Putting Skeptics in their Place: The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and their Role in Philosophical Inquiry (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy)

This Book Is About The Nature Of Skeptical Arguments And Their Role In Philosophical Inquiry. John Greco Defends Three Theses: That A Number Of Historically Prominent Skeptical Arguments Make No Obvious Mistake And Therefore Cannot Be Easily Dismissed, That The Analysis Of Skeptical Arguments Is Philosophically Useful And Important And Should Therefore Have A Central Place In The Methodology Of Philosophy, And That Taking Skeptical Arguments Seriously Requires Us To Adopt An Externalist, Reliabilist Epistemology. This Book Will Be Of Interest To Professionals And Graduate Students In Epistemology And Moral Philosophy.--jacket. 1. The Nature Of Skeptical Arguments And Their Role In Philosophical Inquiry -- 2. Skepticism About The World: Part One -- Reconstructions -- 3. Skepticism About The World: Part Two -- Dismissive Responses -- 4. Skepticism About The World: Part Three -- Dualism, Realism, And Representationalism -- 5. The Argument From An Infinite Regress Of Reasons -- 6. Hume's Skepticism About Unobserved Matters Of Fact -- 7. Agent Reliabilism -- 8. Agent Reliabilism And The Relevant Sense Of Relevant Possibility -- 9. Moral And Religious Epistemology. John Greco. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 255-260) And Index. This book, first published in 2000, is about the nature of skeptical arguments and their role in philosophical inquiry. John Greco delineates three main theses: that a number of historically prominent skeptical arguments make no obvious mistake, and therefore cannot be easily dismissed; that the analysis of skeptical arguments is philosophically useful and important, and should therefore have a central place in the methodology of philosophy; and that taking skeptical arguments seriously requires us to adopt an externalist, reliabilist epistemology. Greco argues that the importance of skeptical arguments is methodological. It is further argued that taking skeptical arguments seriously requires us to adopt a version of 'virtue epistemology', or a theory of knowledge that makes intellectual virtue central in the analysis of knowledge. The above methodology has consequences for moral and religious epistemology; in particular, a theory of moral perception is defended This book is about the nature of skeptical arguments and their role in philosophical inquiry. John Greco delineates three main theses: that a number of historically prominent skeptical arguments make no obvious mistake, and therefore cannot be easily dismissed; that the analysis of skeptical arguments is philosophically useful and important, and should therefore have a central place in the methodology of philosophy; and that taking skeptical arguments seriously requires us to adopt an externalist, reliabilist epistemology. This book will be of interest to professionals and graduate students in epistemology and moral philosophy. This book has three major theses: (1) that a number of historically prominent skeptical arguments make no obvious mistake and therefore cannot be easily dismissed; (2) that the analysis of skeptical arguments is philosophically useful and important and sho This work is about the nature of skeptical arguments and their role in philosophical enquiry. John Greco argues that the importance of skeptical arguments lies in their methodology