Relational Intentionality: Brentano and the Aristotelian Tradition (Primary Sources in Phenomenology)

This book sheds new light on the history of the philosophically crucial notion of intentionality, which accounts for one of the most distinctive aspects of our mental life: the fact that our thoughts are about objects. Intentionality is often described as a certain kind of relation. Focusing on Franz Brentano, who introduced the notion into contemporary philosophy, and on the Aristotelian tradition, which was Brentano’s main source of inspiration, the book reveals a rich history of debate on precisely the relational nature of intentionality. It shows that Brentano and the Aristotelian authors from which he drew not only addressed the question whether intentionality is a relation, but also devoted extensive discussions to what kind of relation it is, if any. The book aims to show that Brentano distinguishes the intentional relation from two other relations with which it might be confused, namely, causality and reference, which also hold between thoughts and their objects. Intentionality accounts for the aboutness of a thought; causality, by contrast, explains how the thought is generated, and reference, understood as a sort of similarity, occurs when the object towards which the thought is directed exists. Brentano claims to find some anticipation of his views in Aristotle. This book argues that, whether or not Brentano’s interpretation of Aristotle is correct, his claim is true of the Aristotelian tradition as a whole, since followers of Aristotle more or less explicitly made some or all of Brentano’s distinctions. This is demonstrated through examination of some major figures of the Aristotelian tradition (broadly understood), including Alexander of Aphrodisias, the Neoplatonic commentators, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and Francisco Suárez. This book combines a __longue durée__ approach – focusing on the long-term evolution of philosophical concepts rather than restricting itself to a specific author or period – with systematic analysis in the history of philosophy. By studying Brentano and the Aristotelian authors with theoretical sensitivity, it also aims to contribute to our understanding of intentionality and cognate features of the mind. This book sheds new light on the history of the philosophically crucial notion of intentionality, which accounts for one of the most distinctive aspects of our mental life: the fact that our thoughts are about objects. Intentionality is often described as a certain kind of relation. Focusing on Franz Brentano, who introduced the notion into contemporary philosophy, and on the Aristotelian tradition, which was Brentano{u2019}s main source of inspiration, the book reveals a rich history of debate on precisely the relational nature of intentionality. It shows that Brentano and the Aristotelian authors from which he drew not only addressed the question whether intentionality is a relation, but also devoted extensive discussions to what kind of relation it is, if any. The book aims to show that Brentano distinguishes the intentional relation from two other relations with which it might be confused, namely, causality and reference, which also hold between thoughts and their objects. Intentionality accounts for the aboutness of a thought; causality, by contrast, explains how the thought is generated, and reference, understood as a sort of similarity, occurs when the object towards which the thought is directed exists. Brentano claims to find some anticipation of his views in Aristotle. This book argues that, whether or not Brentano{u2019}s interpretation of Aristotle is correct, his claim is true of the Aristotelian tradition as a whole, since followers of Aristotle more or less explicitly made some or all of Brentano{u2019}s distinctions. This is demonstrated through examination of some major figures of the Aristotelian tradition (broadly understood), including Alexander of Aphrodisias, the Neoplatonic commentators, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and Francisco Suárez. This book combines a longue durée approach {u2013} focusing on the long-term evolution of philosophical concepts rather than restricting itself to a specific author or period {u2013} with systematic analysis in the history of philosophy. By studying Brentano and the Aristotelian authors with theoretical sensitivity, it also aims to contribute to our understanding of intentionality and cognate features of the mind This book sheds new light on the history of the philosophically crucial notion of intentionality, which accounts for one of the most distinctive aspects of our mental life: the fact that our thoughts are about objects. Intentionality is often described as a certain kind of relation. Focusing on Franz Brentano, who introduced the notion into contemporary philosophy, and on the Aristotelian tradition, which was Brentano's main source of inspiration, the book reveals a rich history of debate on precisely the relational nature of intentionality. It shows that Brentano and the Aristotelian authors from which he drew not only addressed the question whether intentionality is a relation, but also devoted extensive discussions to what kind of relation it is, if any. 0The book aims to show that Brentano distinguishes the intentional relation from two other relations with which it might be confused, namely, causality and reference, which also hold between thoughts and their objects. Intentionality accounts for the aboutness of a thought; causality, by contrast, explains how the thought is generated, and reference, understood as a sort of similarity, occurs when the object towards which the thought is directed exists. Brentano claims to find some anticipation of his views in Aristotle. This book argues that, whether or not Brentano's interpretation of Aristotle is correct, his claim is true of the Aristotelian tradition as a whole, since followers of Aristotle more or less explicitly made some or all of Brentano's distinctions. This is demonstrated through examination of some major figures of the Aristotelian tradition (broadly understood), including Alexander of Aphrodisias, the Neoplatonic commentators, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and Francisco Suárez. 