Problems from Reid

James Van Cleve here shows why Thomas Reid (1710-96) deserves a place alongside the other canonical figures of modern philosophy. He expounds Reid's positions and arguments on a wide range of topics, taking interpretive stands on points where his meaning is disputed and assessing the value of his contributions to issues philosophers are discussing today. Among the topics Van Cleve explores are Reid's account of perception and its relation to sensation, conception, and belief; his nativist account of the origin of the concepts of space and power; his attempt to clear the way for the belief that the things we directly perceive are external things, not ideas in our minds; his stand on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities; his account of "acquired perception," whereby we come to stand in a quasi-perceptual relation to qualities not originally perceived; his claim that visual space is non-Euclidean; his answers to the questions why we see the world right side up with inverted retinal images and whether a newly sighted person would recognize by sight the shapes he previously knew by touch; whether memory, like perception, is a form of direct awareness; and how we manage to conceive of things that are utterly nonexistent. Also examined are Reid's account of human knowledge by means of "first principles," his externalist reply to philosophical skepticism, his volitional theory of action, his use of the distinction between event causation and agent causation to understand freedom of the will, and his criticism of Hume and anticipation of Moore on the analysis of moral judgment. The most comprehensive work on Reid in a quarter century, this book will be welcomed by students of early modern philosophy, epistemology, the philosophy of perception, and the philosophy of action. Problems from Reid 4 Contents 8 Preface 14 Acknowledgments 16 Introduction 18 1. Sensation and Perception 22 A. Explanations of Terms 22 B. Sensation versus Perception 26 C. Reid鈥檚 Threefold Account of Perception 29 D. The Conception in Perception 32 E. Perception and Belief 36 F. Consciousness and Attention 39 G. Are Sensations Self-Reflexive? 42 2. Reid鈥檚 Nativism 51 A. Reid鈥檚 Nativism 51 B. Natural Signs 53 C. The Experimentum Crucis 56 D. Responses to the Experimentum Crucis 62 E. Woulds, Coulds, or Shoulds? 67 F. Nativism as an Antidote to Skepticism 70 3. Direct Realism versus the Way of Ideas 74 A. The Way of Ideas 75 B. First Argument for the Way of Ideas: No Action at a Distance 78 C. Second Argument for the Way of Ideas: Hume鈥檚 Table Argument 82 D. Third Argument for the Way of Ideas: Double Vision 86 E. Fourth Argument for the Way of Ideas: Malebranche鈥檚 Master Argument 92 F. Three Forms of Direct Realism 98 G. Do Sensations Obstruct Direct Perception? 101 H. Is Reid a Presentational Direct Realist? 107 I. All Perception Is Direct Perception 111 4. Primary and Secondary Qualities 116 A. Reid鈥檚 Relation to Locke and Berkeley 116 B. The Real Foundation: Epistemological or Metaphysical? 119 C. Dispositions or Bases? 120 D. Intrinsic or Extrinsic? 127 E. Fixed or Variable? 129 F. Four Views that Conflict with Reid鈥檚 132 5. Acquired Perception 144 A. The Mechanics of Acquired Perception 145 B. Is Acquired Perception Really Perception? 148 C. Are Secondary Qualities Objects of Acquired Perception Only? 159 D. Does Acquired Perception Alter the Content of Our Original Perceptions? 162 E. Could Anything Become an Object of Acquired Perception? 166 F. Is Reid Inconsistent about the Requisites of Perception? 169 6. The Geometry of Visibles 175 A. The Properties of Spherical Figures 176 B. Depth Is Not Perceived 178 C. The Argument from Indistinguishability 180 D. Visibles as Sense Data 183 E. Coincidence as Identity 185 F. Angell鈥檚 Approach 187 G. The Argument of Paragraph 4 190 H. The Real Basis of the Geometry of Visibles 193 I. Does the Geometry of Visibles Jeopardize Direct Realism? 