Propositional and Doxastic Justification: New Essays on Their Nature and Significance (Routledge Studies in Epistemology)
معرفی کتاب «Propositional and Doxastic Justification: New Essays on Their Nature and Significance (Routledge Studies in Epistemology)» نوشتهٔ Paul Silva (editor), Luis R G Oliveira (editor)، منتشرشده توسط نشر Routledge در سال 2022. این کتاب در فرمت pdf، زبان انگلیسی ارائه شده است.
This volume features original essays that advance debates on propositional and doxastic justification and explore how these debates shape and are shaped by a range of established and emerging topics in contemporary epistemology. This is the first book-length project devoted to the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification. Notably, the contributors cover the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification and group belief, credence, commitment, suspension, faith, and hope. They also consider state-of-the-art work on knowledge-first approaches to justification, hinge-epistemology, moral and practical reasons for belief, epistemic normativity, and applications of formal epistemology to traditional epistemological disputes. Finally, the contributors promise to reinvigorate old epistemological debates on coherentism, externalism, internalism, and phenomenal conservatism. __Propositional and Doxastic Justification__ will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in epistemology, metaethics, and normativity. This is the first book devoted to the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification. Its essays advance debates on propositional and doxastic justification and explore how such thinking shapes a range of established and emerging topics in contemporary epistemology. Cover 1 Half Title 2 Series Page 3 Title Page 4 Copyright Page 5 Dedication 6 Table of Contents 8 Contributors 10 Introduction 12 Part I: Foundational Questions 16 Chapter 1: The Plenitude of Justification and the Paucity of Knowledge 18 Varieties of Justification 19 Justification and Knowledge 21 Having Justification 22 Memory as a Source of Justification 25 Conceptual Conditions for Propositional Justification 29 Sources of Propositional Justification 30 The Indefinite Expandability of Justification and Knowledge 34 References 36 Chapter 2: Theoretical Unity and the Priority of Propositional Justification 38 Mapping the Epistemological Landscape 39 The Search for Fundamentality 41 Atomism and Propositionalism 45 Conclusion 49 References 49 Chapter 3: What Does Logic Have to do With Justified Belief?: Why Doxastic Justification is Fundamental 51 The Arguments-On-Paper Thesis 51 Justification as an Empirical Phenomena 53 Is There Empirical Support for the Arguments-On-Paper Thesis? 56 An Alternative Account 59 Why Have We Been Led Astray? 63 The Fundamentality of Doxastic Justification 66 References 67 Chapter 4: Justification Ex Ante and Ex Post : Why We Need Both Notions, and Why Neither is Reducible to the Other 70 What Does the Distinction Amount to? 71 Ex Ante Justification, and Regulating Our Attitudes and Actions 73 Ex Post Justification, and Explaining Attitudes and Actions 80 Conclusion 85 References 86 Part II: Reasons, Basing, and Justification 88 Chapter 5: Factive Reasons and Propositional Justification 90 The Classical Internalist Account of Justification 91 A Non-Classical Internalist Account of Justification 94 Explanatory Justification as a Positive Epistemic Standing 97 Defending Non-Classical Epistemic Internalism 100 Conclusion 104 References 105 Chapter 6: The Epistemic Function of Higher-Order Evidence 108 Evidential Defeat 110 Epistemic Conflicts 113 Unreasonable Knowledge 117 The Proper Basing Relation 120 Ideal and Non-Ideal Rationality 124 Conclusion 129 References 130 Chapter 7: Doxastic Justification and Creditworthiness 132 What is a Properly Based Belief? 