Rationality and the Genetic Challenge: Making People Better? (Cambridge Law, Medicine and Ethics, Series Number 11)

"Should we make people healthier, smarter, and longer-lived if genetic and medical advances enable us to do so? Matti Häyry asks this question in the context of genetic testing and selection, cloning and stem cell research, gene therapies and enhancements. The ethical questions explored include parental responsibility, the use of people as means, the role of hope and fear in risk assessment, and the dignity and meaning of life. Taking as a starting point the arguments presented by Jonathan Glover, John Harris, Ronald M. Green, Jürgen Habermas, Michael J. Sandel, and Leon R. Kass, who defend a particular normative view as the only rational or moral answer, Matti Häyry argues that many coherent rationalities and moralities exist in the field, and that to claim otherwise is mistaken"--Provided by publisher. Half-title......Page 3 Series-title......Page 4 Title......Page 7 Copyright......Page 8 Contents......Page 9 Preface......Page 13 1.1 The genetic challenge......Page 17 1.2 The best babies......Page 19 1.3 Deaf embryos......Page 22 1.4 Saviour siblings......Page 25 1.5 Reproductive cloning......Page 27 1.6 Embryonic stem cells......Page 30 1.7 Gene therapies......Page 32 1.8 Considerable life extension......Page 35 1.9 The questions......Page 38 2.1 Six authors, three approaches......Page 40 2.2 Rational tangibility: Glover and Harris......Page 44 2.3 Moral transcendence: Kass and Sandel......Page 47 2.4 Everybody’s acceptance: Habermas and Green......Page 51 2.5 Why none of the approaches is the one......Page 56 2.6 A nonconfrontational notion of rationality......Page 59 2.7 Equilibria, equipoises, and polite bystanders......Page 64 2.8 Plan for the rest of the book......Page 66 3.1 From infanticide to embryo selection and beyond......Page 68 3.2 Parental responsibility as seen by Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Mill......Page 71 3.3 Disregard and givenness......Page 74 3.4 Knowledge and moderation......Page 77 3.5 Procreative beneficence as a duty......Page 80 3.6 Arithmetical rationality......Page 83 3.7 Assumed parental roles......Page 86 3.8 Moral limits......Page 88 3.9 Parental rationalities......Page 91 4.1 Deafness as a test case......Page 94 4.2 Techniques and their uses......Page 95 4.3 Case, options, and stands......Page 96 4.4 Moral case for the ‘medical view’......Page 98 4.5 Moral case for the ‘social view’......Page 100 4.6 Case for legal permissiveness......Page 102 4.7 The instability of the situation......Page 103 4.8 Moral case for the ‘medical view’ reconsidered......Page 104 4.9 Moral case for the ‘social view’ reconsidered......Page 106 4.10 Towards a nondirective compromise......Page 108 4.11 The nondirective compromise......Page 110 4.12 Contested rationalities......Page 111 5.1 Facts and regulations......Page 115 5.2 The logic of the case......Page 117 5.3 What could justify invasive procedures?......Page 119 5.4 Why would noninvasive procedures be a problem?......Page 122 5.5 Rational consent and genetic privacy......Page 124 5.6 Means, mere means, and outcomes......Page 125 5.7 Means, individuals, and values......Page 129 5.8 Green’s three readings of Kant......Page 132 5.9 Ends and means: two different principles?......Page 135 5.10 Saving rationalities......Page 138 6.1 An almost universal condemnation......Page 140 6.2 Distinctions and politics......Page 141 6.3 The case for cautious progress......Page 143 6.4 Arguments for an absolute prohibition......Page 146 6.5 Lack of limits and defective individuals......Page 147 6.6 Asexual reproduction and distorted families......Page 150 6.7 Project of mastery and misshapen communities......Page 152 6.8 Loss of mystery and perverted societies......Page 154 6.9 Forsaken self-understanding and a confused species......Page 156 6.10 Design for a transhuman world......Page 158 6.11 Cloning rationalities......Page 160 7.1 What, why, and how regulated?......Page 162 7.2 Alternatives and conjectures......Page 164 7.3 Connections with ethical challenges......Page 168 7.4 Would women be unnecessarily used?......Page 169 7.5 Would women be unfairly used?......Page 172 7.6 Would women be wrongfully used?......Page 176 7.7 The destruction of embryos is always wrong......Page 180 7.8 The destruction of embryos is never wrong......Page 183 7.9 The destruction of embryos is sometimes wrong......Page 185 7.10 Embryonic rationalities......Page 188 8.1 Trials and errors......Page 190 8.2 Somatic and germ-line interventions......Page 193 8.3 Therapies and enhancements......Page 196 8.4 Construing benefits and harms......Page 198 8.5 Defining values......Page 200 8.6 Technological optimism and pessimism......Page 203 8.7 Technological determinism and voluntarism......Page 