RELATIVISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A Theory of Pluralist Universalism, 2nd

This is an innovative contribution to the philosophy of human rights. Considering both legal and philosophical scholarship, the views here bear an importance on the legitimacy of international politics and international law. As a result of more than 10 years of research, this revised edition engages with current debates through the help of new sections. Pluralistic universalism considers that, while formal filtering criteria constitute unavoidable requirements for the production of potentially valid arguments, the exemplarity of judgmental activity, in its turn, provides a pluralistic and retrospective reinterpretation for the fixity of such criteria. While speech formal standards grounds the thinnest possible presuppositions we can make as humans, the discursive exemplarity of judgments defends a notion of validity which is both contextually dependent and "subjectively universal". According to this approach, human rights principles are embedded within our linguistic argumentative practice. It is precisely from the intersubjective and dialogical relation among speakers that we come to reflect upon those same conditions of validity of our arguments. Once translated into national and regional constitutional norms, the discursive validity of exemplar judgments postulates the philosophical necessity for an ideal of legal-constitutional pluralism, challenging all those attempts trying to frustrate both horizontal (state to state) and vertical (supra-national-state-social) on-going debates on human rights. On the first edition of this book: "Claudio Corradetti's book is a thoughtful attempt to find an adequate theoretical foundation for human rights. Its approach is interdisciplinary in nature, drawing on issues in analytical philosophy as well as contemporary political theorists, and the result is a densely argued text aimed at scholars ... ." (Andrew Lambert, Metapsychology Online Reviews, Vol. 14 (3), January, 2010) "Charting a clear course through a vast landscape of theories, Claudio Corradetti develops an original and profound account of human rights beyond objectivism and relativism. A remarkable achievement." ( Rainer Forst, Professor of Political Theory and Philosophy, Goethe University Frankfurt/Main) Preface to the Second Edition Introduction References Contents Part: I Chapter 1: Cognitive Relativism and Experiential Rationality 1.1 Beyond Cognitive and Linguistic Relativism 1.2 Epistemic Relativism Refuted 1.3 The Experiential Validity of the Cognitive System 1.3.1 Judgement and Truth References Chapter 2: Beyond Moral Relativism and Objectivism 2.1 Forms of Moral Relativism 2.2 The Two Horns of the Dilemma: Relativism Versus Objectivism 2.2.1 Harman’s Inner-Judgments Relativism 2.2.2 The Limits of Nagel’s Objectivism in Morality 2.3 Wong’s Mixed Position: The Idea of Pluralist Relativism 2.4 Discursive Dialectic of Recognition: For a Post-Metaphysical Justification of the Domain of the Ethical Life References Part: II Chapter 3: Human Rights and Pluralist Universalism 3.1 From Purposive Action to Communicative Action 3.1.1 Discursive Dialectic and Processes of Subjectivization 3.2 The Priority of Recognition and the Formal System of Basic Liberties 3.3 Human Dignity as Orienting Principle of the Universal System of Human Rights 3.3.1 Human Dignity as Juridical Principle 3.4 The Exemplar Validity of Human Rights 3.5 Deliberative Constraints and Pluralist Universalism References Chapter 4: The Legal Dimensions of Human Rights 4.1 The Source and the Content Validity of Law 4.2 The Structure and Function of Human Rights 4.3 Transplantability and Legal Commensurability 4.4 What Is Wrong in the Democratic Peace Theory? A Defense of International Legal Pluralism References Appendix: Book Symposium 1 The Ends of Universalism 1.1 The Relation Between Verständigung and Einverständnis, Between Hermeneutics and Discursivism 1.2 The Universal as Incorporated Cognition and Recognition 1.3 Conclusions 2 Corradetti, Hegel, and the Postmetaphysical Theory of Universal Human Rights 2.1 Hegel and Natural Law Theory 2.2 Dialectical Negativity 2.3 Recognition Theory and Universal Human Rights 2.4 Recognitive Normativity and Hegel’s Discourse on Human Rights 3 Humanity of Rights 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Modern Law: From Reading the World to Interpreting It Ex Novo 