200 J. What Are Visibles? 201 K. Direct Realism and Seeing What We Touch 204 L. Visible Figure as a Relativized Property of Ordinary Objects 206 M. Mediated but Direct? 210 7. Erect and Inverted Vision 213 A. The Na茂ve Puzzle and Rock鈥檚 Question 213 B. The Classical Solution 215 C. Berkeley鈥檚 Solution(s) to the Na茂ve Puzzle 216 D. Reid鈥檚 Alternative to Berkeley鈥檚 Solution 220 E. Answers to Rock鈥檚 Question 226 F. Experiments with Inverting Lenses 228 G. Perceptual Adaptation 232 8. Molyneux鈥檚 Question 235 A. Molyneux鈥檚 Question 235 B. Empirical Evidence 239 C. Berkeley鈥檚 Answer 242 D. Reid鈥檚 Answer(s) 243 E. Is Berkeley鈥檚 Modus Tollens Reid鈥檚 Modus Ponens? 249 F. The One-Two Molyneux Question 252 G. Concluding Confession 254 9. Memory and Personal Identity 256 A. Things Obvious and Certain with Regard to Memory 256 B. Critique of the Impression and Idea Theories of Memory 261 C. Memory as Direct Awareness of Things Past 265 D. The Specious Present 269 E. Personal Identity 273 10. Conception and Its Objects 280 A. Was Reid a Meinongian before Meinong? 282 B. Alternatives to Meinongism: Ideas and Universal 288 C. Alternatives to Meinongism: The Adverbial Theory of Thinking 293 D. A Meinongian Defense of Direct Realism 300 E. Assessment of the Defense 307 F. Direct Realism Redux 314 11. Epistemology 1: First Principles 318 A. First Principles and Epistemic Principles 320 B. A Crucial Ambiguity 321 C. Clues from Reid鈥檚 Discussion of Descartes 324 D. Particulars versus Generals 325 E. Three Reasons for Particularism 326 F. Other Minds and Natural Signs 328 G. Must Principles Be General? 329 H. Establishing Reliability without Circularity 330 I. Reid on Confirming the Testimony of Our Faculties 335 J. Can Epistemic Principles Be First Principles? 336 K. The Epistemic Status of Reliability Principles 342 L. Conclusion 343 12. Epistemology 2: Reid鈥檚 Response to the Skeptic 344 A. Direct Realism 345 B. Naturalism 349 C. Externalism 354 D. Problems for Externalism 360 E. Rationalist Alternatives 364 F. Conclusion 369 13. Epistemology 3: Lehrer鈥檚 371 A. Must a Knower Know that his Faculties are Reliable? 371 B. A Special Role for Principle 7? 375 C. Faculties that Vouch for Themselves? 379 14. Theory of Action 1: Causation, Action, and Volition 384 A. The Notion of Active Power 384 B. Two Types of Causation 393 C. Universal Agent Causation 397 D. Action and Volition 403 15. Theory of Action 2: Determinism, Freedom, and Agency 418 A. Two Forms of Determinism 418 B. What Freedom Is Not: The Williwig Account 423 C. What Freedom Is: The Agent-Causation Account 430 D. The Fundamental Dilemma for Libertarianism 437 E. The Regress of Exertion 439 F. The Regress of Agent Causation 443 G. Anomic Explanation 450 16. Reid versus Hume on Morals 458 A. Hume and Reid in the Broad Scheme of Things 458 B. Reid against Hume 463 C. Hume against Reid 469 D. Ethics and Epistemology 472 Appendices 478 A. Is There Knowledge by Acquaintance? 478 B. Conception and Judgment: The Chicken or the Egg? 480 C. Experience as a Source of Concepts 482 D. Perception as Analog Representation 484 E. Byrne versus Reid 485 F. Infinity and Reflexivity 487 G. Programming the Obvious 489 H. The Sun in the Sky and the Sun in My Mind or Why Arnauld Is Not Steadfastly a Direct Realist 491 I. Secondary Qualities: Can We Have It Both Ways? 495 J. The One-Point Argument 498 K. Stereo Sue 500 L. Hyperbolic Claims About Hyperbolic Geometry 503 M. What Is Special About the Sphere? 504 N. Is Reid鈥檚 Geometry Imaginable? 507 O. Forlorn Reflections 510 P. Ask Marilyn 513 Q. Stratton Overturned 514 R. A Clash Between Two Reidian Laws 515 S. Molyneux鈥檚 Question Answered After 300 Years? 