205 8.8 Precaution, fear, and hope......Page 206 8.9 Therapeutic rationalities......Page 209 9.1 Mortality and ageing......Page 211 9.2 Towards considerable longevity......Page 213 9.3 Identity beyond considerable longevity......Page 216 9.4 How mortality benefits individuals......Page 220 9.5 How freedom to choose benefits individuals......Page 222 9.6 From individual immortality to social transcendence......Page 227 9.7 Natural morality and the meaning of life......Page 228 9.8 Immortal rationalities......Page 231 10.2 Basic tenets and their interpretations......Page 236 10.3 Arguments that cut both ways......Page 239 10.4 Arguments for and against......Page 242 10.5 What is required of a complete case?......Page 243 10.6 Measuring the challenge......Page 245 10.7 Sensing the challenge......Page 248 10.8 Negotiating the challenge......Page 250 10.9 The methods of genethics......Page 252 10.10 Taking the genetic challenge nonconfrontationally......Page 253 Bibliography......Page 257 Index......Page 277 Half-title 3 Series-title 4 Title 7 Copyright 8 Contents 9 Preface 13 1 Seven ways of making people better 17 1.1 The genetic challenge 17 1.2 The best babies 19 1.3 Deaf embryos 22 1.4 Saviour siblings 25 1.5 Reproductive cloning 27 1.6 Embryonic stem cells 30 1.7 Gene therapies 32 1.8 Considerable life extension 35 1.9 The questions 38 2 Rational approaches to the genetic challenge 40 2.1 Six authors, three approaches 40 2.2 Rational tangibility: Glover and Harris 44 2.3 Moral transcendence: Kass and Sandel 47 2.4 Everybody’s acceptance: Habermas and Green 51 2.5 Why none of the approaches is the one 56 2.6 A nonconfrontational notion of rationality 59 2.7 Equilibria, equipoises, and polite bystanders 64 2.8 Plan for the rest of the book 66 3 The best babies and parental responsibility 68 3.1 From infanticide to embryo selection and beyond 68 3.2 Parental responsibility as seen by Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Mill 71 3.3 Disregard and givenness 74 3.4 Knowledge and moderation 77 3.5 Procreative beneficence as a duty 80 3.6 Arithmetical rationality 83 3.7 Assumed parental roles 86 3.8 Moral limits 88 3.9 Parental rationalities 91 4 Deaf embryos, morality, and the law 94 4.1 Deafness as a test case 94 4.2 Techniques and their uses 95 4.3 Case, options, and stands 96 4.4 Moral case for the ‘medical view’ 98 4.5 Moral case for the ‘social view’ 100 4.6 Case for legal permissiveness 102 4.7 The instability of the situation 103 4.8 Moral case for the ‘medical view’ reconsidered 104 4.9 Moral case for the ‘social view’ reconsidered 106 4.10 Towards a nondirective compromise 108 4.11 The nondirective compromise 110 4.12 Contested rationalities 111 5 Saviour siblings and treating people as a means 115 5.1 Facts and regulations 115 5.2 The logic of the case 117 5.3 What could justify invasive procedures? 119 5.4 Why would noninvasive procedures be a problem? 122 5.5 Rational consent and genetic privacy 124 5.6 Means, mere means, and outcomes 125 5.7 Means, individuals, and values 129 5.8 Green’s three readings of Kant 132 5.9 Ends and means: two different principles? 135 5.10 Saving rationalities 138 6 Reproductive cloning and designing human beings 140 6.1 An almost universal condemnation 140 6.2 Distinctions and politics 141 6.3 The case for cautious progress 143 6.4 Arguments for an absolute prohibition 146 6.5 Lack of limits and defective individuals 147 6.6 Asexual reproduction and distorted families 150 6.7 Project of mastery and misshapen communities 152 6.8 Loss of mystery and perverted societies 154 6.9 Forsaken self-understanding and a confused species 156 6.10 Design for a transhuman world 158 6.11 Cloning rationalities 160 7 Embryonic stem cells, vulnerability, and sanctity 162 7.1 What, why, and how regulated? 162 7.2 Alternatives and conjectures 164 7.3 Connections with ethical challenges 168 7.4 Would women be unnecessarily used? 169 7.5 Would women be unfairly used? 172 7.6 Would women be wrongfully used? 176 7.7 The destruction of embryos is always wrong 180 7.8 The destruction of embryos is never wrong 183 7.9 The destruction of embryos is sometimes wrong 185 7.10 Embryonic rationalities 188 8 Gene therapies, hopes, and fears 190 8.1 Trials and errors 190 8.2 Somatic and germ-line interventions 193 8.3 Therapies and enhancements 196 8.4 Construing benefits and harms 198 8.5 Defining values 200 8.6 Technological optimism and pessimism 203 8.7 Technological determinism and voluntarism 205 8.8 Precaution, fear, and hope 206 8.9 Therapeutic rationalities 209 9 Considerable life extension and the meaning of life 211 9.1 Mortality and ageing 211 9.2 Towards considerable longevity 213 9.3 Identity beyond considerable longevity 216 9.4 How mortality benefits individuals 220 9.5 How freedom to choose benefits individuals 222 9.6 From