135 An Interesting Rapprochement 139 Conclusion 140 References 141 Chapter 8: Does the Basing Demand on Doxastic Justification Have Any Dialectical Force?: A Response to Oliveira 142 References 148 Part III: Other Attitudes and Justification 150 Chapter 9: On Suspending Properly 152 Suspension and the Theory of Epistemic Justification: The Challenge and the Relegation Approach 153 Illustrations of the Challenge: Evidentialism and Early Virtue Epistemology 153 Evidentialism, Reasons for Suspending, and Ex Ante Justification 154 Early Virtue Epistemology, Reasons for Suspension, and Ex Post Justification 156 Suspension of Judgment, Evidence, and Respecting Reality 160 The Nature and Rational Profile of Suspension 160 The Diversity of Epistemic Reasons 162 Basing and Respect for Reality 163 Putting Things Together 168 The Epistemic and the Zetetic: A Reappraisal 169 References 171 Chapter 10: Propositional and Doxastic Hinge Assumptions 173 Propositional and Doxastic Hinge Assumptions 174 Assuming Doxastically – Three Varieties 178 Wright’s Objections 181 Conclusion 190 References 190 Chapter 11: On Behalf of Knowledge-First Collective Epistemology 192 Rejectionism 193 The Acceptance View 193 Problems for the Acceptance View 195 Social Distributive Views 198 Bird's Account 198 Palermos' Account 200 A Dilemma for Social Distributivism 201 Knowledge-First Collective Epistemology 202 Individual-First, Social-First, Knowledge-First 203 Knowledge-First Collective Belief Functionalism 205 Knowledge-First Collective Justification 207 Conclusion 209 References 209 Chapter 12: Faith, Hope, and Justification 212 The Nature of Faith and Hope 213 Belief, Faith, and Hope 214 Mental Fundamentality 217 Normative Questions 218 Propositional and Doxastic Justification 222 Conclusion 225 References 225 Part IV: New Horizons for Justification 228 Chapter 13: Doxastic Rationality 230 The “Basing” Account 231 Rationality as a Virtue 237 Degrees of Rational Virtue 241 Objections and Replies 245 A Further Advantage of this Account 248 References 250 Chapter 14: Intersubjective Propositional Justification 252 Ordinary Inferential Beliefs 255 Objective Propositional Justification 256 Mathematical Beliefs 258 Idealized Capacity Principle 261 Good Arguments That Are Not Ideally Good 265 Conclusion 271 References 272 Chapter 15: Knowledge-First Theories of Justification 274 First Response: Knowledge without Justification 275 Second Response: Evidence without Knowledge 277 On Neutrality 280 On Common Objects 284 Third Response: Knowledge and Being Justified without Evidence 289 References 295 Chapter 16: Epistemic Consent and Doxastic Justification 297 Attributability and Ownership 300 Constitutivism and Normativism 304 Consent and Authority 308 Epistemic Consent and Doxastic Justification 313 Conclusion 317 References 319 Index 324 Paul,Silva,Jr.;,Luis,Oliveira;,Hilary,Kornblith;,Duncan,Pritchard;,Clayton,Littlejohn;,Ralph,Wedgwood;,Rima,Basu;,Ram,Neta;,Annalisa,Coliva;,Errol,Lord;,Liz,Jackson;,Mona,Simion;,Lisa,Miracchi;,Robert,Audi;,Anne,Meylan;,epistemology;,justification;,justification,for,belief;,doxastic,justification;,propositional,justification;,belief;,phenomenal,conservatism;,coherentism;,subjective,bayesianism;,liberalism;,internalism;,externalism;,group,belief;,credence;,commitment;,suspension;,faith;,hope;,epistemic,normativity;,hinge-epistemology;,knowledge-first;,moral,belief;,awareness;,luck;,moral,encroachment;,basing,relation Paul Silva Jr.,Luis Oliveira,Hilary Kornblith,Duncan Pritchard,Clayton Littlejohn,Ralph Wedgwood,Rima Basu,Ram Neta,Annalisa Coliva,Errol Lord,Liz Jackson,Mona Simion,Lisa Miracchi,Robert Audi,Anne Meylan,epistemology,justification,justification for belief,doxastic justification,propositional justification,belief,phenomenal conservatism,coherentism,subjective bayesianism,liberalism,internalism,externalism,group belief,credence,commitment,suspension,faith,hope,epistemic normativity,hinge-epistemology,knowledge-first,moral belief,awareness,luck,moral encroachment,basing relation "This volume features original essays that advance debates on propositional and doxastic justification and explore how such thinking shapes and is shaped by a range of established and emerging topics in contemporary epistemology. This is the first book-length project devoted to the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification. Notably, the contributors cover the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification and group belief, credence, commitment, suspension, faith, and hope. They also consider state-of-the-art work on knowledge-first approaches to justification, hinge-epistemology, moral and practical reasons for belief, epistemic normativity, and applications of formal epistemology to traditional epistemological disputes. Finally, the contributors promise to reinvigorate old epistemological debates on coherentism, externalism, internalism, and phenomenal conservatism. Propositional and Doxastic Justification will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in epistemology, metaethics, and normativity"-- Provided by publisher
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