Problems of mind: Descartes to Wittgenstein (Essays in philosophy)

First published in 1972, __Problems of Mind__ begins with a consideration of the view that the human mind is an immaterial thing that does not require corporeal embodiment for its operations. It takes up the conception that "inner experiences" are "strictly identical" with brain processes. The book also deals exclusively with the doctrine called "Logical Behaviourism", which will always possess a compelling attraction for anyone who is perplexed by the psychological concepts, who has become aware of the worthlessness of an appeal to introspection as an account of how we learn those concepts, and who has no inclination to identify mind with brain. The three most plausible theories of mind-body dualism, mind-brain monism, and behaviourism are all rejected, and nothing is set forth as the true theory. Norman Malcolm states that this is 'only a drop in the bucket. It will serve its purpose if it leads the reader into the writings of Wittgenstein, who is easily the most important figure in the philosophy of mind.’ __Problems of Mind__ will be an essential read for scholars and researchers of philosophy of mind, ethics, logic, and philosophy in general. First published in 1972, Problems of Mind begins with a consideration of the view that the human mind is an immaterial thing that does not require corporeal embodiment for its operations. It takes up the conception that "inner experiences" are "strictly Cover 1 Title Page 4 Copyright Page 5 Original Title Page 6 Original Copyright Page 7 Preface 8 I: Mind and Body 16 1: A Mysterious Union 16 2: Cartesian Dualism 17 3: Impressions and Ideas 23 4: Ideas as the Mind’s Immediate Objects 25 5: Words and Ideas 27 6: Inner Ostensive Definition 30 7: Inferring the Existence of Other Minds 31 8: Solipsism 38 9: The Living Human Being 43 10: Obtaining Concepts by Introspection 46 11: Tangible and Intangible Mental Phenomena 51 12: Using a Picture 54 13: Knowing What Pain Is 59 14: The Man Who Has Never Felt Pain 61 15: A Comparison with Blindness 63 16: Ostensive Definition Revisited 65 17: Getting Rid of the Private Object 71 II: Materialism 75 18: Minds and Brains 75 19: Contingent Identity 80 20: Conceptual Revision 86 21: The Brain as the Subject of Experience 88 22: Direct and Private Access 92 III: Logical Behaviorism 95 23: The Rejection of Introspection 95 24: The Asymmetry in Mental Concepts 97 25: The Asymmetry as Implying Two Senses of Mental Terms 102 26: Attitudes Toward Persons 106 Mind,Body,Materialism,Logical Behaviorism First published in 1972, Problems of Mind begins with a consideration of the view that the human mind is an immaterial thing that does not require corporeal embodiment for its operations. It goes on to reject theories of mind-body dualism, mind-brain monism, and behaviourism and leads the readers into the writings of Wittgenstein.