518 T. Relative Identity 519 U. Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Reid on Abstract Ideas 521 V. The First Principles of Contingent Truths 522 W. Reid on the First Principle(s) of Descartes 523 X. Rowe鈥檚 Regress 525 Y. Volition and Undertaking 527 Z. Reid, Chisholm, Taylor, and Ginet 530 Works Cited 532 1. Works by Reid and Other Classical Authors through Mill 532 2. Works by More Recent Authors 534 Index 550 Acknowledgments Introduction Chapter 1: Sensation and Perception A. Explanations of Terms B. Sensation versus Perception C. Reid's Threefold Account of Perception D The Conception in Perception E. Perception and Belief F. Consciousness and Attention G. Are Sensations Self-Reflexive? Chapter 2: Reid's Nativism A. Reid's Nativism B. Natural Signs C. The Experimentum Crucis D. Responses to the Experimentum Crucis E. Woulds, Coulds, or Shoulds? F. Nativism as an Antidote to Skepticism? Chapter 3: Direct Realism Versus the Way of Ideas A. The Way of Ideas B. First Argument for the Way of Ideas: No Action at a Distance C. Second Argument for the Way of Ideas: Hume's Table Argument D. Third Argument for the Way of Ideas: Double Vision E. Fourth Argument for the Way of Ideas: Malebranche's Master Argument F. Three Forms of Direct Realism G. Do Sensations Obstruct Direct Realism? H. Is Reid a Presentational Direct Realist? I. All Perception is Direct Perception Chapter 4: Primary and Secondary Qualities A. Reid's Relation to Locke and Berkeley B. The Real Foundation: Epistemological or Metaphysical? C. Dispositions or Bases? D. Intrinsic or Extrinsic? E. Fixed or Variable? F. Four Views that Conflict with Reid's Chapter 5: Acquired Perception A. The Mechanics of Acquired Perception B. Is Acquired Perception Really Perception? C. Are Secondary Qualities Objects of Acquired Perception Only? D. Does Acquired Perception Alter the Content of our Original Perceptions? E. Could Anything Become an Object of Acquired Perception? F. Is Reid Inconsistent about the Requisites of Perception? Chapter 6: The Geometry of Visibles A. The Properties of Spherical Figures B. Depth is Not Perceived C. The Argument from Indistinguishability D. Visibles as Sense Data E. Coincidence as Identity F. Angell's Approach G. The Argument of Paragraph 4 H. The Real Basis of the Geometry of Visibles I. Does the Geometry of Visibles Jeopardize Direct Realism? J. What Are Visibles? K. Direct Realism and Seeing What we Touch L. Visible Figure as a Relativized Property of Ordinary Objects M. Mediated but Direct? Chapter 7: Erect and Inverted Vision A. The Naive Puzzle and Rock's Question B. The Classical Solution C. Berkeley's Solution(s) to the Naive Puzzle D. Reid's Alternative to Berkeley's Solution E. Answers to Rock's Question F. Experiments with Inverting Lenses G. Perceptual Adaptation Chapter 8: Molyneux's Question A. Molyneux's Question B. Empirical Evidence C. Berkeley's Answer D. Reid's answer(s) E. Is Berkeley's Modus Tollens Reid's Modus Ponens? F. The One-Two Molyneux Question G. Concluding Confession Chapter 9: Memory and Personal Identity A. Things Obvious and Certain with Regard to Memory B. Critique of the Impression and Idea Theories of Memory C. Memory as Direct Awareness of Things Past D. The Specious Present E. Personal Identity Chapter 10: Conception and its Objects A. Was Reid a Meinongian before Meinong? B. Alternatives to Meinongism: Ideas and Universals C. Alternatives to Meinongism: The Adverbial Theory of Thinking D. A Meinongian Defense of Direct Realism E. Assessment of the Defense F. Direct Realism Redux Chapter 11: Epistemology 1: First Principles A. First Principles and Epistemic Principles B. A Crucial Ambiguity C. Clues from Reid's Discussion of Descartes D. Particulars Versus Generals E. Three Reasons for Particularism F. Other Minds and Natural Signs