Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Law)

This book provides a comprehensive, systematic theory of moral responsibility. The authors explore the conditions under which individuals are morally responsible for actions, omissions, consequences, and emotions. The leading idea in the book is that moral responsibility is based on "guidance control." This control has two components: the mechanism that issues in the relevant behavior must be the agent's own mechanism, and it must be appropriately responsive to reasons. The book develops an account of both components. The authors go on to offer a sustained defense of the thesis that moral responsibility is compatible with causal determinism. This major study will interest moral philosophers, legal theorists, and those in religious studies concerned with the issue of moral responsibility. This book provides a comprehensive, systematic theory of moral responsibility. The authors explore the conditions under which individuals are morally responsible for actions, omissions, consequences, and emotions. The leading idea in the book is that moral responsibility is based on "guidance control." This control has two components: the mechanism that issues in the relevant behavior must be the agent's own mechanism, and it must be appropriately responsive to reasons. The book develops on account of both components. The authors go on to offer a sustained defense of the thesis that moral responsibility is compatible with causal determinism. This major study will interest moral philosophers, legal theorists, and those in religious studies concerned with the issue of moral responsibility This book provides a comprehensive, systematic theory of moral responsibility. The authors explore the conditions under which individuals are morally responsible for actions, omissions, consequences, and emotions. The leading idea in the book is that moral responsibility is based on 'guidance control'. This control has two components: the mechanism that issues in the relevant behavior must be the agent's own mechanism, and it must be appropriately responsive to reasons. The book develops an account of both components. The authors go on to offer a sustained defense of the thesis that moral responsibility is compatible with causal determinism.-- Provided by publisher Cover 1 Epigraph 3 Half-title 4 Series-title 5 Title 6 Copyright 7 Contents 8 Acknowledgments 9 Moral Responsibility: The Concept and the Challenges 11 Moral Responsibility for Actions: Weak Reasons-Responsiveness 38 Moral Responsibility for Actions: Moderate Reasons-Responsiveness 72 Responsibility for Consequences 102 Responsibility for Omissions 133 The Direct Argument for Incompatibilism 161 Responsibility and History 180 Taking Responsibility 217 Conclusion 250 Bibliography 271 Index 281 Acknowledgements 1. Moral responsibility: the concepts and challenges 2. Moral responsibility for actions: weak reasons-responsiveness 3. Moral responsibility for actions: moderate reasons-responsiveness 4. Responsibility for consequences 5. Responsibility for omissions 6. The direct argument for incompatibilism 7. Responsibility and history 8. Taking responsibility 9. Conclusion Bibliography. An important difference between persons and other creatures is that only persons can be morally responsible for what they do. John Martin Fischer, Mark Ravizza. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 261-269) And Index.