Routes to Reform: Civil-Military Relations and Democracy in the Third Wave (Oxford Studies in Democratization)

Abstract This book examines the conditions under which new democracies succeed or fail in establishing firm and lasting civilian control of the military. It introduces a multidimensional conceptual framework to evaluate the degree of civilian control in new democracies and to trace developments over time. The theory of civilian control in new democracies proposed in this book integrates rationalist, structuralist, and institutionalist arguments into a coherent model to explain when, how, and through which causal mechanism new democracies succeed or fail in establishing and sustaining civilian control over the military. This theory is tested on an original dataset on civilian control over the military in 66 countries that have undergone a democratization from authoritarianism at least once in the period from 1974 to 2010. The study traces the effects of different degrees of civilian control on the survival and democratic quality of third wave democracies. In a multi-method design, we combine large-N statistical analyses with detailed case study narratives of several countries. The study establishes a comprehensive understanding of the conditions and processes under which third wave democracies succeeded or failed in establishing firm and lasting civilian control of the military—and its consequences for the survival and quality of the new democratic structures, processes, and practices. Cover Series Page Title Page Copyright Page Acknowledgments Contents List of figures List of tables 1 Civilian control of the military in new democracies 1.1 Why study civilian control in third wave democracies 1.2 Analytical framework and arguments of this book 1.3 Cases, data, and methods 1.4 The plan of the book 2 Conceptualizing and theorizing civilian control 2.1 Conceptualizing civilian control 2.1.1 What civilian control is 2.1.2 Five decision-making areas 2.1.3 How to measure civilian control 2.2 Establishing civilian control in new democracies 2.2.1 Existing scholarship 2.2.2 Our approach 2.2.3 The causal mechanisms: Civilian control strategies 2.2.4 The power resources of civilian control strategies 2.3 Democracy and civilian control 2.3.1 Democracy and its partial regimes 2.3.2 Civilian control and the survival and quality of democracy 2.4 Conclusion 3 Mapping and explaining civilian control in third wave democracies 3.1 The universe of third wave democracies 3.2 Civilian control in third wave democracies 3.2.1 The five decision-making areas 3.2.2 The overall strength of civilian control 3.3 Determinants of civilian control in third wave democracies 3.3.1 Operationalization of independent variables 3.3.2 Multiple regression analyses 3.3.3 Determinants of civilian control across the five decision-making areas 3.4 Conclusion 3.5 Appendix 3.5.1 The population of third wave democracies 4 Reforming civil–military relations 4.1 South Korea: Incremental institutionalization of civilian control 4.1.1 Civilian control 4.1.2 Strategies 4.1.3 Resources 4.2 Chile: Military prerogatives, tutelary democracy, and the success of delayed reform 4.2.1 Civilian control 4.2.2 Strategies 4.2.3 Resources 4.3 Spain: Pacted transition, aborted coup, and swift reforms in civil–military relations 4.3.1 Civilian control 4.3.2 Strategies 4.3.3 Resources 4.4 Philippines: Weak institutions, failed praetorianism, and civil–military symbioses 4.4.1 Civilian control 4.4.2 Strategies 4.4.3 Resources 4.5 Madagascar: Fragile institutions, weak incumbents, and the military as kingmaker 4.5.1 Civilian control 4.5.2 Strategies 4.5.3 Resources 4.6 Russia: Weak institutions, strong incumbent, and the personalization of civilian control in the early Putin era 4.6.1 Civilian control 4.6.2 Strategies 4.6.3 Resources 4.7 Conclusion 5 The effect of civilian control on democracy 5.1 Empirical approach 5.1.1 Social determinants 5.1.2 Economic determinants 5.1.3 International determinants 5.2 Survival of democracy 5.2.1 Description 5.2.2 Analysis 5.2.3 Summary 5.3 Civilian control and the partial regimes of embedded democracy 5.3.1 Description 5.3.2 Analysis 5.3.3 Summary 5.4 Conclusion 5.5 Appendix 6 Democratic survival and quality 6.1 Civilian control and democratic breakdown 6.1.1 The military as perpetrator of democratic breakdown 6.1.2 The military as partner of civilian-led democratic breakdown 6.1.3 The military as bystander of democratic breakdown 6.1.4 Discussion 6.2 Civilian control and democratic quality 6.2.1 Low civilian control and democratic quality: Brazil 6.2.2 High civilian control and democratic quality: Taiwan 6.2.3 Discussion 6.3 Conclusion 7 Conclusion 7.1 Summary of findings 7.2 Lessons for the promotion of civilian control in new democracies 7.3 Implications for future research Bibliography Index Supplementary appendices discussing the data and regression analyses in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5, along with the dataset, are available on a companion website at www.oup.co.uk/companion/RoutesToReform This book examines the conditions under which new democracies succeed or fail in establishing firm and lasting civilian control of the military. David Kuehn and Aurel Croissant introduce a multi-dimensional conceptual framework to evaluate the degree of civilian control in new democracies and to trace developments over time. The theory of civilian control in new democracies that they propose integrates rationalist, structuralist, and institutionalist arguments into a coherent model to explain when, how, and through which causal mechanism new democracies succeed or fail in establishing and sustaining civilian control over the military. This theory is tested on an original dataset on civilian control over the military in 66 countries that have made the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule at least once in the period from 1974 to 2010. The study traces the effects of different degrees of civilian control on the survival and democratic quality of third wave democracies, combining large-N statistical analyses with detailed case study narratives of several countries. The book establishes a comprehensive understanding of the conditions and processes under which third wave democracies succeeded or failed in establishing firm and lasting civilian control of the military-and its consequences for the survival and quality of the new democratic structures, processes, and practices. This book examines the conditions under which new democracies succeed or fail in establishing firm and lasting civilian control of the military. It introduces a multi-dimensional conceptual framework to evaluate the degree of civilian control in new democracies, and tests a new theory on a large dataset from 66 countries.