Reasons in Action : A Reductionist Account of Intentional Action

"The principal aim of this book is to analyse what it is to act for a reason in such a way that we intentionally do what we have a reason for doing and intentionally attain the end for which we perform this action, as specified by the reason. The analysis is mainly developed to suit physical actions, but it is considered how it needs to be modified to cover mental acts. It is also adapted to fit the notion of letting something be the case by refraining from acting. The analysis of intentional action presented is reductionist in the sense that it does not appeal to any concepts that are distinctive of the domain of action theory, such as a unique type of agent-causation, or irreducible mental acts, like acts of will, volitions, decisions, or tryings. Nor does it appeal to any unanalysed attitudes or states essentially related to intentional action, like intentions and desires to act. Instead, the intentionality of actions is construed as springing from desires conceived as physical states of agents which cause facts because of the way these agents think of them. A sense of our having responsibility that is sufficent for our acting for reasons is also sketched." -- Oxford Scholarship Online "Ingmar Persson offers an original view of the processes of human action: deliberating on the basis of reasons for and against actions, making a decision about what to do, and from there implementing the decision in action in a way that makes the action intentional. Persson's analysis is mainly developed to suit physical actions, though how it needs to be modified to cover mental acts is also discussed. The interpretation of intentional action that is presented is reductionist in the sense that it does not appeal to any concepts that are distinctive of the domain of action theory, such as a unique type of agent-causation, or irreducible mental acts, like acts of will, volitions, decisions, or tryings. Nor does it appeal to any unanalyzed attitudes or states essentially related to intentional action, like intentions and desires to act. Instead, the intentionality of actions is construed as springing from desires conceived as physical states of agents which cause facts because of the way agents think of them. A sense of our having responsibility that is sufficient for our acting for reasons is also sketched out."-- Provided by publisher Cover Reasons in Action: A Reductionist Account of Intentional Action Dedication Contents Acknowledgements Introduction and Outline of the Book 1: Acting and Thinking 1.1 Acting and Causing 1.2 Thinking and Believing 2: The Purport of Reason-Conditionals 2.1 The Conditional Form of Reasons 2.2 Varieties of ‘Can’ 3: The Reference to Desire in Reasons for Action 3.1 Kinds of Reasons for Action 3.2 Desiring in General 3.3 Decisive Desiring 3.4 Motivational Cognitivism or Conativism 4: Reasoning about Means 4.1 Deriving Desires for Means from Desires for Ends 4.2 Means and Morality 4.3 Reasons for Emotions 5: The Intentionality of Actions: Basic and Non-Basic 5.1 The Intentionality of Basic Actions 5.2 The Intentionality of Mental Acts 5.3 The Intentionality of Non-Basic Actions 6: Refraining: Its Nature and Normative Role 6.1 Letting Be by Refraining from Action 6.2 Causal and Contentual Relations 6.3 The Experience of Self-Determination and Freedom 6.4 Refraining and ‘Ought’ Conclusion References Index