Rules and Choice in Economics: Essays in Constitutional Political Economy (Economics as Social Theory)

Using an analysis which draws on economics, law, moral philosophy, sociology and political science, Vanberg demonstrates how the rules and institutions which are the basis of cooperation in society can be systematically explained. Why do the conventions that enable society to cohere survive, even when it is not in everyone's interests to obey them? This book is about how the rules and institutions which are the basis of co-operation in society can be systematically explained. The social sciences which have concerned themselves with this question have frequently come up with opposite explanations, neither of which seem adequate. Economics, with its emphasis on individual choice, seems unable to account for individuals following rules when it is not in their interest to do so. Sociology, which can explain such rule-following behaviour, struggles to account for purposeful individual action. In the place of such a stark opposition, Viktor J. Vanberg offers an analysis which cuts across traditional disciplinary boundaries between such fields as economics, law, moral philosophy, sociology and political science. Addressing such issues as the relationship between self-interest and morality and between evolution and design, his range of reference is equally wide, and Vanberg analyses the contributions of Rawls, Axelrod, Gauthier and Coleman, amongst others. Particular attention is given to a comparison of Hayek's evolutionary liberalism and Buchanan's contractarian liberalism. Taken together, the various parts of the volume represent a coherent theoretical argument about why institutions exist, and why they change. Book Cover......Page 1 Title......Page 4 Contents......Page 5 List of figures......Page 8 Acknowledgements......Page 9 Introduction: Economics as social theory......Page 10 Rules and choice in economics and sociology......Page 20 Rational choice vs adaptive rule-following: On the behavioural foundations of the social sciences......Page 34 Morality and economics: De moribus est disputandum......Page 50 Rational choice and moral order (with James M.Buchanan)......Page 69 Spontaneous market order and social rules: A critical examination of F.A.Hayek's theory of cultural evolution......Page 86 Hayekian evolutionism;a reconstruction......Page 104 Hayek's constitutional political economy......Page 118 Organizations as constitutional systems......Page 134 Carl Menger's evolutionary and John R.Commons's collective action approach to institutions: A comparison......Page 153 Interests and theories in constitutional choice (with James M. Buchanan)......Page 176 Constitutional choice, rational ignorance and the limits of reason (with James M.Buchanan)......Page 187 Liberal evolutionism and contractarian constitutionalism......Page 204 Individual choice and institutional constraints: The normative element in classical and contractarian liberalism......Page 217 Notes......Page 244 Bibliography......Page 302 Index......Page 314 First published in 1994. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company