Realism and Antirealism in Kant's Moral Philosophy : New Essays

The debate between moral realism and antirealism plays an important role in contemporary metaethics as well as in the interpretation of Kant’s moral philosophy. This volume aims to clarify whether, and in what sense, Kant is a moral realist, an antirealist, or something in-between. Based on an explication of the key metaethical terms, internationally recognized Kant scholars discuss the question of how Kant’s moral philosophy should be understood in this regard. All camps in the metaethical field have their inhabitants: Some contributors read Kant’s philosophy in terms of a more or less robust moral realism, objectivism, or idealism, and some of them take it to be a version of constructivism, constitutionism, or brute antirealism. In any case, all authors introduce and defend their terminology in a clear manner and argue thoughtfully and refreshingly for their positions. With contributions of Stefano Bacin, Jochen Bojanowski, Christoph Horn, Patrick Kain, Lara Ostaric, Fred Rauscher, Oliver Sensen, Elke Schmidt, Dieter Schönecker, and Melissa Zinkin. Realism and Antirealism in Kant’s Moral Philosophy: New Essays Table of Contents Preface Antirealist Interpretations of Kant Frederick Rauscher: Transcendental and Empirical Levels of Moral Realism and Idealism I Empirical and Transcendental Levels II Using the Transcendental/Empirical Distinction Literature Melissa Zinkin: Kantian Constructivism, Respect, and Moral Depth 1 Fitzpatrick’s Critique of Korsgaard 2 Kant’s Constructivism 3 Respect 4 Systematicity and Moral Agency Literature Realist Interpretations of Kant Christoph Horn: Kant’s Theory of Historical Progress: A Case of Realism or Antirealism? Literature Patrick Kain: Dignity and the Paradox of Method The Value of Humanity in the Groundwork The Paradox of Method in the second Critique Conclusion Literature Lara Ostaric: Practical Cognition, Reflective Judgment, and the Realism of Kant’s Moral Glaube Introduction 1 The Antirealist Arguments of Kant’s Moral Glaube 1.1 An Antirealist Reading of Kant’s Argument for the Highest Good “from the Truth of the Moral Law” (TML) 1.2 Kant’s “Argument for the Highest Good from Human Psychology” (AHP) 2 Moral Glaube in the Third Critique 3 Kant’s Notion of Practical Cognition 4 A Case for a Realist Reading of Moral Glaube 5 Reflective Judgment and Moral Glaube 5.1 The Role of Reflective Judgment in Maintaining Glaube 5.2 The Role of Reflective Judgment in Grounding Glaube 6 Concluding Remarks Literature Elke Elisabeth Schmidt & Dieter Schönecker: Kant’s Moral Realism regarding Dignity and Value. Some Comments on the Tugendlehre 1 An Outline of Kant’s Ethical Foundations 1.1 Kant’s Ground-Thesis 1.2 Basic Concepts of Kant’s Foundations The Good Will Autonomy End in Itself and Rational Nature On Dignity 2 Dignity in the Tugendlehre 2.1 On § 11 of the Tugendlehre Ad (i) ‘for’ (denn) Ad (ii) ‘i. e.’ (d.i.) Ad (iii) ‘by which’ (wodurch) 2.2 On § 37 of the Tugendlehre 2.3 On § 38 of the Tugendlehre 3 Dignity, Value, and Moral Realism Literature Something in Between Stefano Bacin: Moral Realism by Other Means: The Hybrid Nature of Kant’s Practical Rationalism 1 Moral Realism in Eighteenth-Century Moral Philosophy 2 The Weaknesses of Pre-Kantian Moral Realism 3 Kant’s Non-Realist Strategy: The Outline 4 Kant’s Idealist Transformation of Moral Realism Literature Jochen Bojanowski: Why Kant Is Not a Moral Intuitionist Introduction Conclusion Literature Oliver Sensen: Kant’s Constitutivism Introduction Section 1: The Categorical Imperative 1.1 The Categorical Imperative as Supreme Practical Principle 1.2 The End in Itself Objection Section 2: Respect for Persons Section 3: Value Section 4: Dignity Section 5: Kant’s Constitutivism Literature About the Authors Subject Index Index of Persons