Recourse to Force: State Action against Threats and Armed Attacks (Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures, Series Number 15)

The United Nations Charter in 1945 prohibits all use of force by states except in the event of an armed attack or when authorized by the Security Council. Although the Charter is very hard to amend, its drafters agreed that it should be interpreted flexibly by the UN's principal political institutions and the text has undergone extensive interpretation. This book relates these changes in law and practice to changing public values pertaining to the balance between maintaining peace and promoting justice. Cover......Page 1 Half-title......Page 3 Series-title......Page 4 Title......Page 5 Copyright......Page 6 Dedication......Page 9 Contents......Page 11 Acknowledgments......Page 14 The legacy of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht......Page 15 The use of force under the UN Charter system......Page 16 Adaptability of the Charter as a quasi-constitutional instrument......Page 19 War in the pre-Charter era......Page 23 The Charter's constraints on violence......Page 25 Anticipated problems in banning violence: between the desiderata of perpetual peace and perfect justice......Page 28 The drafters' vision......Page 33 The Charter and uses of force......Page 34 Collective use of armed force: original intent......Page 35 The practice: uncoupling Article 42 from Article 43......Page 38 The role of the General Assembly: original intent......Page 45 Adapting General Assembly powers: “Uniting for Peace”......Page 47 Inventing “Chapter 6 1/2”......Page 53 Expanding the concept of threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression......Page 54 Self-defense: the drafting history......Page 59 Analyzing practice of collective self-defense......Page 65 4 Self-defense against state-sponsored terrorists and infiltrators......Page 67 Israel–Egypt (1956)......Page 69 OAS–Dominican Republic (1960)......Page 70 Israel–Lebanon (1982)......Page 71 US–Nicaragua (1980–1986)......Page 74 Turkey–Iraq (1995)......Page 77 The law of countermeasures against terrorism......Page 78 5 Self-defense against ideological subversion......Page 83 Warsaw Pact–Hungary (1956)......Page 84 US–Dominican Republic (1965)......Page 86 USSR–Czechoslovakia (1968)......Page 87 Conclusions......Page 89 6 Self-defense against attacks on citizens abroad......Page 90 Belgium–The Congo (1960, 1964)......Page 92 Turkey–Cyprus (1964)......Page 93 US–Dominican Republic (1965)......Page 95 Israel–Uganda (1976)......Page 96 US–Grenada (1983)......Page 100 US–Egypt (1985–1986)......Page 102 US–Libya (1986)......Page 103 US–Panama (1989)......Page 105 US–Afghanistan and Sudan (1998)......Page 108 Conclusions......Page 110 Anticipatory use of force in self-defense as a legal concept......Page 111 The Cuba missile crisis (1962–1963)......Page 113 Israeli-Arab War (1967)......Page 115 Israel–Iraq (nuclear reactor) (1981)......Page 119 Conclusions......Page 121 The “self-help” dilemma......Page 123 Israel–Argentina (1960)......Page 126 India–Portugal (1961)......Page 128 Turkey–Cyprus (1974)......Page 131 Morocco (Mauritania)–Spain (1975)......Page 135 Indonesia–East Timor (1975)......Page 141 Argentina–UK (Malvinas/Falklands) (1982)......Page 143 Conclusions......Page 145 Definition......Page 149 India–Bangla Desh (1971)......Page 153 Tanzania–Uganda (1978)......Page 157 Vietnam–Kampuchea (1978–1979)......Page 159 France–Central African Empire (1979)......Page 165 France, UK, and US–Iraq (the Kurds, 1991)......Page 166 ECOMOG–Liberia, Sierra Leone (1989–1999)......Page 169 NATO–Yugoslavia (Kosovo) (1999)......Page 177 Conclusions......Page 185 10 What, eat the cabin boy? Uses of force that are illegal but justifiable......Page 188 Index......Page 206 The nations that drafted the UN Charter in 1945 clearly were more concerned about peace than about justice. As a result, the Charter prohibits all use of force by states except in the event of an armed attack or when authorised by the Security Council. This arrangement has only very imperfectly withstood the test of time and changing world conditions. In requiring states not to use force in self-defence until after they had become the object of an actual armed attack, the Charter failed to address a growing phenomenon of clandestine subversion and of instantaneous nuclear threats. Fortunately although the Charter is very hard to amend, the drafters did agree that it should be interpreted flexibly by the United Nations'principal political institutions. In this way the norms governing use of force in international affairs have been adapted to meet changing circumstances and new challenges. The book also relates these changes in law and practice to changing public values pertaining to the balance between maintaining peace and promoting justice. The nations that drafted the UN Charter in 1945 clearly were more concerned about peace than about justice. As a result, the Charter prohibits all use of force by states except in the event of an armed attack or when authorised by the Security Council. This arrangement has only very imperfectly withstood the test of time and changing world conditions. In requiring states not to use force in self-defence until after they had become the object of an actual armed attack, the Charter failed to address a growing phenomenon of clandestine subversion and of instantaneous nuclear threats. Fortunately although the Charter is very hard to amend, the drafters did agree that it should be interpreted flexibly by the United Nations' principal political institutions. In this way the norms governing use of force in international affairs have been adapted to meet changing circumstances and new challenges. The book also relates these changes in law and practice to changing public values pertaining to the balance between maintaining peace and promoting justice "The UN Charter in 1945 prohibits all use of force by states except in the event of an armed attack or when authorized by the Security Council. This arrangement has only very imperfectly withstood the test of time. It did not anticipate the Cold War which incapacitated the Security Council through the permananent members' frequent recourse to the veto. The Charter failed to address a growing phenomenon of clandestine subversion and of nuclear threats, nor did it make allowance for the rise in public support for human rights. Fortunately, although the Charter is very hard to amend, the drafters did agree that it should be interpreted flexibly by the UN's principal political institutions. In nearly sixty years, the text has undergone extensive interpretation through this practice. This book relates these changes in law and practice to changing public values pertaining to the balance between maintaining peace and promoting justice." In this book Professor Franck tracks various conflicts since 1945 which have contributed to the extensive interpretation of the UN Charter by the UN's principal political institutions. He examines the law pertaining to the use of force againt subversion and terrorism, and the need to balance peace with justice

Extensive interpretation of nearly sixty years of the UN Charter of 1945 in practice.