Royal Navy Strategy in the Far East 1919-1939: Planning for War Against Japan (Cass Series: Naval Policy and History)

Between the ending of the Great War and the start of the Second World War in 1939, the Royal Navy remained the largest in the world. But with the League of Nations seeming to offer a solution to all future conflicts, a country weary of war and without an obvious enemy there seemed no need for a large battlefleet. The strategic focus shifted eastwards, to Japan, with its growing battlefleet as the new threat to the British Empire and to the Royal Navy's supremacy. From 1924 a strategic plan, War Memorandum (Eastern), was written and refined. The plan called for the Royal Navy, still the largest in the world, even after the Washington Naval Treaties, to move eastwards to a defended base at Singapore, cut off Japan and force her battlefleet into a decisive fleet battle. As a strategy War Memorandum (Eastern) had many flaws. Its real importance lay in the fact that it provided a justification for the Royal Navy to maintain its leading position in the world and to be in the forefront of the development of new tactical thinking. Through planning for a war with Japan the Royal Navy was able to test its readiness for a future war. Many of the lessons learnt during this period were ultimately put to good use against a different foe in 1939. "Between the ending of the Great War and the start of the Second World War in 1939, the Royal Navy remained the largest naval force in the world. But with the League of Nations seeming to offer a solution to all future conflicts, a country weary of war and without an obvious enemy, there seemed no need for a large battlefleet. The strategic focus then shifted eastwards, towards Japan, with its growing battlefleet, as the new threat to the British Empire and to the Royal Navy's maritime supremacy." "From 1924 on, a strategic plan, War Memorandum (Eastern), was refined. This called for the Royal Navy, still the largest in the world even after the 1922 Washington Naval Treaties, to move eastwards to a defended base in Singapore and cut off Japan and force its battlefleet into a decisive battle." "This was not to be another Jutland - as the book explains, new tactics were developed, with aircraft and submarines playing an important part, alongside the battlefleet to ensure victory. The effects that developing such a strategy had on virtually all aspects of naval thinking during the interwar period are also considered. It was impossible to have a fleet permanently based at Singapore, so the strategy had to encompass not only the logistics of sending and maintaining a fleet to the Far East but also how best to use it to destroy the Japanese fleet." "As a strategy, War Memorandum (Eastern) had many flaws - its real importance lay in the fact that it provided a justification for the Royal Navy to maintain its leading position in the world and to be in the forefront of the development of new tactical thinking. Through planning for a war with Japan, the Royal Navy was able to test its readiness for a future war. Many of the lessons it learnt in this period were ultimately put to good used against a different foe after 1939."--BOOK JACKET

Between the end of the Great War and the start of World War II in 1939, the Royal Navy's strategic focus shifted eastwards, to Japan, with its growing battlefleet as the new threat to the British Empire and to the Royal Navy's supremacy. From 1924 a strategic plan, War Memorandum (Eastern), was written and refined. The plan called for the Royal Navy to move eastwards to a defended base at Singapore, cut off Japan and force its battlefleet into a decisive fleet battle. The author examines the new tactics that were developed and the effects that developing such a strategy had on virtually all aspects of naval thinking during the period.

Japan took its commitment to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance seriously in the Great War, participating in the hunt for Graf Spee's squadron, escorting convoys, seizing German colonies in China and the Pacific and even putting down a mutiny in Singapore. To understand why British naval policy in the Far East was so unsuccessful when the Japanese entered World War II, the author takes the reader back to the end of World War I and examines the roots of British naval strategy Through planning for a war against Japan the Royal Navy was able to test its readiness for a future war and many lessons learnt during this period were ultimately put to good use against a different foe in 1939.