Rethinking Scientific Change and Theory Comparison:: Stabilities, Ruptures, Incommensurabilities? (Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science Book 255)

The volume is a collection of essays devoted to the analysis of scientific change and stability. It explores the balance and tension that exist between commensurability and continuity on the one hand, and incommensurability and discontinuity on the other. Moreover, it discusses some central epistemological consequences regarding the nature of scientific progress, rationality and realism. In relation to these topics, it investigates a number of new avenues, and revisits some familiar issues, with a focus on the history and philosophy of physics, and an emphasis on developments in cognitive sciences as well as on the claims of new experimentalists . The book constitutes fully revised versions of papers which were originally presented at the international colloquium held at the University of Nancy, France, in June 2004. Each paper is followed by a critical commentary. The conference was a striking example of the sort of genuine dialogue that can take place between philosophers of science, historians of science and scientists who come from different traditions and endorse opposing commitments. This is one of the attractions of the volume. CONTENTS......Page 6 Contributors......Page 9 INTRODUCTION......Page 11 Part 1: Incommensurability, As Differences in Quasi-Intuitive Cognitive Capacities: A Task for Psychology?......Page 28 INCOMMENSURABILITY NATURALIZED......Page 29 COMMENTARY ON BIRD'S PAPAER......Page 48 Part 2: Incommensurability in a Wittgensteinian Perspective: How to Make Sense of Nonsense......Page 54 NONSENSE AND PARADIGM CHANGE......Page 55 COMMENTARY ON BALTA'S PAPER......Page 77 Part 3: Intra-Theoretical Change, as a Subjective Creative Elucidation of an Objective Formerly Present Content......Page 90 FROM ONE VERSION TO THE OTHER: INTRA-THEORETICAL CHANGE......Page 91 COMMENTARY ON BARBEROUSSE'S PAPER......Page 106 Part 4: Investigating the Continuities of Scientific Theorizing: A Task for the Bayesian?......Page 109 MODELING HIGH-TEMPERATURE SUPERCONDUCTIVITY: CORRESPONDENCE AT BAY?......Page 110 COMMENTRY ON HARTMANN'S PAPER......Page 131 Part 5: From the Cumulativity of Physical Predictions to the Cumulativity of Physics......Page 142 IS SCIENCE CUMULATIVE? A PHYSICIST VIEWPOINT......Page 143 COMMENTARY ON D'ESPAGNAT'S PAPER......Page 150 Part 6: From Denotational Continuity to Entity Realism......Page 154 THE OPTIMISTIC META-INDUCTION AND ONTOLOGICAL CONTINUTTY: THE CASE OF THE ELECTRON......Page 155 COMMENTARY ON NOLA'S PAPER......Page 199 Part 7: Is a Realist Interpretation of Quantum Physics Possible?......Page 203 CAN WE CONSIDER QUANTUM MECHANICS TO BE A DESCRIPTION OF REALITY?......Page 204 COMMENTARY ON ZWIRN' PAPER......Page 213 Part 8: Ontological Continuity: A Policy for Model Building or an Argument in Favour of Scientific Realism?......Page 217 REASONS FOR CHOSSING AMONG READINGS OF EQUIPOLLENT THEORIES......Page 218 COMMENTARY ON HARRÉ'S PAPER......Page 232 Part 9: A Change of Perspective: Dissolving the Incommensurability Problem in the Framework of a Theoretical Pluralism Incorporating an Instrumental Rationality......Page 237 OF COURSE IDEALIZATIONS ARE INCOMMENSURABLE!......Page 238 COMMENTARY ON TELLER'S PAPER......Page 256 Part 10: What Can Philosophical Theories of Scientific Method Do?......Page 261 THE AIM AND STRUCTURE OF METHODOLOGICAL THEORY......Page 262 COMMENTARY ON CARRIER'S PAPER......Page 280 Part 11: A New Kind of Incommensurability at the Level of Experimental Practices?......Page 286 THE INCOMMENSURABILITY OF EXPERIMENTAL PRACTICES: AN INCOMMENSURABILITY OF WHAT? AN INCOMMENSURABILITY OF A THIRD TYPE?......Page 287 COMMENTARY ON SOLER'S PAPER......Page 328 Part 12: Pragmatic Breakdowns: A New Kind of Scientific Revolution?......Page 335 DISRUPTIVE SCIENTIFIC CHANGE......Page 336 COMMENTARY ON NICKLES' PAPER......Page 365 LÉNA SOLER This volume is a collection of essays devoted to the analysis of scientific change and stability. It represents the most recent thinking on the topic of incommensurability and scientific theory change. It explores the balance and tension that exists between commensurability and continuity (or stabilities) on the one hand, and incommen- rability and discontinuity (or ruptures) on the other. And it discusses some central epistemological consequences regarding the nature of scientific progress, rationality and realism. With respect to these topics, it investigates a number of new avenues and revisits some familiar issues, with a focus on the history and philosophy of physics, in a way that is informed by developments in cognitive sciences as well as the claims of “New experimentalists”. The essays in this book are fully revised versions of papers which were ori- nally presented at the international colloquium, “Repenser l'évaluation comparative des théories scientifiques: stabilités, ruptures, incommensurabilités?” organized by Léna Soler and Paul Hoyningen-Huene at the University of Nancy, France, in June 2004. Each paper is followed by a critical comment, which either represents an opposing viewpoint or suggests some developments. The conference was a striking example of the sort of genuine dialogue that can take place between philosophers of science, historians of science and scientists who come from different traditions and endorse opposing commitments. I hope that this is evident in the book too and that it will constitute one of its attractions. The volume is a collection of essays devoted to the analysis of scientific change and stability. It explores the balance and tension that exists between commensurability and continuity on the one hand, and incommensurability and discontinuity on the other. And it discusses some central epistemological consequences regarding the nature of scientific progress, rationality and realism. In relation to these topics, it investigates a number of new avenues and revisits some familiar issues, with a focus on the history and philosophy of physics, and an emphasis on developments in cognitive sciences as well as on the claims of "new experimentalists". The book is constituted of fully revised versions of papers which were originally presented at the international colloquium held at the University of Nancy, France, in June 2004. Each paper is followed by a critical commentary. The conference was a striking example of the sort of genuine dialogue that can take place between philosophers of science, historians of science and scientists who come from different traditions and endorse opposing commitments. This is one of the attractions of the volume This volume presents a collection of essays devoted to the analysis of scientific change and stability. It explores the balance and tension that exist between commensurability and continuity on the one hand and incommensurability and discontinuity on the other. The book constitutes fully revised versions of papers that were originally presented at an international colloquium held at the University of Nancy, France, in June 2004.