Retreat from Power: Studies in Britain’s Foreign Policy of the Twentieth Century, Volume Two: After 1939

refrained from allowing German troops to enter Spain and assault Gibraltar. 'Diplomacy in war', Sir Edward Grey wrote during the earlier struggle, 'is futile without military success to back it. In time of war military success is to diplomacy what heavy artillery, with plenty of munitions, is to an army in the field.'l In the first phase, before the allied defeats in Norway, Belgium and France, the balance of advantage was by no means clear. Whatever doubts might be entertained on the British side, the Cabinet and Chiefs of Staff had not realised how readily German armour, with air power in close support, might bundle France out of the war. Even in May 1940 the Chiefs of Staff told the Prime Minister that by bombing and economic strangulation they hoped to produce such crippling shortages in continental Europe that widespread starvation would ensue before the winter and 'by the same date depletion of oil stocks will force Germany to weaken her military control in Europe or to immobilise her armed forces'. In the autumn of that year, after the collapse of France and the Battle of Britain, the Chiefs of Staff were still hoping to produce such privations in Europe that revolt might be stimulated and a British army of thirty divisions able to re-enter the Continent by 1942.2 Such was the store set by the weapon of blockade, the efficacy of which seemed to have been proved in the First World War. There was a crucial difference, however, a yardstick of Britain's relative decline in a quarter of a century. Not only were she and the Commonwealth countries now left to fight alone, by contrast with the early days of the First World War when Britain, France and Russia waged war together, but there was no longer any hope of paying for this effort. As the British ambassador said to American journalists in 1940, 'Boys, Britain's broke, it's your money we want.' That Roosevelt was well disposed nobody doubted. However, his good will found only a limited expression until after the presidential election at the end of the year. The fact that the United States showed little sign of intervening, even when France capitulated and Britain was apparently near the last gasp, lends no credence to the view that skilful handling by the British in the 1930S would have brought America into the struggle at an earlier date. The President soon after his re-RETREAT FROM POWER evidence that the British and Americans could have invaded France successfully in 1943; even twelve months later, it was a close-run thing. Meanwhile, the Prime Minister had to bear the Russian reproaches with as much patience as he could muster. On one occasion he refused to receive a message from Stalin; he placed it firmly back in the hands of the ambassador and bade him a pointed good-day, describing the document learnedly as 'nul et non avenu'. Churchill recorded in the summer of 1943 that he was becoming rather tired ofrepeated Russian scoldings, 'considering that they had never been actuated by anything but cold-blooded self-interest and total disdain of our lives and fortunes'. 14 However, the critical facts remained that to contain Germany Russian help was vital; if Europe was to have a peaceful future, the British and the Russians must get on; and the prospect of open Russian hostility, with a defeated France and a prostrate Germany lying between Britain and the Red Army, could not be called inviting. Moreover, the British were full of admiration for the heroic defence made by Russia, and realised that she had done what Britain could never do, had broken the back of the German Army. But there was the question of Poland. Because the British had gone to war on account of the guarantee to Poland, the issue could not be ignored with a grimace. Thus by stages during 1944 and 1945 Russia's behaviour over the Polish question became the touchstone of good relations between Britain and herself. The allies had already made, in effect, large concessions of territory at Poland's expense, in the well-based belief that Russia would not accept frontiers shallower than those across which she was invaded in 1941. Poland would be compensated at Germany's expense. It was understood that somehow there must be a Polish government friendly to Russia. In the spring of 1944, Eden had minuted on a Foreign Office paper, 'Is Soviet regime one which will ever co-operate with the West?'15 This was a genuine, not a rhetorical, question. British influence in the political counsels of the allies ebbed away as the military balance altered. At Moscow in October 1944, Churchill rounded on the Poles and threatened that if they did not behave more reasonably, they would no longer be supported. Stalin said that he and Molotov were the only two \* RETREAT FROM POWER the British had known that sooner or later this problem would have to be faced. Churchill had said robustly during the war that he would not mind being asked by the Americans whether Britain could repay: I shall say, yes by all means let us have an account if we can get it reasonably accurate, but I shall have my account to put in too, and my account is for holding the baby alone for eighteen months, and it was a very rough brutal baby ... I don't quite know what I shall have to charge for it.20 In August, the Labour government received a paper by J. M. Keynes. It showed how heavily Britain had been enabled to overspend. Even with optimistic calculations, the Treasury could not foresee equilibrium before 1949, and then only by a sharp increase of exports, large cuts in overseas expenditure, strict control of imports , and rationing. And to reach that state further substantial help would be needed from America; without which Britain would be 'virtually bankrupt, and the economic basis for the hopes of the public non-existent'.21 This was addressed to a government whose principal plank in the election had been the promise of nationalisation and large social reforms. The weakness of Britain's economic position, and acute difficulty over the balance of payments, therefore reappeared immediately as a large factor in the making offoreign policy. Happily for the ministers, they could not foresee the extent and rapidity of Britain's economic and political enfeeblement; or that within a generation or so, defeated and partitioned Germany, quarrelsome and mismanaged France, would be much richer than Great Britain. There was nothing for it but to turn to the United States anew. Keynes, who had negotiated many of Britain's financial arrangements with the United States during the war, apparently felt confident that he could get £1,500 million as a gift (presumably as an expression of American thanks for holding that troublesome baby) or as an interest-free loan. The shrewd Foreign Secretary said reflectively, 'When I listen to Lord Keynes talking, I seem to hear those coins jingling in my pocket; but I am not so sure that they are really there.'22 Had the negotiations taken place, say, twelve months later, the task of the Russians decided not to come in, for they would have been provided with opportunities to delay and obstruct. 'They may do their best to mobilize European countries against the French and ourselves as things are; but at least the gloves are off, and we know where we stand with them.' It has really become a matter of the defence of western civilisation, or everyone will be swamped by this Soviet method of infiltration .... There is only one conclusion to draw. After all the efforts that have been made and the appeasement that we followed to try and get a real friendly settlement on a four-power basis, not only is the Soviet Government not prepared at the present stage to co-operate in any real sense with any non-Communist or non-Communist-controlled Government, but it is actively preparing to extend its hold over the remaining part of continental Europe and, subsequently, over the Middle East and no doubt the Far East as well. ... Front Matter....Pages i-viii Introduction....Pages 1-35 The Twilight War and the Fall of France: Chamberlain and Churchill in 1940....Pages 36-65 War and Foreign Policy: 1939–45....Pages 66-100 Operation Bracelet: Churchill in Moscow, 1942....Pages 101-119 Britain, America and the Bomb....Pages 120-137 Nehru and the Commonwealth....Pages 138-151 The British Nuclear Deterrent: Problems and Possibilities....Pages 152-169 Back Matter....Pages 170-189 V. 1. 1906-1939 -- V. 2. After 1939. Edited By David Dilks. Includes Bibliographies And Indexes.