Statute: A Summary......Page 196 10.2 Directions for Future Research......Page 197 10.3 Final Remarks......Page 198 Part VI: APPENDICES......Page 201 Appendix A: Proofs (Chapter 3)......Page 203 Appendix B: Data and Sources......Page 211 Published Works......Page 213 Additional Sources......Page 217 Appendix C: Statistical Analysis (Chapter 8)......Page 218 Sample of Democratic Countries......Page 222 Sample of Autocratic Countries......Page 224 Bibliography......Page 225 Index......Page 243 "What are the main factors that allow presidents and prime ministers to enact policy through acts of government that carry the force of law? Or, simply put, when does a government actually govern? The theory presented in this book provides a major advance in our understanding of statutory policy making. Using a combination of an original analytical framework and statistical techniques, as well as historical and contemporary case studies, the book demonstrates that contrary to conventional wisdom variations in legislative passage rates are the consequences of di erences in uncertainty, not partisan support. In particular, it shows that a chief executives legislative success depends on the predictability of legislators voting behavior and whether buying votes is a feasible option. From a normative standpoint, the book reveals that governability is best served when the opposition has realistic chances of occasionally defeating the executive in the legislative arena"-- Provided by publisher Investigates how presidents and prime ministers enact policy through acts of government that carry the force of law. It demonstrates that success depends on the predictability of legislators' voting behavior and on whether buying votes is a feasible option.