Property rights and managerial decisions in for -profit, non-profit and public organizations : ... comparative theory and policy

The author describes the property rights that exist in different organizational forms and explains how these establish incentives for managerial decision behaviour. She compares the rights, incentives, and corresponding decision behaviour in for-profit, nonprofit, and public organizations under conditions of unbounded rationality. She shows that managerial responses to regulation, tax, and industrial organization policies may differ from the usual predictions when property rights are considered. She also shows how property rights link economic and organization theory. Front Matter....Pages i-xi Introduction and Overview....Pages 1-9 Front Matter....Pages 11-11 The Economic Theory of Organizations: What It Is and What It Isn’t....Pages 13-26 Efficient Decisions in Organizations and Social Welfare....Pages 27-44 Property Rights, Incentives, and Organizations....Pages 45-57 Front Matter....Pages 59-59 Private For-profit Organizations: the Firm....Pages 61-78 Public Sector Organizations: the Bureau....Pages 79-92 Nonprofit Organizations....Pages 93-107 Comparative Organizational Structures and Managerial Decisions....Pages 108-125 Front Matter....Pages 127-127 Organizational Structure and Policy: Regulation and Taxation....Pages 129-147 Organizational Structure and Policy: Industrial Organization....Pages 148-163 Variations in Organizational Structures....Pages 164-181 Front Matter....Pages 183-183 Economic Theory of Organizations as a Social Science....Pages 185-198 Additional Issues in Economic Theory of Organizations....Pages 199-207 Back Matter....Pages 208-231 "In Property Rights and Managerial Decisions in For-profit, Nonprofit, and Public Organizations, Kathleen Carroll describes the property rights that exist in different organizational forms and explains how these establish incentives for managerial decision behaviour. She compares the rights, incentives, and corresponding decision behaviour in for-profit, nonprofit, and public organizations under conditions of unbounded and bounded rationality. She shows that managerial responses to regulation, tax, and industrial organization policies may differ from the usual predictions when property rights are considered. She also shows how property rights link economic and organization theory."--Jacket

The author describes the property rights that exist in different organizational forms and explains how these establish incentives for managerial decision behavior. She compares the rights, incentives, and corresponding decision behavior in for-profit, nonprofit, and public organizations under conditions of unbounded rationality. She shows that managerial responses to regulation, tax, and industrial organization policies may differ from the usual predictions when property rights are considered. She also shows how property rights link economic and organization theory.