G. Must Principles Be General? H. Establishing Reliability Without Circularity I. Reid on Confirming the Testimony of our Faculties J. Can Epistemic Principles Be First Principles? K. The Epistemic Status of Reliability Principles L. Conclusion Chapter 12: Epistemology 2: Reid's Response to the Skeptic A. Direct Realism B. Naturalism C. Externalism D. Problems for Externalism E. Rationalist Alternatives F. Conclusion Chapter 13: Epistemology 3: Lehrer's Reid A. Must a Knower Know that his Faculties are Reliable? B. A Special Role for Principle 7? C. Faculties that Vouch for Themselves? Chapter 14: Theory of Action 1: Causation, Action, and Volition A. The Notion of Active Power B. Two Types of Causation C. Universal Agent Causation D. Action and Volition Chapter 15: Theory of Action 2: Determinism, Freedom, and Agency A. Two Forms of Determinism B. What Freedom is not: the Williwig Account C. What Freedom is: the Agent-Causation Account D. The Fundamental Dilemma for Libertarianism E. The Regress of Exertion F. The Regress of Agent Causation G. Anomic Explanation Chapter 16: Reid versus Hume on Morals A. Hume and Reid in the Broad Scheme of Things B. Reid against Hume C. Hume against Reid D. Ethics and Epistemology Appendices A. Is There Knowledge by Acquaintance? B. Conception and Judgment: the Chicken or the Egg? C. Experience as a Source of Concepts D. Perception as Analog Representation E. Byrne versus Reid F. Infinity and Reflexivity G. Externality and Extension H. Programming the Obvious I. The Sun in the Sky and the Sun in my Mind J. Secondary Qualities: Can We Have it Both Ways? K. The One-Point Argument L. Stereo Sue M. Hyperbolic Claims about Hyperbolic Geometry N. What Is Special about the Sphere? O. Is Reid's Geometry Imaginable? P. Forlorn Reflections Q. Ask Marilyn R. Stratton Overturned S. Molyneux's Question Answered after 300 Years? T. Relative Identity U. Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Reid on Abstract Ideas V. The First Principles of Contingent Truths W. Reid on the First Principle(s) of Descartes X. Rowe's Regress Y. Volition and Undertaking Z. Reid, Chisholm, Taylor, and Ginet Bibliography Index A Contemporary Of Hume, Thomas Reid Is Especially Known Today For His Opposition To Skepticism And The Way Of Ideas (the Notion That What The Mind Perceives Is Not Objective Reality, But Simply An Internal Image). Reid Was One Of The First To Question This View, Which Is Still Prevalent Today, And Pointed Out Some Of The Negative Consequences To Which It Leads. For The Growing Recognition About These And Other Contributions In Epistemology, Theory Of Action, And Moral Theory, Reid Has Increasingly Attracted Attention In Anglo-american Philosophy Over The Last Twenty Years-- Introduction -- 1. Sensation And Perception -- 2. Reid's Nativism -- A. Reid's Nativism -- 3. Direct Realism Versus The Way Of Ideas -- 4. Primary And Secondary Qualities -- 5. Acquired Perception -- 6. The Geometry Of Visibles -- 7. Erect And Inverted Vision -- 8. Molyneux's Question -- 9. Memory And Personal Identity -- 10. Conception And Its Objects -- 11. Epistemology 1: First Principles -- 12. Epistemology 2: Reid's Response To The Skeptic -- 13. Epistemology 3: Lehrer's Reid -- 14. 14: Theory Of Action 1: Causation, Action, And Volition -- 15. Theory Of Action 2: Determinism, Freedom, And Agency -- 16. Reid Versus Hume On Morals -- Appendices. James Van Cleve. Includes Bibliographical References (pages 515-532) And Index. In this systematic study, James Van Cleve expounds Thomas Reid's positions and arguments on topics in the philosophy of perception, knowledge, and action, taking interpretive stands on points where his meaning is disputed and assessing the extent to which his ideas make valuable contributions to issues philosophers are discussing today.