0This book combines a longue durée approach - focusing on the long-term evolution of philosophical concepts rather than restricting itself to a specific author or period - with systematic analysis in the history of philosophy. By studying Brentano and the Aristotelian authors with theoretical sensitivity, it also aims to contribute to our understanding of intentionality and cognate features of the mind This book sheds new light on the history of the philosophically crucial notion of intentionality, which accounts for one of the most distinctive aspects of our mental life: the fact that our thoughts are about objects. Intentionality is often described as a certain kind of relation. Focusing on Franz Brentano, who introduced the notion into contemporary philosophy, and on the Aristotelian tradition, which was Brentano's main source of inspiration, the book reveals a rich history of debate on precisely the relational nature of intentionality. It shows that Brentano and the Aristotelian authors from which he drew not only addressed the question whether intentionality is a relation, but also devoted extensive discussions to what kind of relation it is, if any. The book aims to show that Brentano distinguishes the intentional relation from two other relations with which it might be confused, namely, causality and reference, which also hold between thoughts and their objects. Intentionality accounts for the aboutness of a thought; causality, by contrast, explains how the thought is generated, and reference, understood as a sort of similarity, occurs when the object towards which the thought is directed exists. Brentano claims to find some anticipation of his views in Aristotle. This book argues that, whether or not Brentano's interpretation of Aristotle is correct, his claim is true of the Aristotelian tradition as a whole, since followers of Aristotle more or less explicitly made some or all of Brentano's distinctions. This is demonstrated through examination of some major figures of the Aristotelian tradition (broadly understood), including Alexander of Aphrodisias, the Neoplatonic commentators, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and Francisco Suarez. This book combines a longue duree approach - focusing on the long-term evolution of philosophical concepts rather than restricting itself to a specific author or period - with systematic analysis in the history of philosophy. By studying Brentano and the Aristotelian authors with theoretical sensitivity, it also aims to contribute to our understanding of intentionality and cognate features of the mind Preface 6 Contents 11 Chapter 1: Introduction: Is Intentionality a Relation? 13 Chapter 2: Psychic Causality 27 2.1 The Young Brentano as a Reader of Aristotle’s De Anima 27 2.2 Causality and Intentionality in the Aristotelian Tradition 30 2.2.1 The Debate Between Burnyeat and Sorabji 30 2.2.2 Thinking as κρίσις: Alexander of Aphrodisias and the Neoplatonist Commentators49 34 2.2.3 The Medieval Position 41 2.2.3.1 Thomas Aquinas 43 2.2.3.2 Duns Scotus 49 2.3 The Opposition Between Causality and Intentionality in Brentano 54 Chapter 3: Intentionality as a Relation 81 3.1 Contemporary Readings of Metaphysics Δ.15 82 3.2 Objects and Correlates from Aristotle to Brentano 90 3.2.1 Intentional Objects: Antiquity and the Middle Ages 90 3.2.1.1 The Neoplatonist Reading of Categories 7, 7b25–27 90 3.2.1.2 Cognized Being: Duns Scotus and Others 92 3.2.2 “Being Thought About” as an Extrinsic Denomination 95 3.2.3 The Intentional Object in Brentano 100 3.2.3.1 The Discontinuist Interpretation 101 3.2.3.2 The Continuist Interpretation 105 3.2.3.3 In Favour of the Discontinuist Interpretation 109 3.3 Relations Without Two Relata, in Brentano and Before 115 3.3.1 Transcendental Relations in Suárez (and the Background Scholastic Discussions) 115 3.3.2 Intentionality and Relations According to the Reist Brentano248 120 Chapter 4: Reference 162 4.1 Reference as Similarity: The Medieval Origins 163 4.1.1 The Assimilation Theory: Thomas Aquinas 163 4.1.2 Thought or Assimilation: Duns Scotus 169 4.2 Reference in Brentano 177 Chapter 5: Conclusion: Intentionality and History 202 Appendix 212 References 214 (a) Antiquity 214 (b) Middle Ages and Late Scholasticism 216 (c) School of Brentano 218 (d) Modern and Contemporary Periods 222 Index 240 Front Matter ....Pages i-xii Introduction: Is Intentionality a Relation? (Hamid Taieb)....Pages 1-14 Psychic Causality (Hamid Taieb)....Pages 15-68 Intentionality as a Relation (Hamid Taieb)....Pages 69-149 Reference (Hamid Taieb)....Pages 151-190 Conclusion: Intentionality and History (Hamid Taieb)....Pages 191-200 Back Matter ....Pages 201-233