individual immortality to social transcendence 227 9.7 Natural morality and the meaning of life 228 9.8 Immortal rationalities 231 10 Taking the genetic challenge rationally 236 10.1 From challenges to solutions 236 10.2 Basic tenets and their interpretations 236 10.3 Arguments that cut both ways 239 10.4 Arguments for and against 242 10.5 What is required of a complete case? 243 10.6 Measuring the challenge 245 10.7 Sensing the challenge 248 10.8 Negotiating the challenge 250 10.9 The methods of genethics 252 10.10 Taking the genetic challenge nonconfrontationally 253 Bibliography 257 Index 277 Should we make people healthier, smarter, and longer-lived if genetic and medical advances enable us to do so? The author asks this question in the context of genetic testing and selection, cloning and stem cell research, gene therapies and enhancements. The ethical questions explored include parental responsibility, the use of people as means, the role of hope and fear in risk assessment, and the dignity and meaning of life. Taking as a starting point the arguments presented by Jonathan Glover, John Harris, Ronald M. Green, Jürgen Habermas, Michael J. Sandel, and Leon R. Kass, who defend a particular normative view as the only rational or moral answer, the author argues that many coherent rationalities and moralities exist in the field, and that to claim otherwise is mistaken. Features include: The book introduces only one main ethical consideration with the introduction of a new scientific or medical practice, allowing the reader to gain a thorough picture of the practice and of the nuances of the ethical argument; Each chapter begins with a one-sentence summary of its contents, giving the reader an orientation to the text ahead; Summaries bring all the ethical considerations together, helping the reader see what has been claimed in the book and how these claims have been supported; Separate introductions for genetic practices and philosophical considerations help the reader keep the different dimensions analytically separated. -- Provided by publisher Should we make people healthier, smarter, and longer-lived if genetic and medical advances enable us to do so? The author asks this question in the context of genetic testing and selection, cloning and stem cell research, gene therapies and enhancements. The ethical questions explored include parental responsibility, the use of people as means, the role of hope and fear in risk assessment, and the dignity and meaning of life. Taking as a starting point the arguments presented by Jonathan Glover, John Harris, Ronald M. Green, Jürgen Habermas, Michael J. Sandel, and Leon R. Kass, who defend a particular normative view as the only rational or moral answer, the author argues that many coherent rationalities and moralities exist in the field, and that to claim otherwise is mistaken. Features include: The book introduces only one main ethical consideration with the introduction of a new scientific or medical practice, allowing the reader to gain a thorough picture of the practice and of the nuances of the ethical argument; Each chapter begins with a one-sentence summary of its contents, giving the reader an orientation to the text ahead; Summaries bring all the ethical considerations together, helping the reader see what has been claimed in the book and how these claims have been supported; Separate introductions for genetic practices and philosophical considerations help the reader keep the different dimensions analytically separated.-- Résumé de l'éditeur

Should we make people healthier, smarter, and longer-lived if genetic and medical advances enable us to do so? Matti Häyry asks this question in the context of genetic testing and selection, cloning and stem cell research, gene therapies and enhancements. The ethical questions explored include parental responsibility, the use of people as means, the role of hope and fear in risk assessment, and the dignity and meaning of life. Taking as a starting point the arguments presented by Jonathan Glover, John Harris, Ronald M. Green, Jürgen Habermas, Michael J. Sandel, and Leon R. Kass, who defend a particular normative view as the only rational or moral answer, Matti Häyry argues that many coherent rationalities and moralities exist in the field, and that to claim otherwise is mistaken.

Machine generated contents note: 1. Seven ways of making people better; 2. Rational approaches to the genetic challenge; 3. The best babies and parental responsibility; 4. Deaf embryos, morality, and the law; 5. Saviour siblings and treating people as a means; 6. Reproductive cloning and designing human beings; 7. Embryonic stem cells, vulnerability, and sanctity; 8. Gene therapies, hopes, and fears; 9. Considerable life extension and the meaning of life; 10. Taking the genetic challenge rationally.