Recreating the American Republic : Rules of Apportionment, Constitutional Change, and American Political Development, 1700–1870

Rules of apportionment are vital elements of every social, political, and legal order. In marriages and families, in business partnerships and social organizations, and in governments and supranational relationships, rules of apportionment affect not only how collective decisions are made and by whom, but also how and why a particular constitutional order develops over time. Recreating the American Republic provides a first and far-reaching analysis of when, how, and why these rules change and with what constitutional consequences. Recreating the American Republic reveals the special import of apportionment rules for pluralistic, democratic orders by engaging three critical eras and events of American history: the colonial era and the American Revolution; the early national years and the 1787 Constitutional Convention; and the nineteenth century and the American Civil War. This study revisits and systematically compares each seemingly familiar era and event--revealing new insights about each and a new metanarrative of American political development from 1700 to 1870. Recreating the American Republic will engage and challenge scholars and students of American history; political scientists and sociologists working within the analytical narrative, comparative, and historical-institutionalist methodological traditions; and political and legal theorists intrigued by questions of history, human order, consensual constitutionalism, the agency-structure antinomy, institutional change and representative governance. Cover......Page 1 Half-title......Page 3 Title......Page 5 Copyright......Page 6 Contents......Page 7 TABLES......Page 11 FIGURES......Page 13 Preface......Page 15 CONCLUSION......Page 31 1 Introduction......Page 37 CASE SELECTION......Page 39 EXPLANATIONS OF POLITICAL CHANGE......Page 45 NEW INSTITUTIONALISM AND RATIONALITY MODELS......Page 50 Description......Page 55 Explanation......Page 56 Initial Condition — (causal mechanism).........Page 57 Theorization......Page 62 B. Expected Increase in Governmental Authority, Expected Increase in Decision-making Capacity......Page 67 C. Expected Decrease in Decision-making Capacity, Expected Decrease in Governmental Authority......Page 69 D. Expected Decline in Governmental Authority, Expected Decline in Decision-making Capacity......Page 70 ORGANIZATION......Page 71 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE I: 1700–1781......Page 73 2 Raising Leviathan: British-American Relations, 1700–1774......Page 75 PART I: INTERPRETATIVE PERSPECTIVES......Page 76 PART II: ECONOMIC CONDITIONS......Page 83 PART III: DEMOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS......Page 86 The British Constitution......Page 90 The Imperial Constitution......Page 94 The Colonial Constitution......Page 96 Conceptual Change and the British Constitution......Page 101 Conceptual Dissension and the American Conceptualization of Representation......Page 120 American and British Concepts of Representation......Page 130 CONCLUSION......Page 141 3 Our Emperors Have No Clothes: The Macro-Micro Synthesis and the American Revolution......Page 143 PART I: THE MACRO-MICRO SYNTHESIS......Page 145 PART II: DEFINING THE OUTCOME SET......Page 151 Colonial Submission to Parliamentary Authority......Page 152 Colonial Independence......Page 155 The Status Quo......Page 158 Colonial Representation in Parliament......Page 159 Dual Sovereignty......Page 166 PART III: A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION......Page 168 CONCLUSION......Page 179 4 Union over Multiplicity: A Bond of Words, a Confederation in Speech, and the Constitutional Rule of Equal State.........Page 182 PART I: THE PROBLEMS OF UNION......Page 187 The Architectonic Issue of Apportionment......Page 189 The Financial Costs and Constitutional Benefits of a Coordinated Resistance......Page 192 Territorial Lines as Constitutional Divisions......Page 194 Framing the Constitutional Debate......Page 195 PART II: DELIBERATIONS TOWARD A CONSTITUTIONAL CONSENSUS......Page 200 The Rule of Apportionment and the Powers of the National Government......Page 201 Securing the Consent of Uncertain Majorities and Certain Minorities......Page 204 The Apportionment Rule Debated......Page 206 The Rule for Dividing Common Expenses Debated......Page 208 Rules for Regulating State Boundaries and the Western Lands Debated......Page 211 PART III: THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE CONSENSUAL UNION......Page 214 Evolution of Constitutional Consensus......Page 216 The Calculus of Consent......Page 227 PART IV: RATIFICATION OF THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION......Page 231 CONCLUSION......Page 233 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE II: 1781–1789......Page 235 5 Contours of the Confederation: Macrolevel Conditions, 1776–1786......Page 237 PART I: INTERPRETATIVE PERSPECTIVES......Page 239 PART II: ECONOMIC CONDITIONS......Page 243 PART III: DEMOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS......Page 246 PART IV: INSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS......Page 248 PART V: IDEOLOGICAL CONDITIONS – THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION......Page 255 Localism......Page 259 Responsive Elitism......Page 264 Dynamic Institutionalism......Page 266 CONCLUSION......Page 270 6 Divide et Impera: Constitutional Heresthetics and the Abandonment of the Articles of Confederation......Page 272 PART I: CONSTITUTIONAL ENTREPRENEURS......Page 273 Profile of An Entrepreneur: James Madison......Page 275 PART II: STRATEGIC ACTORS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE......Page 278 PART III: A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF STATE COMMITMENT TO THE 1787 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION......Page 284 CONCLUSION......Page 295 7 The Veil of Representational Certainty: The 1787 Constitutional Convention and the Making of the U.S. Constitution......Page 297 PART I: A CONTEST FOR POWER, NOT FOR LIBERTY......Page 300 The Virginia Plan......Page 301 The Rule of Apportionment......Page 302 House Elections......Page 304 Senate Elections......Page 306 The Rule of Apportionment Revisited......Page 309 PART II: CONSTRUCTING A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL CONSENSUS......Page 320 The Representation of Enslaved Persons......Page 331 Representation of New Western States......Page 334 PART III: THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT......Page 336 CONCLUSION......Page 342 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE III: 1790–1870......Page 345 8 The Relational Republic: Macrolevel Conditions, 1790–1860......Page 347 PART I: INTERPRETATIVE PERSPECTIVES......Page 350 PART II: ECONOMIC CONDITIONS......Page 353 PART III: DEMOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS......Page 355 PART IV: INSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS......Page 363 PART V: IDEOLOGICAL CONDITIONS – THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION......Page 376 Representation in the State Legislatures......Page 386 Beyond Localism......Page 387 From Dynamic to Static Institutionalization......Page 412 CONCLUSION......Page 418 9 Between Consent and Coercion: Libido Dominandum and the End of Representation......Page 420 PART I: THE OUTCOME SET......Page 422 Symbolic Reform......Page 425 Status Quo......Page 426 PART II: A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF THE SECESSION CRISIS......Page 435 PART III: RECONSTRUCTION AND A NEW NATIONAL RULE OF APPORTIONMENT......Page 449 CONCLUSION......Page 454 10 Conclusions......Page 458 Acknowledgments......Page 471 Index......Page 473 "Rules of apportionment are vital elements of every social and political order. In marriages and families, in business partnerships and social organizations, and in every government and supranational relationship, rules of apportionment exist in various written and unwritten forms. In every form, the rule of apportionment affects not only how collective decisions are made and by whom, but also how and why a particular constitutional order develops over time. Recreating the American Republic provides a first and far-reaching analysis of when, how, and why these rules change and with what constitutional consequences." "This book reveals the special import of apportionment rules for pluralistic, democratic societies by engaging three critical eras and events of American political history: the colonial era and the American Revolution; the early national years and the 1787 Constitutional Convention; and the nineteenth century and the American Civil War. The author revisits and systematically compares each seemingly familiar era and event - revealing new insights about each and a new metanarrative of American political development from 1700 to 1870"--Jacket Rules of apportionment are elements of social and political order. In social gatherings, families and governments they assume a variety of written and unwritten forms and in every order they determine not only how collective decisions are made but also how and why a particular constitutional order develops over time. Recreating the American Republic provides a far-reaching analysis of when, how and why these rules change and with what consequences. Recreating the American Republic reveals the import of these rules of apportionment by engaging the three most widely recognized and studied eras and events of American political history: the Colonial era and the American Revolution; the early national years and the 1787 Constitutional Convention; and the nineteenth century and the American Civil War. Recreating the American Republic systematically compares each seemingly familiar era and event - revealing new insights and a new metanarrative of American political development between 1700 and 1870. Political historians recognize the colonial years and the American Revolution, the early national era and the 1787 Constitutional Convention, the nineteenth century and the American Civil War as the three most important eras in American history. Recreating the American Republic offers the first comparative historical analysis and synthesis of these Four research questions frame this inquiry into the elemental import of rules of apportionment, the process of constitutional change, and the development of the American political order between 1700 and 1870. Charles A. Kromkowski. Includes Bibliographical References And Index.