Psychology and Value in Plato, Aristotle, and Hellenistic Philosophy : The Ninth Keeling Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy

Ancient Greek thought saw the birth, in Western philosophy, of the study now known as moral psychology. In its broadest sense, moral psychology encompasses the study of those aspects of human psychology relevant to our moral lives--desire, emotion, ethical knowledge, practical moral reasoning, and moral imagination--and their role in apprehending or responding to sources of value. This volume draws together contributions from leading international scholars in ancient philosophy, exploring central issues in the moral psychology of Plato, Aristotle, and the Hellenistic schools. Through a series of chapters and responses, these contributions challenge and develop interpretations of ancient views on topics from Socratic intellectualism to the nature of appetitive desires and their relation to goodness, from the role of pleasure and pain in virtue, to our capacities for memory, anticipation and choice and their role in practical action, to the question of the sufficiency or otherwise of the virtues for a flourishing human life. Cover Psychology and Value in Plato, Aristotle, and Hellenistic Philosophy: The Ninth Keeling Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy Copyright Dedication Contents Preface List of Contributors Keeling Colloquia List of Abbreviations 1. Psychology and Value in Ancient Greek Philosophy 1. Introduction 2. Intellectualism 3. Appetites 4. Pleasure and Pain 5. Virtue References 2. Intellectualism and the Method of Hypothesis in Plato’s Early Dialogues 1. The Aristotelian Reading 2. The Intellectualist Hypothesis 3. The Method of Hypothesis 4. Intellectualism: Consequences and Higher Hypotheses 5. Conclusions References 3. Comments on Rachel Barney, Intellectualism and the Method of Hypothesis in Plato’s Early Dialogues’ 1. Introduction 2. Aristotle and Socratic Intellectualism 3. What Is Socrates’ Doctrine? 4. Is Intellectualism Socrates’ Doctrine? 5. Two Types of Hypothetical Argument 6. The Role of the Intellectualist Hypothesis 7. Socratic Virtue References 4. Against Bare Urges and Good-Independent Desires: Appetites in Republic IV 1. Bare Urges? 2. Good-Independent Desires? References 5. The Blind Desires of Republic IV 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. References 6. Comments on Matthew Evans, ‘The Blind Desires of Republic IV’ and Jessica Moss, ‘Against Bare Urges and Good-Independent Desires: Appetites in Republic IV’ References 7. Plato on the Object of Thirst: Comments on Jessica Moss, ‘Against Bare Urges and Good-Independent Desires: Appetites in Republic IV’ 1. 2. 3. References 8. Courage and Pleasure in Aristotle’s Ethics 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. References 9 Comments on Raphael Woolf, ‘Courage and Pleasure in Aristotle’s Ethics’ References 10. Memory, Anticipation, Pleasure 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. References 11. Modelling the Memory and Anticipation of Pleasure: Comments on James Warren’s ‘Memory, Anticipation, Pleasure’ 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. References 12. Three Mistakes about Stoic Ethics 1. The Order of Explanation 2. The Self-sufficiency of Virtue 2.1 What is self-sufficiency? 2.2 What “participates” in virtue 2.3 Epictetus and self-sufficiency 3. Why the Stoics Make Virtue Sufficient for Happiness 3.1 The modern reconstruction 3.2 Cicero’s testimony 3.3 Epictetus’ argument 3.4 The significance of Epictetus’ argument 4. Conclusion References 13. Comments on Daniel C. Russell, ‘Three Mistakes about Stoic Ethics’ Index of Passages Cited General Index and Index of Names This volume draws together contributions from leading international scholars in ancient philosophy to explore central issues in the moral psychology of Plato, Aristotle, and the Hellenistic schools.