Repression, Integrity and Practical Reasoning

Repression receives little attention in philosophical literature. This study of cases of repression that inhibit an agent's deliberative access to his reasons argues that an agent cannot correctly deliberate about a reason to overcome repression as if he did so, he would already have overcome repression and so would have no reason to do so. Often it is most rational for us to repress the temptation to satisfy those desires that conflict with our most established goals or that seem contrary to our way of life. Sometimes, however, failing to see the reason-giving force of these desires leads to the least rational course of action. This book argues that sometimes we have reasons to overcome repression and that these reasons are unlike any other reasons for action typically recognized by philosophers. Even though they are relative to our desires, reasons to overcome repression are external in the sense that we cannot deliberate about them. If we could correctly deliberate about them, we would already have overcome repression and would lose our reason to do so. Although seemingly irrational at first, overcoming repression is rational is so far as it enhances integrity and makes us a more active agent over time Front Matter....Pages i-ix The Oligarchic Soul....Pages 1-13 Normative Repression....Pages 14-36 Repression and External Reasons....Pages 37-55 The Limits of Non-Relative Views....Pages 56-76 The Limits of Relative Internalism....Pages 77-98 Reasons, Rationality and Agency....Pages 99-121 Objections and Rejoinders....Pages 122-140 Conclusion: The Scope of Relative Externalism....Pages 141-154 Back Matter....Pages 155-169