Prolepsis and Ennoia in the Early Stoa (Sozomena Studies in the Recovery of Ancient Texts - Vol. 5)

This book offers a reconstruction of the early Stoic doctrine of prolepsis, revealing it to be much closer to Platonic recollection in certain respects than previously thought. The standard interpretation of prolepsis as preconceptions is inconsistent with their status as criteria of truth. Rather, prolepsis is a form of tacit knowledge that requires articulation and systematization. This reconstruction is supported by a comprehensive collection of texts relating to prolepsis from Epicurus to Alexander of Aphrodisias. Henry Dyson - Prolepsis and Ennoia in the Early Stoa (2009)......Page 1 Sozomena - Studies in the Recovery of Ancient Texts - Vol. 5......Page 3 ISBN: 9783110212280......Page 5 Acknowlegements......Page 6 Note on Translations......Page 8 Contents......Page 10 Introduction: The Seeds of Virtue and Knowledge......Page 16 1.1 Prolepsis......Page 35 1.2 Koinai Ennoiai......Page 39 1.3 The Underlying Doctrine......Page 42 1.4 Sandbach's Terminological Arguments......Page 45 1.5 Sandbach's Argument from Concept-Formation......Page 50 1.6 Additional Problems......Page 53 2.1 Prolepsis as a Criterion for Sensible Presentations......Page 57 2.2 Prolepsis as a Criterion for Non-Sensible Presentations......Page 64 2.3 Common Conceptions as Criteria of Truth......Page 67 3.1 The Meaning of Koine......Page 82 3.2 Prolepsis and Common Conceptions as Forms of Tacit Knowledge......Page 87 3.3 The Identity of Prolepses and Common Conceptions......Page 94 Interim Conclusions: Meno's Paradox and the Early Stoa......Page 106 4.1 The Problem of Induction......Page 114 4.2 The Epicurean Account of Concept-Formation......Page 118 4.3 Stoic Accounts of Concept-Formation......Page 122 4.4 Implications of the Chrysippean Account......Page 136 5.1 Two Functions of Prolepsis in Ordinary Cognition......Page 144 5.2 Prolepsis and Recognition......Page 147 5.3 Prolepsis and Inferential Thought......Page 153 5.4 Prolepsis and Socratic Intellectualism......Page 162 5.5 Prolepsis and Stoic Dialectic......Page 167 Conclusion: Are the Stoics Empiricists or Rationalists ?......Page 179 Tables: The Usage of Prolepsis, Ennoia and Related Terms......Page 186 Appendix A: Epicurus and Later Epicureans......Page 197 Appendix B: The Early Stoa......Page 206 Appendix C: Cicero and Seneca......Page 215 Appendix D: Epictetus......Page 227 Appendix E: Plutarch......Page 242 Appendix F: Sextus Empiricus......Page 261 Appendix G: Alexander of Aphradisias......Page 278 Appendix H: Alcinous......Page 284 Bibliography......Page 287 This book reconstructs the Stoic doctrine of prolepsis. Prolepses are conceptions that develop naturally from ordinary experience. They are often identified with preconceptions (i.e. the first conceptions one unconsciously forms of something). However, this is inconsistent with the Stoics'claim that prolepseis are criteria of truth. Rather, prolepseis are analytically true claims embedded within one's ordinary conceptual scheme (e.g. the good is beneficial). When they have been articulated and systematized, prolepseis can be used to judge conceptual claims that go beyond the scope of sense-perceptual knowledge (e.g. pleasure is the good). The Stoics often refer to prolepseis as “common conceptions” to emphasize that they are shared by everyone, although in most people they remain unarticulated. This reconstruction suggests that Chrysippus was influenced by Platonic recollection to a greater extent than previously recognized. It supports the orthodoxy of Epictetus'statements about prolepsis and suggests that later authors who assimilate the Epicurean and Stoic doctrines were misled by the polemical attacks of Carneades. The argument of the book is supported by a comprehensive collection of fragments relating to prolepsis in Epicurus, the early Stoa, Cicero, Epictetus, Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, and Alexander of Aphrodisias. Introduction: The seeds of virtue and knowledge Are Prolepses and common conceptions identical? Prolepsis The common conceptions The underlying doctrine Sandbach's terminological arguments Sandbach's argument from concept-formation Additional problems Prolepsis and common conception as criteria of truth Prolepsis as a criterion for sensible presentations Prolepsis as a criterion for non-sensible presentations Common conceptions as criteria of truth Stages in the development of reason The meaning of Joima Prolepsis and common conception as forms of tacit knowledge The identity of Prolepsis and common conception The formation of Prolepses The problem of induction The Epicurean account of concept-formation Stoic accounts of concept-formation Implications of the Chrysippean account Prolepsis in ordinary and philosophical cognition Functions of prolepsis in ordinary cognition Prolepsis and recognition Prolepsis and inferential thought Prolepsis and socratic intellectualism Prolepsis and stoic dialectic Appendices A-H. Main description: This book offers a reconstruction of the early Stoic doctrine of prolepsis, revealing it to be much closer to Platonic recollection in certain respects than previously thought. The standard interpretation of prolepsis as preconceptions is inconsistent with their status as criteria of truth. Rather, prolepsis is a form of tacit knowledge that requires articulation and systematization. This reconstruction is supported by a comprehensive collection of texts relating to prolepsis from Epicurus to Alexander of Aphrodisias Offers a reconstruction of the early Stoic doctrine of prolepsis, revealing it to be much closer to Platonic recollection in certain respects than previously thought. This book features a collection of texts relating to prolepsis from Epicurus to Alexander of Aphrodisias.