3.3 What Kind of Rights and What Kind of Human Being 3.4 Before the Law 4 Human Rights: From the Challenge of Relativism to the Possibility of Cosmopolitanism 4.1 Human Rights and Perpetual Peace 4.2 The Fragility of Pluralist Universalism 5 The Interdependence of Human Rights, Peace and Law: Some Reflections on Relativism and Human Rights, a Theory of Pluralist Universalism by Claudio Corradetti 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Human Rights as a Multifaceted Concept 5.3 European Law and Human Rights: Constitutionalism and Practice-Dependence 5.4 Human Rights, Derogations and Proportionality 5.5 Holism, Universalism, Peace and Human Rights 6 Cosmopolitan Law and the Right to a Healthy Environment 6.1 Introduction 6.2 Cosmopolitan Law and the Concept of Common Concern of Humankind 6.3 Human and Non-human Beings: Towards the Affirmation of the Rights of Nature and of a Right to a Healthy Environment 6.4 Cosmopolitan Authority and the Advisory Opinion of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of 2017 6.5 Conclusions 7 AI and the Grounds for Human Rights Part I: Statistical Machine Learning and Its Uses Part II: AI and the Grounds for Human Rights Part III: AI, Human Rights and the Formidable State Part IV: Conclusion: Technology and Our Self-Understanding Author’s Reply 1 The Philosophical Roots of the Theory: Between German Idealism and the Frankfurt School 2 The Philosophical Project Behind the Theory 3 Applications of the Theory: Artificial Intelligence, Non-humans and the Environment Author Index Subject Index "This is an innovative contribution to the philosophy of human rights. Considering both legal and philosophical scholarship, the views here bear an importance on the legitimacy of international politics and international law. As a result of more than 10 years of research, this revised edition engages with current debates through the help of new sections. Pluralistic universalism considers that, while formal filtering criteria constitute unavoidable requirements for the production of potentially valid arguments, the exemplarity of judgmental activity, in its turn, provides a pluralistic and retrospective reinterpretation for the fixity of such criteria. While speech formal standards grounds the thinnest possible presuppositions we can make as humans, the discursive exemplarity of judgments defends a notion of validity which is both contextually dependent and "subjectively universal". According to this approach, human rights principles are embedded within our linguistic argumentative practice. It is precisely from the intersubjective and dialogical relation among speakers that we come to reflect upon those same conditions of validity of our arguments. Once translated into national and regional constitutional norms, the discursive validity of exemplar judgments postulates the philosophical necessity for an ideal of legal-constitutional pluralism, challenging all those attempts trying to frustrate both horizontal (state to state) and vertical (supra-national-state-social) on-going debates on human rights."--Provided by publisher When he nished writing, he raised his eyes and looked at me. From that day I have thought about Doktor Pannwitz many times and in many ways. I have asked myself how he really functioned as a man; how he lled his time, outside of the Polymerization and the Indo- Germanic conscience; above all when I was once more a free man, I wanted to meet him again, not from a spirit of revenge, but merely from a personal curiosity about the human soul. Because that look was not one between two men; and if I had known how completely to explain the nature of that look, which came as if across the glass window of an aquarium between two beings who live in different worlds, I would also have explained the essence of the great insanity of the third Germany. PRIMO LEVI [If this is a man, pp. 111–112, in, If this is a man and The truce, trans. S. Woolf, Abacus, London, 1987] If all propositions, even the contingent ones, are resolved into identical propositions, are they not all necessary? My answer is: certainly not. For even if it is certain that what is more perfect is what will exist, the less perfect is nevertheless still possible. In propositions of fact, existence is involved. LEIBNIZ [Samtlic ̈ he schriften und briefe vol VI pt 4 Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1449A VI 4] We live in a rule-constrained world.