Reasons and Purposes : Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action

## Abstract This book involves rethinking the answer to Davidson's question, ”What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains the action by giving the agent's reason for doing what he did?” It focuses on the thought that practical deliberation is central to explaining human action. One common version of the widely held view that explanations of actions in terms of the agent's reasons are causal explanations understands desires and beliefs as the main causal factors and says roughly that what might be called a purely causal or ’non‐purposive’ account of desire‐belief interactions underlies the surface and (apparently) purposive or teleological explanation in terms of the agent's reasons. It is argued in this book that any such view can make no sense in the end of a common, and indeed essential, element in reasons explanations, practical reasoning itself. In the alternative account suggested here, explanations of actions in terms of the agent's reasons have an ineliminable normative element, not explicable in unadorned causal terms, which stems from the central role of practical deliberation in the genesis, and thus in the explanation, of actions. Intentional actions are always done for reasons, and the agent's reasons for doing what she did, even when there is no explicit deliberation, are whatever led her to think that this action is what she should do. So her reasons for doing what she did are intelligible only as features of her actual or possible practical deliberation, which must therefore always be at least implicitly referred to in explanations of her actions in terms of her reasons. At the same time, practical deliberation is inherently normative, both in the sense that the agent must employ evaluations in her deliberation and in the sense that her reasons are automatically open to normative criticism from herself and others. It is argued here that this requires that explanations of actions that refer essentially to the agent's deliberation have a normative element as well. People Do Things For Reasons. But Philosophers Have Disagreed Sharply About How 'reasons Explanations' Of Actions Actually Work And Hence About Their Implications For Human Freedom And Autonomy. The Dominant View In Contemporary Philosophy Is The (humean) Idea That The Beliefs And Desires That Constitute Our Reasons For Acting Simply Cause Us To Act As We Do. G. F. Schueler Seeks To Replace Such Causal Views, Arguing That They Leave Out Two Essential Elements Of These Explanations. Reasons Explanations Are Inherently Teleological In The Sense That The Agent's Reasons Always Explain The Purpose For Which He Acted. They Are Also Inherently Normative Since It Is Always Possible That An Agent's Reasons For Doing Something Are Not Good Reasons. Schueler Argues That Causal Accounts Of Reasons Explanations Make No Sense Of Either Of These Features; He Argues Instead For An Account Based On Practical Deliberation, Our Ability To Evaluate The Reasons We Accept.--jacket. 1. 1. Purposes, Causes, And Reasons Explanations Purposes -- 2. Reasons And Causes -- 3. Causes And Causal Explanations -- 4. 2. Non Telelogical Explanations Of Actions The Argument For 'the Humean Theory Of Motivation' -- 5. Are 'causal' Explanations Unavoidable? -- 6. 3. Teleological Explanations Of Actions The Need For Teleological Explanaations -- 7. Character Traits -- 8. 4. Explaining In Terms Of The Agent's Reasoning Problems With The Practical Syllogism -- 9. Practical Reasoning And The Explanation Of Actions -- 10. Practical Reasoning And Evaluations -- 11. The Principle Of Charity -- 12. 5. The Inherently Normative Nature Of Action Explanations Normative Explanations I: The Deliberative Model -- 13. Normative Explanations Ii: The Agent's Perspective. G.f. Schueler. Includes Bibliographical References. People do things for reasons. But philosophers have disagreed sharply about how'reasons explanations'of actions actually work and hence about their implications for human freedom and autonomy. The dominant view in contemporary philosophy is the (Humean) idea that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do. Fred Schueler seeks to replace such causal views, arguing that they leave out two essential elements of these explanations. Reasons explanations are inherently teleological in the sense that the agent's reasons always explain the purpose for which he acted. They are also inherently normative since it is always possible that an agent's reasons for doing something are not good reasons. Schueler argues that causal accounts of reasons explanations make no sense of either of these features; he argues instead for an account based on practical deliberation, our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept. People act for reasons. That is how we understand ourselves. But what is it to act for a reason? This is what Fred Schueler investigates. He rejects the dominant view that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do, and argues instead for a view centred on practical deliberation--our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept. Schueler's account of 'reasons explanations' emphasizes the relation between reasons and purposes, and the fact that the reasons for an action are not always good reasons. People act for reasons. But what is it to act for a reason? Schueler rejects the accepted view that beliefs & desires cause us to act as we do & argues instead for a view centred on practical deliberation, our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept Local Disk......Page 0 E:\SHARE\GigaHFILE\G. F. Schueler - Reasons and Purposes, Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action\htm.htm......Page 1 It seems clear enough that intentional actions are inherently purposive; indeed, international human actions are paradigm examples of purposive behavior.