Repairing Bertrand Russell’s 1913 Theory of Knowledge (History of Analytic Philosophy)

This book repairs and revives the Theory of Knowledge research program of Russell’s Principia era. Chapter 1, 'Introduction and Overview', explains the program’s agenda. Inspired by the non-Fregean logicism of Principia Mathematica , it endorses the revolution within mathematics presenting it as a study of relations. The synthetic a priori logic of Principia is the essence of philosophy considered as a science which exposes the dogmatisms about abstract particulars and metaphysical necessities that create prisons that fetter the mind. Incipient in The Problems of Philosophy , the program’s acquaintance epistemology embraced a multiple-relation theory of belief. It reached an impasse in 1913, having been itself retrofitted with abstract particular logical forms to address problems of direction and compositionality . With its acquaintance epistemology in limbo, ScientificMethod in Philosophy became the sequel to Problems . Chapter 2 explains Russell’s feeling intellectually dishonest. Wittgenstein’s demand that logic exclude nonsense belief played no role. The 1919 neutral monist era ensued, but Russell found no epistemology for the logic essential to philosophy. Repairing, Chapters 4–6 solve the impasse. Reviving, Chapters 3 and 7 vigorously defend the facts about Principia . Studies of modality and entailment are viable while Principia remains a universal logic above the civil wars of the metaphysicians. Series Editor’s Foreword Preface Contents Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview The Principia Era Problems on the Value of Philosophy Analytic Realism Trials and Tribulations The Real Difficulty Bibliography Works by Other Authors Chapter 2: What Is Logic? The Subject is Hopelessly Difficult Truth Be Told, Not Shown Parity as if Logical Form Bibliography Works by Other Authors Chapter 3: Facts About Principia Principia’s Missing Appendix Principia’s Simple Types No Classes and No Relations-e A New Axiom **105 Truth as Correspondence Recursively Defined Bibliography Works by Other Authors Chapter 4: Acquaintance Acquaintance and Intentionality What I Believe Acquaintance with ‘Acquaintance’ Adicity Identity, Poetic License, and the Russell Property Acquaintance and the Verb Bibliography Works by Other Authors Chapter 5: Direction Relations Have Sense (Direction) The Family of ‘consist-Rn of’ Relations Position Relations and Adicity Converses of p-Relations Position Relations (often) Don’t Permute Bibliography Works by Other Authors Chapter 6: Compositionality Punctuation Marks Compositionality Not Predication Structureless Logical Forms L-Forms with en Resolves Russell’s Impasse Understanding Principia’s Simple Types Bibliography Works by Other Authors Chapter 7: Scientific Philosophy’s Necessity Logical Necessity Is Not an Invariance L-forms of Necessity The Necessity of L-forms Time for Scientific Method in Philosophy Bibliography Works by Russell Works by Other Authors Bibliography Works by Russell Works by Other Authors Index "This book repairs and revives the Theory of Knowledge research program of Russells Principia era. Chapter 1, 'Introduction and Overview', explains the programs agenda. Inspired by the non-Fregean logicism of Principia Mathematica, it endorses the revolution within mathematics presenting it as a study of relations. The synthetic a priori logic of Principia is the essence of philosophy considered as a science which exposes the dogmatisms about abstract particulars and metaphysical necessities that create prisons that fetter the mind. Incipient in The Problems of Philosophy, the programs acquaintance epistemology embraced a multiple-relation theory of belief. It reached an impasse in 1913, having been itself retrofitted with abstract particular logical forms to address problems of direction and compositionality. With its acquaintance epistemology in limbo, Scientific Method in Philosophy became the sequel to Problems. Chapter 2 explains Russells feeling intellectually dishonest. Wittgensteins demand that logic exclude nonsense belief played no role. The 1919 neutral monist era ensued, but Russell found no epistemology for the logic essential to philosophy. Repairing, Chapters 46 solve the impasse. Reviving, Chapters 3 and 7 vigorously defend the facts about Principia. Studies of modality and entailment are viable while Principia remains a universal logic above the civil wars of the metaphysicians."--Back cover